Date
Nov 2007 – June 2010
Location
Iran
Industry
Nuclear
Access vector
Removable Media
OT targeting
Direct (sophisticated)
Primary peril
Centrifugal Force
Impact duration
945 days

Stuxnet attack on the Natanz enrichment plant, 2007–2010

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Stuxnet attack on the Natanz enrichment plant, 2007–2010

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. Between 2007 and 2010, malware later named Stuxnet ran two separate sabotage payloads against the centrifuge cascades of Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, while the operators’ screens showed normal values[1]. The malware was publicly identified in June 2010[2]. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) says Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges in late 2009 or early 2010, and calls Stuxnet a reasonable explanation[3].

        Why it matters. It is the clearest documented case of malware that changed a physical process while hiding the change from the people watching it. It also shows that heavy equipment losses need not cut output: ISIS says Stuxnet did not lower the plant’s production in 2010[4].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Much of it rests on technical analyses of the malware and on press reports citing unnamed officials; Iran has published little, and no government has acknowledged the operation. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • An earlier payload took over the controllers of the plant’s Cascade Protection System, replayed 21 seconds of recorded sensor values and kept exhaust valves closed. A later one drove centrifuge rotors from their normal 63,000 rpm to 84,600 rpm, then nearly to a stop[1].
        • ISIS puts the loss at about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges. Iran acknowledged “problems for a limited number of our centrifuges”, and neither Iran nor the IAEA has published a count[3].
        • The New York Times, citing unnamed officials, attributed Stuxnet to a joint US-Israel program code-named “Olympic Games”. Neither government has acknowledged it, and how the malware entered Natanz has never been confirmed[5].
        • No cost has been disclosed by anyone, and the plant’s output did not measurably fall[4].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [reported | NYT, unnamed officials]
        • Access vector: Removable Media [reported | T0847, route not confirmed]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed]; Privilege Abuse [confirmed | T1068]; Firmware Manipulation [confirmed | T0889, T0835]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Sophisticated [confirmed]
        • OT impact: Manipulate Control [confirmed | T0836, T0831]; Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting [confirmed | T0832]; Inhibit Response [confirmed | T0835]; Loss of Protection [confirmed | Earlier payload]
        • Perils: Centrifugal Force [primary]; Pressure Failure [reported | Earlier payload]
        • Financial losses: Assets & Equipment [confirmed]; Data Loss [confirmed]; Health, Safety, Casualty [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        The earliest known version, which Symantec calls Stuxnet 0.5, was submitted to a malware scanning service in November 2007[6]. It carried the more complex of the two payloads: an attack on the Cascade Protection System, the layer Iran built around its cascades, whose Siemens S7-417 controllers control “the valves and pressure sensors of up to six cascades”[1]. Once in place, Langner writes, it took over control completely. It recorded 21 seconds of sensor values and replayed them in a loop, while stage exhaust valves stayed closed so that overpressure could not be released[1]. Symantec says this version was built to stop compromising computers on July 4, 2009[6].

        A second, simpler payload, tried from 2009, targeted the Centrifuge Drive System, where one S7-315 controller runs the 164 drives of one cascade. About once a month it suspended the legitimate drive logic and raised rotor speed from 63,000 rpm to 84,600 rpm for fifteen minutes; the next run brought the cascade nearly to a stop, at 120 rpm, and back up[1]. Symantec and ISIS describe the same attack as frequency changes up to 1,410 Hz and down to 2 Hz[2][3].

        The IAEA reported that on January 31, 2010, a number of centrifuges in 11 cascades of Unit A26 had been disconnected, and all centrifuges had been removed from one cascade of Unit A28[7]. ISIS reads the agency’s data as about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges decommissioned and replaced, “implying that these centrifuges broke”[3]. The Belarusian antivirus firm VirusBlokAda identified the malware on June 17, 2010, and Symantec found about 60% of infected hosts in Iran[2]. In November 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said “Westerners sent a virus to [our] country’s nuclear sites”, and President Ahmadinejad said the attackers had “succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges”[3].

        Intent: malicious

        Stuxnet was built for one kind of plant. Symantec documents code that checks for specific controller configurations before it acts, and drivers signed with stolen Realtek and JMicron certificates[2]. No ransom demand or financial motive is documented.

        What the sabotage was meant to achieve is Langner’s reading, not a finding. He writes that the attackers “took great care to avoid catastrophic damage”, that the likely aim was to make rotors break early, and that Stuxnet was “a low-yield weapon with the overall intention to reduce the lifetime of Iran’s centrifuges”[1]. He adds that the damage was meant to look like reliability problems. He presents this as the more likely reading, not a certainty.

        Threat actors: attributed by press reports, never acknowledged

        No government has acknowledged responsibility, and none of the technical analyses names a sponsor[2][1]. The attribution rests on journalism. On June 1, 2012, The New York Times, citing unnamed current and former American, European and Israeli officials, described a joint US-Israel program code-named “Olympic Games”, in which the National Security Agency worked with Israel’s Unit 8200. It said the effort dates from 2006 under President George W. Bush and was expanded under President Obama[5]. Yahoo News later reported that the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD had recruited an engineer to help[8].

        Nation-State is shown as reported: detailed reporting by a major outlet, on unnamed sources, with no official confirmation.

        Access vector: a route into the plant never confirmed

        How Stuxnet reached Natanz has not been established by any authority. What is confirmed is how the malware spreads: Symantec documents copying to and from removable drives through the Windows shortcut flaw CVE-2010-2568 and autorun.inf, spreading across local networks, and copying itself into Siemens Step 7 projects[2].

        The route into the plant comes from press reports. The New York Times reported that the operation relied on engineers, maintenance workers and others with physical access, some unwitting, and that thumb drives were critical to spreading early variants[5]. Yahoo News reported in 2019 that an Iranian engineer recruited by the AIVD posed as a mechanic and transmitted the virus at Natanz on a USB flash drive[8]. In January 2024, de Volkskrant reported, as relayed by NL Times, that a Dutch engineer recruited by the AIVD probably brought the code in a water pump he installed[9]. Ralph Langner disputed that: “a water pump cannot carry a copy of Stuxnet”[10]. The Dutch interior minister said he could not respond on substance[11]. Removable media is shown as reported.

        IT impact: malware on Windows engineering hosts

        Symantec documents the Windows stage in detail: four then-unpatched Microsoft vulnerabilities, two local privilege-escalation flaws, a rootkit that hides the malware’s files, drivers signed with stolen certificates, and a replaced Siemens library, s7otbxdx.dll, that intercepts reads and writes to the controllers and hides the malicious code on them[2]. It also reaches the WinCC database server with a password hard-coded in the WinCC software[2].

        These are shown as Malware, Privilege Abuse and Firmware Manipulation, all confirmed. The last refers to malicious logic written into the Siemens controllers, not a wholesale replacement of their firmware[12]. No source describes data being encrypted or stolen, and Iran has published nothing about which of its hosts were infected.

        OT targeting: a direct compromise

        Both payloads reprogrammed the controllers that ran the process: the S7-417 controllers of the Cascade Protection System and the S7-315 controllers of the Centrifuge Drive System[1]. Symantec documents the infection of matching S7-315 controllers through their organization blocks OB1 and OB35, and its later paper documents the working S7-417 attack in Stuxnet 0.5[2][6].

        The malware did not stop at IT systems that the plant depends on; it acted on the equipment itself. That makes this a direct OT compromise, and the assets at risk were the centrifuge cascades.

        OT sophistication: sophisticated

        Sophistication is not in doubt. Both payloads needed detailed knowledge of the plant’s instrumentation and control design, to know which sensors and valves had to be falsified together for the deception to hold. Langner writes that the attackers’ knowledge may have reached as far as “the favorite pizza toppings of the local head of engineering”[1].

        The dividing line used here is manipulation and deception on one side, denial and destruction on the other. Stuxnet manipulated the physical process while showing operators a false picture of normal operation, which places it clearly on the sophisticated side. Symantec called it “one of the most complex threats we have analyzed”[2].

        OT impact: control manipulated, view spoofed, protection subverted

        The changes to the process are confirmed by the technical analyses. The drive payload wrote to the parameters of Fararo Paya and Vacon frequency converters and drove rotors outside their safe speed[2][1]. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms that is Modify Parameter and Manipulation of Control[12], shown as Manipulate Control.

        Operators did not see it. The overpressure attack replayed recorded sensor values to the legitimate control code; during the speed attack, a SCADA screen “would simply have seen the exact speed values from the time before the attack sequence executes”[1]. Symantec states Stuxnet can change PLC data “without the operator of the PLC realizing it”[2]. That is Manipulation of View and Manipulate I/O Image, shown as Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting and Inhibit Response.

        The protection layer was itself a target. The earlier payload took over the Cascade Protection System and kept its exhaust valves shut, shown as Loss of Protection. The later payload left it running, so it kept isolating failing centrifuges but could not stop the over-speed[1].

        The sabotage stayed hidden because the screens the operators trusted were fed by the same compromised controllers.

        Perils: centrifugal force, and overpressure

        The primary peril is centrifugal force. The speed attack drove IR-1 rotors to 84,600 rpm, a good one-third above their 63,000 rpm operating speed, and took them through their critical resonance speeds[1]. ISIS calls Stuxnet a reasonable explanation for the roughly 1,000 broken centrifuges, while adding that questions remain[3].

        Pressure failure is reported, not established. The earlier payload kept exhaust valves closed so that overpressure built up in the cascades[1][6], but it was a separate attack, and no source establishes that it burst any vessel or centrifuge. No injury, death or release beyond the facility is documented in any source.

        Financial losses: no cost disclosed

        No source gives a loss figure. Iran has never published one, and the operation’s sponsors have never acknowledged it. What is counted is physical: ISIS says Stuxnet destroyed about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges out of about 9,000 deployed[4]; The Washington Post, citing Europe-based diplomats, said Iran dismantled more than 10 percent of 9,000[13]; and The New York Times, citing unnamed officials, said nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 then spinning were temporarily taken out[5]. These are readings of one loss, not additions. Reports of a $1 billion to $2 billion development cost describe the attacker’s spending, not the victim’s loss[10].

        Output did not measurably fall. ISIS wrote that Stuxnet “did not lower the production of LEU during 2010”, while adding that output could have been higher without it[4]. Langner estimated a two-year setback to the program[14].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Equipment repair and replacement (about 1,000 IR-1 centrifuges, unpriced); Production data integrity
        • Implied: Asset degradation; Startup and return-to-service validation; Process safety engineering; Proprietary data response and recovery; Embedded device replacement; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Direct business interruption; Third-party physical and societal impact; Network device replacement; Regulatory action or liability; Ransom extortion; Bodily injury; Loss of life; Environmental damage

        The IAEA’s verified totals of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride rose from 1,808 kg in November 2009 to 3,135 kg in October 2010[7][15]. The agency also recorded that on November 16, 2010, no cascades were being fed, and gave no cause; Iran said 28 were being fed by November 22[15].

        What this incident shows

        Stuxnet worked by deceiving the people watching the process. Both payloads hid what they did behind normal-looking values, and no independent measurement, outside the compromised controllers, showed what the machines were really doing[1][2]. By the most detailed press accounts, the way in was a device carried by a person, not a network connection[5].

        Two things limited the damage. The Cascade Protection System, left running during the speed attack, kept isolating failing centrifuges as designed[1]. And Iran kept a large stock of spare centrifuges: in summer 2010, Langner writes, it operated about 4,000 and kept another 5,000 in stock[14]. For anyone assessing this kind of risk, equipment loss and lost output are separate questions: an attack can destroy much equipment and still not cut production.

        References

        1. Langner, Ralph. “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve.” The Langner Group, Nov. 2013, archive copy. icscsi.org/library/Documents/Cyber_Events/Langner%20-%20To%20Kill%20a%20Centrifuge.pdf
        2. Falliere, Nicolas, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien. “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Version 1.4. Symantec Security Response, Feb. 2011. docs.broadcom.com/doc/security-response-w32-stuxnet-dossier-11-en
        3. Albright, David, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond. “Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant?” Institute for Science and International Security, 22 Dec. 2010. isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/did-stuxnet-take-out-1000-centrifuges-at-the-natanz-enrichment-plant
        4. Albright, David, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond. “Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report.” Institute for Science and International Security, 15 Feb. 2011. isis-online.org/isis-reports/stuxnet-malware-and-natanz-update-of-isis-december-22-2010-reportsupa-href1
        5. Sanger, David E. “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.” The New York Times, 1 June 2012, as reposted on attrition.org. attrition.org/pipermail/infowarrior/2012-June/008578.html
        6. McDonald, Geoff, Liam O Murchu, Stephen Doherty, and Eric Chien. “Stuxnet 0.5: The Missing Link.” Symantec Security Response, 2013, as carried by the National Security Archive. nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/2700175/Document-88.pdf
        7. International Atomic Energy Agency. “Director General report on Iran, GOV/2010/10.” IAEA Board of Governors, 18 Feb. 2010. iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2010-10.pdf
        8. Zetter, Kim, and Huib Modderkolk. “Revealed: How a Secret Dutch Mole Aided the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet Cyberattack on Iran.” Yahoo News, 2 Sept. 2019, as reproduced by Iran Watch. iranwatch.org/news-brief/revealed-how-secret-dutch-mole-aided-us-israeli-stuxnet-cyberattack-iran
        9. “Dutch Man Sabotaged Iranian Nuclear Program without Dutch Government’s Knowledge: Report.” NL Times, 8 Jan. 2024. nltimes.nl/2024/01/08/dutch-man-sabotaged-iranian-nuclear-program-without-dutch-governments-knowledge-report
        10. Kovacs, Eduard. “Dutch Engineer Used Water Pump to Get Billion-Dollar Stuxnet Malware Into Iranian Nuclear Facility: Report.” SecurityWeek, 10 Jan. 2024. securityweek.com/dutch-engineer-used-water-pump-to-get-billion-dollar-stuxnet-malware-into-iranian-nuclear-facility-report/
        11. Redactie. “Minister kan niet zeggen of AIVD betrokken was bij verspreiding Stuxnet [Minister cannot say whether the AIVD was involved in spreading Stuxnet].” Security.NL, 29 Jan. 2024. security.nl/posting/827315/Minister+kan+niet+zeggen+of+AIVD+betrokken+was+bij+verspreiding+Stuxnet
        12. MITRE ATT&CK. “Stuxnet, Software S0603.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0603/
        13. Warrick, Joby. “Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet Cyberattack.” The Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2011, as reposted on SecLists.org. seclists.org/isn/2011/Feb/64
        14. Langner, Ralph. “Stuxnet’s Secret Twin.” Foreign Policy, 19 Nov. 2013. foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/19/stuxnets-secret-twin/
        15. International Atomic Energy Agency. “Director General report on Iran, GOV/2010/62.” IAEA Board of Governors, 23 Nov. 2010. iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2010-62.pdf