Date
December 23, 2015
Location
Ukraine
Industry
Electrical T&D
Access vector
Phishing
OT targeting
Direct (crude)
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
1 day

Ukraine power grid cyberattack, December 2015

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Ukraine power grid cyberattack, December 2015

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On December 23, 2015, attackers who had been inside the networks of three Ukrainian regional electricity distribution companies for months used the operators’ own workstations to open breakers, and about 225,000 customers lost power[1][2]. They also overwrote firmware on substation communication devices, wiped systems with a modified KillDisk and flooded the companies’ call centers with calls[1].

        Why it matters. It was the first confirmed cyberattack to cause a power blackout. The attackers acted directly on the systems that run the grid, then worked to stop operators from restoring it remotely.

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Most of the technical detail comes from the SANS ICS and E-ISAC analysis of March 2016 and the US ICS-CERT alert of February 2016, and no source has published a cost for any part of the loss. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • On December 23, 2015, breakers were opened by remote command at Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Kyivoblenergo and Chernivtsioblenergo, within 30 minutes of each other, and about 225,000 customers lost power[1][2].
        • The attackers got in through spear-phishing emails carrying BlackEnergy 3, harvested credentials and reached the control network through VPNs that SANS and E-ISAC say appear to lack two-factor authentication[1].
        • To slow restoration they overwrote firmware on serial-to-Ethernet converters, leaving them “inoperable and unrecoverable”, wiped systems with KillDisk and scheduled outages of backup power supplies[1][2]. Workers closed breakers by hand.
        • In 2020 a US grand jury indicted six officers of Russia’s GRU Unit 74455, which researchers call Sandworm[3]. No cost of the attack has ever been published.

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | GRU Unit 74455, per US indictment and EU listing]
        • Access vector: Phishing [confirmed | T1566.001]; Credential Theft [confirmed | T1056.001, T1078, T0859]; External Remote Services [confirmed | T0822, VPN]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | BlackEnergy 3, KillDisk]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1561.002]; Firmware Manipulation [confirmed | T1693.001]; System Outage [confirmed | T0816, UPS]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Crude [confirmed]
        • OT impact: Manipulate Control [confirmed | T0831, T1692.001]; Loss / Denial of Control [confirmed | T0827; T0813 inferred]; Inhibit Response [confirmed | T0816, T1693.001]
        • Perils: Bricking [secondary | serial-to-Ethernet converters]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [implied]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Data Loss [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        The attack was the end of a long campaign. Spear-phishing emails carried BlackEnergy 3 in weaponized Word and Excel files to people in the companies’ administrative or IT networks[1]. SANS and E-ISAC say the attackers got in more than six months before December 23 and date the campaign from spring 2015; Idaho National Laboratory (INL) traces activity back to May 2014[1][4]. The attackers harvested credentials, escalated privileges and moved into the industrial control system (ICS) network through the utilities’ VPNs[1].

        On the afternoon of Wednesday, December 23, they opened breakers at Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Kyivoblenergo and Chernivtsioblenergo, within 30 minutes of each other[1][2]. Wired reported that operators watched the cursors on their screens move on their own[5]. SANS and E-ISAC count at least 27 substations offline across the three companies and say the true number is probably higher; Kyivoblenergo reported 30 on its own network, Prykarpattyaoblenergo 27, and INL later gave at least 57[1][6][4]. Outage times differ by utility and source. Kyivoblenergo’s first disconnections came at 15:31 and all its consumers had power again at 18:56[6]; Booz Allen Hamilton and INL say six hours[7][4].

        The attackers then worked to slow restoration. They uploaded malicious firmware to serial-to-Ethernet converters at multiple sites, so that “remote commands could not be issued to bring the substations back online”, and a modified KillDisk erased master boot records on some systems and deleted logs on others[1]. ICS-CERT says they scheduled disconnects for server UPS units through the UPS remote management interface[2]. Thousands of calls flooded the companies’ call centers[1][8].

        Workers restored power by closing breakers by hand at each substation[7]. Full remote control took much longer: in March 2016 SANS and E-ISAC said the utilities “continue to operate their distribution systems in an operationally constrained mode”, and INL says substations were still run manually more than two months later[1][4]. No source gives a date on which full automation was restored.

        Intent: malicious

        The operation was prepared over months and carried out against three companies within half an hour. The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry said the networks had been compromised at least six months before the main events[9], and Booz Allen Hamilton points to “the complexity of organization and planning, the discipline in execution” the attackers showed[7]. No source reports a ransom demand or any other demand. The aim was disruption. Even the telephone flood was hostile: SANS and E-ISAC first read it as a way to stop customers reporting the outage, but on the whole evidence judged it “more likely” meant to frustrate customers[1].

        Threat actors: Russia’s GRU Unit 74455

        On October 15, 2020, a US federal grand jury indicted six officers of GRU Unit 74455, and the Department of Justice announced the charges on October 19. The indictment covers “December 2015 through December 2016 destructive malware attacks against Ukraine’s electric power grid”, naming BlackEnergy, Industroyer and KillDisk, and DOJ notes that researchers call the unit “Sandworm Team”[3]. In July 2020 the Council of the European Union listed the unit, field post number 74455, as responsible for the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in the winters of 2015 and 2016[10]. Earlier, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said remote unauthorized access from Russian territory had been established in all the cases it investigated[6]. The map shows Nation-State as confirmed on the strength of the indictment and the EU listing.

        Access vector: spear-phishing, stolen credentials and a VPN

        Three access vectors are confirmed. The first was phishing: emails with Word and Excel files carrying BlackEnergy 3 reached IT and administrative staff, and SANS and E-ISAC say no exploit code was observed; recipients were prompted to enable macros[1]. The second was credential theft: BlackEnergy 3 was used with keystroke loggers, and the harvested credentials were used to escalate privileges and move laterally[1]. ICS-CERT says the actors “acquired legitimate credentials prior to the cyber-attack”[2], and INL says the VPN credentials were likely taken from Windows domain controllers[4].

        The third was the utilities’ own remote access. The attackers entered the ICS network through VPNs that “appear to lack two-factor authentication”, then used remote administration tools already on the operator workstations[1]. Neither SANS nor ICS-CERT names the tool[2].

        IT impact: wiped systems, corrupted firmware, backup power cut

        A modified KillDisk erased master boot records on some systems and deleted logs and system events on others; SANS and E-ISAC list workstations, servers and an HMI card inside a remote terminal unit (RTU) among the systems hit[1][11]. The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry listed the destruction of data on servers and workstations[9]. Malicious firmware was written to serial-to-Ethernet converters at multiple sites; the map lists it here, under Firmware Manipulation, although the devices sat in the substations’ control path[1]. ICS-CERT says server UPS units were scheduled to disconnect[2], while SANS and E-ISAC say there was not enough forensic evidence to prove the UPS changes were ready for the attack[1].

        Whether data was taken from the networks is not known; SANS and E-ISAC say they cannot confirm it. The telephone flood hit call centers, not a control system, and is not charted.

        OT targeting: a direct compromise

        The attackers acted on the systems that run the grid: the operator workstations and their human-machine interfaces (HMIs), and the converters that carried commands to the substations[1]. That makes this a direct OT compromise, not an IT outage that operations happened to depend on. MITRE ATT&CK catalogs the operation as campaign C0028, “2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack”[12].

        OT sophistication: crude

        Crude here describes the effect on the process, not the planning. The breaker openings were overt, and operators saw them happen[5]. The firmware overwrite was destructive: it blocked recovery rather than faking normal operation or hiding the attack from the control room[1]. That is a denial-style effect, the opposite of Stuxnet’s deceptive reprogramming of controllers.

        The operation behind it was not simple. Booz Allen Hamilton describes “capability in many of the discrete tasks exhibited by the threat actors” and says the attackers likely developed the converter firmware themselves, although no firmware sample was recovered[7].

        OT impact: control taken, then denied

        Three effects are confirmed. The attackers manipulated control: they used the HMIs to send breaker-open commands to live equipment[1][12]. Operators lost control: the attackers took over the workstations and locked them out, and the utilities restored power by operating breakers manually[1]. Denial of control, the inability to reclose breakers remotely once the converters were overwritten and the workstations wiped, is inferred from those confirmed effects. The attackers also inhibited the response: they scheduled UPS shutdowns and wrote firmware that left remote recovery unusable[2][1].

        MITRE also lists blocked reporting messages from the converters[12]. The SANS report does not describe it, so it is not charted.

        Perils: no fire or explosion, bricked converters

        The main consequence was a service interruption: customers lost electricity. No physical peril caused it, and the Perils list has no label for a service interruption, so no primary peril is shown. No fire, explosion, injury or environmental release is reported.

        The one physical consequence is bricking. The firmware left the serial-to-Ethernet converters “inoperable and unrecoverable”, according to SANS and E-ISAC[1], and “unrecoverable by the manufacturer”, according to INL, which says at least 16 substations were cut off from the control network[4].

        The blackout came from the operators’ own controls, used by someone else.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        No source in the record discloses a money figure for any part of this loss, and neither the three utilities nor the Ukrainian government appears to have published an estimate. The only measure of lost supply is “up to 73 MWh”, 0.015% of Ukraine’s daily consumption, given by Wikipedia, which cites a Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry statement that could not be read; it is a reported figure, not a verified one[13]. The losses below are confirmed as occurrences only.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue (power not delivered); Manual operations and workarounds; Third-party physical and societal impact (about 225,000 customers without power in winter); Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network device replacement (serial-to-Ethernet converters); Embedded device replacement (an HMI card inside an RTU)
        • Implied: Cyber-physical event response (crews closing breakers by hand); Startup and return-to-service validation; Production data integrity; Proprietary data response and recovery; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Ransom extortion; Industry regulation liability

        No compensation, liability, regulatory penalty or public reimbursement has been reported. A US team from NCCIC/ICS-CERT, US-CERT, the Department of Energy, the FBI and NERC traveled to Ukraine to work with local authorities[2]; no cost of that work, or of the utilities’ own recovery, is disclosed.

        What this incident shows

        The path ran from spear-phished office computers, through stolen credentials, into the control network over VPNs that appear to have lacked two-factor authentication[1]. The attackers then spent months inside without being detected. What limited the damage was not a technical safeguard: nothing stood between the hijacked HMIs and the breakers. It was the utilities’ “extensive experience in manual operation of their infrastructure”, which let them restore power within hours without a prepared contingency plan[7].

        The incident is also a gap in the financial record. It is one of the most studied OT cyberattacks, and no source has priced any part of it. For anyone quantifying this kind of risk, the outage itself is well documented, while what it cost the utilities and their customers has to be estimated from scratch.

        References

        1. SANS ICS and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC). “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid.” Defense Use Case, 18 Mar. 2016, copy hosted by WhiteHawk. whitehawksoftware.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Attack_Ukraine_Documents_E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf
        2. ICS-CERT. “IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01: Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure.” Alert, 25 Feb. 2016, copy held by the National Security Archive. nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/3007346/Document-10.pdf
        3. US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace.” Press release, 19 Oct. 2020. justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and
        4. Idaho National Laboratory (CyOTE program). “Precursor Analysis Report: Ukraine Energy Sector Cyber Attack 2015.” 30 June 2022. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_Ukraine-2015.pdf
        5. Zetter, Kim. “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid.” Wired, 3 Mar. 2016, in a Russian translation by alizar, Habr, 7 Mar. 2016. habr.com/en/articles/391439
        6. “Кібервійна проти України. Перші жертви і висновки [Cyberwar against Ukraine: the first victims and conclusions].” Glavcom, 8 Apr. 2016. glavcom.ua/publications/334262-kibervijna-proti-ukrajini.-pershi-zhertvi-i-visnovki.html
        7. Booz Allen Hamilton. “When the Lights Went Out: A Comprehensive Review of the 2015 Attacks on Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure.” Report, Sept. 2016. boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf
        8. “Russian hackers plan energy subversion in Ukraine.” Ukrinform, 28 Dec. 2015. ukrinform.net/rubric-crime/1937899-russian-hackers-plan-energy-subversion-in-ukraine.html
        9. “Вірусну атаку на українські обленерго готували не менше півроку – Міненерговугілля [The virus attack on Ukrainian regional power companies was prepared for at least half a year, says the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry].” Interfax-Ukraine, 12 Feb. 2016. interfax.com.ua/news/general/324221.html
        10. Council of the European Union. “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1125.” EUR-Lex, 30 July 2020. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R1125
        11. MITRE. “KillDisk, Software S0607.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0607/
        12. MITRE. “2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Campaign C0028.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0028/
        13. “2015 Ukraine power grid hack.” Wikipedia, read 22 Oct. 2026. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Ukraine_power_grid_hack