Date
March 4, 2007
Location
United States
Industry
Energy
Access vector
Not applicable
OT targeting
None
Primary peril
Mechanical Breakdown
Impact duration
About 3 minutes

Aurora generator test at Idaho National Laboratory, 2007

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Aurora generator test at Idaho National Laboratory, 2007

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On March 4, 2007, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), working for the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), repeatedly opened and reclosed the breaker of a large diesel generator out of phase with the grid until the machine tore itself apart[1][2]. DHS documents released in 2014 record “a total loss of generating capability with extensive damage to equipment in just three minutes”[3]. It was a consented test on a government test asset, not an attack.

        Why it matters. It is the clearest public demonstration that control of a breaker is control of the machine behind it: a command, with no fire and no release, ended in a destroyed asset[4][3].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Because this was a test, several stages have no attacker to describe and are marked not applicable, and the relay mechanism rests on a single retrospective account. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Control Engineering says the team reprogrammed the generator’s synchronism and phase-imbalance protective relays to open and close its breaker at random, and that on the third and fourth runs the engine and generator “essentially tore themselves apart”[2].
        • DHS described the work to CNN as “controlled hacking into a replica of a power plant’s control system”, and CNN published the test video on September 26, 2007[4].
        • The DHS documents, released by mistake in 2014 in reply to a request about an unrelated “Operation Aurora”, record a total loss in about three minutes. The $2.8 million they mention is what DHS spent on the test, not the value of the machine[3][5].
        • The response was engineering: NERC alerted industry in June 2007 and issued an AURORA recommendation in October 2010[6].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Not applicable [not in path | Consented test, no attacker]
        • Threat actors: Not applicable [not in path | Government test team]
        • Access vector: Not applicable [not in path | No compromise]
        • IT impact: Not in path [not in path | No IT stage]
        • OT targeting: None [not in path | Consented test, no victim]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No attacker]
        • OT impact: Manipulate Control [confirmed | T0831]; Loss of Protection [reported | T0837]
        • Perils: Mechanical Breakdown [primary]; Overheating [reported | Burned windings]
        • Financial losses: Assets & Equipment [confirmed]

        What happened

        The Aurora vulnerability is a property of any rotating machine tied to a grid. A generator’s breaker opens and the machine drifts out of phase; the breaker closes again and the grid drags the rotor back into step by force. Protective relays usually prevent that. Done deliberately and repeatedly, with the protection reprogrammed, the torque destroys the coupling and the shaft.

        INL’s team did exactly that on its own test bed, for the DHS Control Systems Security Program, and filmed it. Control Engineering’s retrospective says the team bought a 2.25 MW, 27-ton diesel generator from surplus, built a facility for it, and reprogrammed its synchronism and phase-imbalance protective relays to open and close the breaker at random. The test lasted three minutes, and on the third and fourth runs the engine and generator “essentially tore themselves apart”[2]. The date, March 4, 2007, comes from Joe Weiss; CNN and AP say only “March”[1][4][7].

        CNN published the film on September 26, 2007, and AP ran its own story the next day, reporting that INL produced the video for DHS and that simulated hackers triggered commands[4][7]. The program documents, about 840 pages, reached the public in July 2014, when DHS sent them in reply to a MuckRock request about the unrelated Operation Aurora espionage campaign[8][5][9].

        Intent: not applicable, a consented test

        There was no attacker and no victim. A government test team worked on a government-owned test asset for DHS[7][4]. Robert Jamison, DHS acting undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate, told CNN: “there is no threat, there is no indication that anybody is trying to take advantage of this individual vulnerability”[4]. The purpose was to demonstrate a vulnerability, which is neither malicious nor accidental, so this stage is marked not applicable.

        Threat actors: none

        No threat actor was involved. The team that changed the settings was INL’s own, working for the DHS Control Systems Security Program[7]. Anyone citing Aurora as a cyberattack is citing the vulnerability, not this event. No threat actor is highlighted on the map.

        Access vector: not applicable

        There was no compromise to get into. DHS described the work as “controlled hacking into a replica of a power plant’s control system”[4], but the team had full access to its own test bed. How the new relay settings were loaded is not described in any DHS or INL text that could be read, and the released file itself could not be opened for this analysis[9]. This stage is marked not applicable.

        IT impact: no IT stage

        The test was OT-native. No corporate network, workstation or server stood between the team and the generator’s protective relays, and no IT technique is involved[2]. The lesson of the test lies entirely on the plant side: whoever holds the breaker holds the machine. This stage is marked Not in path.

        OT targeting: none, because there was no target

        The test acted directly on the generator’s protection and breaker, and in a real attack that would be a direct OT compromise. Here it is marked None, because there was no victim and no attacker: it was a consented test on a laboratory asset[7]. The value records the absence of a target, not the absence of an effect on OT.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        Sophistication is graded for an attacker’s technique, and there was no attacker. What the test needed was knowledge of the machine’s protection: the relays meant to stop an out-of-phase closure were the ones set to cause it[2]. One controlled demonstration shows what is possible, not how often a real attacker could reproduce it. This stage is marked not applicable.

        OT impact: control taken, protection turned around

        The manipulation of control is confirmed by DHS. It acknowledged hacking in which researchers “changed the operating cycle of the generator, sending it out of control”, and the video INL produced for DHS shows simulated hackers triggering commands[4][7]. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms that is Manipulation of Control, shown as Manipulate Control.

        The mechanism rests on one source. Control Engineering says the synchronism and phase-imbalance protective relays were reprogrammed to open and close the breaker at random[2]. That is Modify Parameter and, because the relays whose job is to block an out-of-phase closure were the ones made to cause it, Loss of Protection. No DHS or INL text that could be read states the mechanism, so Loss of Protection is shown as reported.

        Whoever holds the breaker holds the machine behind it.

        Perils: mechanical breakdown, and reported overheating

        The primary peril is mechanical breakdown: the out-of-phase closures tore the engine-generator apart from inside. Control Engineering says the rubber coupling between engine and generator deteriorated and the engine shaft twisted and struck the crankcase[2], and the DHS documents record a total loss of generating capability[3]. The video shows the machine shaking, smoking and stopping[4][7].

        Overheating is reported, not established. Control Engineering says a postmortem found the windings melted and burned, and no DHS or INL source read confirms it[2]. No source reports smoke damage or confirms electrical arcing in this test.

        Financial losses: a destroyed machine, unpriced

        No cost was ever published for the generator. The only dollar figure found is that DHS “spent some $2.8 million on the test”[3]; that is the cost of running the test, not the value of the machine, and it is not counted as a loss. No source says whether INL replaced the unit or retired the wreck. The generator served no load, so there was no lost output.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Equipment repair and replacement (a 2.25 MW, 27-ton diesel generator destroyed, unpriced)
        • Not supported: Direct business interruption; Third-party physical and societal impact; Regulatory action or liability; Reputation damage; Data loss

        What this incident shows

        Aurora is the reference case for a command, and nothing else, producing the mechanical failure of heavy rotating plant. Its cause is known exactly, and its consequence was a wrecked machine, on film[4][3]. It shows what is possible, not what is likely: it was one controlled demonstration, with no adversary.

        The response was engineering, not law enforcement. NERC first alerted industry on June 21, 2007, and in October 2010 issued an AURORA recommendation, requiring affected entities to report mitigation progress by December 13 and every six months after[6]. That the consequence could be engineered out after the test suggests it could have been engineered out before: a breaker that cannot be reclosed out of phase, whatever it is told, would have prevented it.

        References

        1. Weiss, Joe. “One reason why we need regulation.” Control Global (Unfettered blog), 18 Dec. 2008. controlglobal.com/blogs/unfettered/one-reason-why-we-need-regulation
        2. Capano, Daniel E. “Throwback Attack: Lessons From the Aurora Vulnerability.” Control Engineering, undated. controleng.com/throwback-attack-lessons-from-the-aurora-vulnerability/
        3. Vijayan, Jaikumar. “New docs show DHS was more worried about critical infrastructure flaw in ’07 than it let on.” Computerworld, via CSO Online, 9 July 2014. csoonline.com/article/2452545/new-docs-show-dhs-was-more-worried-about-critical-infrastructure-flaw-in-07-than-it-let.html
        4. “Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid.” CNN, 26 Sept. 2007. cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/
        5. Fisher, Dennis. “DHS Releases Hundreds of Documents on Wrong Aurora Project.” Threatpost, 9 July 2014. threatpost.com/dhs-releases-hundreds-of-documents-on-wrong-aurora-project/107107
        6. “NERC Issues AURORA Vulnerability Guidelines.” POWER Magazine, 20 Oct. 2010. powermag.com/nerc-issues-aurora-vulnerability-guidelines/
        7. Bridis, Ted, and Eileen Sullivan. “US video shows simulated hacker attack.” Associated Press, 27 Sept. 2007, as reposted on attrition.org. attrition.org/pipermail/infowarrior/2007-September/002034.html
        8. “DHS Mistakenly Releases 840-Pages of Critical Infrastructure Documents Via Mishandled FOIA Request.” SecurityWeek, 8 July 2014. securityweek.com/dhs-mistakenly-releases-840-pages-critical-infrastructure-documents-mishandled-foia-request/
        9. MuckRock. “Operation Aurora.” FOIA request 2014-HQFO-00514, filed 17 May 2014. muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/operation-aurora-11765/