Date
May – June 2008
Location
United States
Industry
Energy
Access vector
Credential Theft
OT targeting
Direct
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
Unknown

Pacific Energy Resources offshore leak detection sabotage, 2008

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Pacific Energy Resources offshore leak detection sabotage, 2008

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. In May and June 2008, a former IT contractor illegally accessed the computer system Pacific Energy Resources (PER) used to communicate with its offshore oil platforms and for leak detection, according to the US Department of Justice[1]. PER temporarily lost use of the system; DOJ says no oil leak or environmental harm resulted[1].

        Why it matters. An insider reached an OT monitoring system after his engagement ended, with no exploit, malware or outside intrusion alleged[1]. The likeliest gap is the removal of a departing contractor’s access, not any technical defense.

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. DOJ’s account is brief: how he got in, how long the outage lasted and what sentence followed are not established. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Mario Azar, 28, had helped set up the system as a contractor. DOJ says he accessed it after PER declined to offer him permanent employment[1].
        • Press reports of his plea say court documents show he had established multiple user accounts on the system; no source says he used them to get back in[2][3].
        • DOJ: “While PER temporarily lost use of its computer systems as result of Azar’s conduct, the outage did not lead to any oil leaks or environmental harm”[1].
        • He pleaded guilty on September 14, 2009 to one felony count of intentionally damaging a computer system used in interstate and foreign commerce[3][2].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed | guilty plea]
        • Threat actors: Disgruntled Insider [confirmed | former contractor]
        • Access vector: Credential Theft [reported | T1078, accounts he had set up]
        • IT impact: System Outage [confirmed | PER lost use of its systems]; Data Sabotage [reported | per the indictment]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: None [not in path | Nothing described required sophistication]
        • OT impact: Loss / Denial of View [inferred | T0815]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No leak or environmental harm, per DOJ]
        • Financial losses: Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | no amount]

        What happened

        Azar, of Upland, California, was an IT consultant under contract to PER, a Long Beach company that operated offshore oil platforms, until May 2008. He helped set up a system PER “used to communicate between its offices and its oil platforms”, which “also served a ‘leak detection’ function”[1]. The Register reported that he worked until about May 8, 2008, when he received his final paycheck[2].

        DOJ says that “During May and June of 2008, Azar illegally accessed the PER computer system” and, according to the indictment, “caused damage by impairing the integrity and availability of data”. PER temporarily lost use of its computer systems as a result[1]. A Los Angeles grand jury returned the indictment, which DOJ announced on March 17, 2009[4][1]. He was charged with one count of unauthorized impairment of a protected computer, carrying a ten-year maximum[1].

        He pleaded guilty on September 14, 2009, and sentencing was set for December 7, 2009[3][5][2]. No DOJ or court document on the sentence has been located. RISI, an incident aggregator, reports an April 2010 sentence of five years’ probation and $50,000 restitution, citing no court record[6]; this analysis does not rely on it.

        Intent: malicious

        This was a deliberate act by a named individual who pleaded guilty to it[2]. DOJ says he accessed the system after PER declined to offer him permanent employment[1]; it states no motive beyond that sequence. SC Magazine’s report of the plea called him a “disgruntled SCADA consultant”[5].

        Threat actors: a former contractor

        The actor is named and pleaded guilty: Mario Azar, an IT consultant whose contract with PER ended in May 2008[1][2]. He was not an employee, and DOJ does not describe him as fired: his contract ended after PER declined to offer him permanent employment. He had helped set up the system he later impaired[1]. The map shows Disgruntled Insider as confirmed.

        Access vector: accounts he had set up, reportedly

        DOJ does not say how he got in. Its release says only that he “illegally accessed the PER computer system”[1]. Press reports of the plea say he “had established multiple user accounts on it, according to court documents”[2] and “had several user accounts on company systems”[3]. Neither says he used those accounts after he left. DOJ alleges no exploit, no malware and no outside intrusion[1]. The map shows Credential Theft, MITRE’s Valid Accounts technique T1078, as reported[7].

        IT impact: a system made unavailable

        DOJ says PER “temporarily lost use of its computer systems as result of Azar’s conduct”[1]. The indictment alleges he “caused damage by impairing the integrity and availability of data”; that is the charging allegation, so data sabotage is shown as reported[1]. No source says what commands he ran or what he changed, and no source gives the outage’s duration.

        OT targeting: a direct compromise

        The impaired system was not a corporate system that operations happened to depend on. It was the system PER used to communicate with its platforms and for leak detection[1], which The Register described as used for remote telemetry[4]. That makes this a direct OT compromise, on the monitoring side. The Register also reported that parts of the systems were used to operate the platforms remotely[2]; DOJ does not say so, and no source alleges he acted on any process.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        Nothing described required sophistication. He went back into a system he had helped build[1]. No exploit, malware or process manipulation is alleged, so there is no OT technique to grade, and the stage is marked as not in the path. The absence of sophistication is itself the finding: access, not tradecraft, decided what he could do.

        OT impact: loss of view over the platforms

        The effect DOJ confirms is that PER temporarily lost use of the system it used to communicate with its platforms and to detect leaks[1]. In MITRE terms that is a denial of the operators’ view of the platforms, Denial of View, T0815[7]; the reading is inferred, because no source describes the operators’ view directly. No source says production was reduced or halted. No alarm-disarming is alleged, and no platform count appears in DOJ’s release or in the press reports reviewed; RISI says “three oil derricks” without a source[6].

        Perils: none, with a safeguard down

        DOJ says the outage “did not lead to any oil leaks or environmental harm”[1]. No source reports a leak, fire, release, damage or injury. The loss of leak detection removed a safeguard, but nothing happened while it was down, so no peril is shown. How close this came to a spill is not described by any source.

        A departing contractor’s accounts are part of the OT attack surface.

        Financial losses: no figure

        No amount is published. DOJ says the indictment alleges “thousands of dollars in damage”, which gives no figure[1], and SC Magazine reports the same phrase from prosecutors[5]. RISI’s report of $50,000 restitution is not confirmed by any DOJ or court document located, and is not used[6]. What is confirmed is an outage of the platform communications and leak-detection system, with a federal investigation and prosecution behind it[1].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Network event response and recovery (temporary loss of the system)
        • Implied: Voluntary improvements (closing the account-lifecycle gap)
        • Not supported: Direct business interruption; Spills and cleanup; Environmental regulation liability

        What this incident shows

        No firewall bypass, vulnerability or remote-access failure is alleged. A contractor who had set up accounts on the system left, and within weeks he was back in it[1][2]. The control most likely to have failed is the cheapest one: removing a departing person’s access. PER had also relied on an outside contractor for the system’s build and its accounts, and no source describes its oversight of his work.

        The consequence was decided by what the system did, not by what he did. It watched the platforms and detected leaks; it is not described as running them, and DOJ records that nothing leaked[1]. No source describes how PER noticed the impairment or how long that took.

        References

        1. U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California. “Upland Man Indicted for Allegedly Damaging Computer Systems Used to Monitor Off-Shore Oil Platforms.” Release No. 09-030, 17 Mar. 2009. justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2009/030.html
        2. Goodin, Dan. “(Former) IT consultant confesses to SCADA tampering.” The Register, 25 Sept. 2009. theregister.com/2009/09/24/scada_tampering_guilty_plea/
        3. McMillan, Robert. “Contractor pleads guilty to SCADA tampering.” Computerworld (IDG News Service), 24 Sept. 2009. computerworld.com/article/1472234/contractor-pleads-guilty-to-scada-tampering.html
        4. Leyden, John. “IT contractor charged over US oil rig hack.” The Register, 19 Mar. 2009. theregister.com/2009/03/19/oil_rig_hack_charges/
        5. Miller, Chuck. “Disgruntled SCADA consultant pleads guilty.” SC Magazine, 25 Sept. 2009. scworld.com/news/disgruntled-scada-consultant-pleads-guilty
        6. Repository of Industrial Security Incidents (RISI). “Hacker Disabled Offshore Oil Platforms.” Database entry, updated 2 May 2011. risidata.com/Database/Detail/hacker_disabled_offshore_oil_platforms
        7. MITRE. Technique pages T1078 Valid Accounts, T0815 Denial of View and T0829 Loss of View. MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/