- Date
- December 17, 2016
- Location
- Ukraine
- Industry
- Electrical T&D
- Access vector
- Phishing
- OT targeting
- Direct (sophisticated)
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 1 day
Industroyer attack on Kyiv transmission substation, 2016

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. Just before midnight on December 17, 2016, the Pivnichna transmission substation outside Kyiv, run by Ukraine’s national transmission operator Ukrenergo, switched off unexpectedly[1]. Dragos assesses with high confidence that malware it calls CrashOverride, also known as Industroyer, de-energized the substation[2]. Ukrenergo’s acting head said about 200 MW was lost, roughly a fifth of the capital’s nighttime consumption, and that power was fully restored after 1 hour 15 minutes[3][4][5][6].
Why it matters. Industroyer was built to send commands in the native protocols used at substations, and its operators also tried to disable the protective relays that guard lines when they are switched back on[7][8]. That attempt failed because of the attackers’ own error, not because of a defense[9][8].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. How the attackers got in has never been established, and the steps before the outage rest largely on one government laboratory’s reconstruction. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- Breakers at the Pivnichna substation opened just before midnight on December 17, 2016. About 200 MW was lost, and Ukrenergo’s head said staff switched to manual control and had power fully restored after 1 hour 15 minutes[3][5].
- Industroyer carried modules for four industrial protocols that can send control commands directly, and a wiper that makes Windows hosts unbootable and overwrites substation configuration files[7].
- A tool aimed at Siemens SIPROTEC protective relays did not work: the Idaho National Laboratory says the target addresses were configured incorrectly, and Dragos found they were read backwards in the code. No equipment damage is reported[9][8].
- A 2020 US Department of Justice indictment of six officers of Russia’s GRU Unit 74455 names Industroyer among their tools. How the attackers entered Ukrenergo’s network is still not established[10][7].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | Sandworm, GRU Unit 74455]
- Access vector: Phishing [reported | T1566.001, per INL]; Credential Theft [reported | T0859, per INL]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | Industroyer]; Data Sabotage [reported | T0809]; Inhibit Recovery [reported | backups, per INL]; Firmware Manipulation [reported | T0800, attempt failed]
- OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Sophisticated [confirmed]
- OT impact: Manipulate Control [confirmed | T0831, T1692.001]; Loss / Denial of Control [reported | T0813, T0827]; Loss / Denial of View [reported | T0815, T0829]; Inhibit Response [reported | T0809, T0814]; Loss of Protection [reported | T0837, attempt failed]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Loss of supply only, no damage]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]; Data Loss [implied]
What happened
Ukrenergo’s engineers were at first unsure why the substation had switched off. C4ISRNET gives 11:53 p.m. as the time the remote terminal units controlling the breakers were hit, without naming a source[1]. The malware was Industroyer, documented by ESET in June 2017: a main backdoor, a fallback backdoor hidden in a trojanized copy of Windows Notepad, and a launcher set to activate on hardcoded dates, December 17 and December 20, 2016, in the samples[7]. The launcher ran four payload modules, for IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850 and OPC Data Access, able to issue breaker-open and other commands in each protocol’s own syntax[7]. Consumers in the northern part of Kyiv’s right bank and nearby areas of Kyiv Oblast, including Bucha and Irpin, lost power[6][5].
A wiper component emptied the ImagePath registry value of every listed Windows service, which makes the system unbootable, overwrote files including substation configuration (.scl) and ABB MicroSCADA files, and killed processes until the host crashed[7]. INL says the attack caused operators to lose control over and view of the control environment, and that the attackers destroyed backups vital to recovery[9]. The toolkit also held a denial-of-service tool aimed at Siemens SIPROTEC protective relays through CVE-2015-5374. It had no effect[7][9].
Kovalchuk, Ukrenergo’s acting head, wrote on December 18 that his specialists switched the equipment to manual control, began restoring power after 30 minutes and had it fully restored after 1 hour 15 minutes[5][6]. Other accounts are close: C4ISRNET says power was back by 1:05 a.m., The Register says about 75 minutes, and Ukrenergo’s statement to SecurityWeek and INL say just over an hour[1][11][12][9]. On January 18, 2017, Ukrenergo told Reuters the blackout was caused by a cyber attack[13]. The outage was confined to one substation, against roughly 30 in the December 2015 attack on Ukraine’s grid.
Intent: malicious
This was a staged operation: INL dates likely first access to early 2016, and the launcher was set to fire on hardcoded dates[9][7]. No ransom demand was made and none is documented; nothing in the record points to money as a motive.
What the attackers meant to achieve is read more widely now than in 2017. Dragos’s 2019 reassessment calls it a protection-focused attack: cutting power was an initial step, and disabling protective relays a final phase meant to leave lines unprotected when operators re-energized them, with “possible physical destruction via cyber means”[8].
Threat actors: Sandworm, a Russian military intelligence unit
ESET’s June 2017 report named no actor and found no code link to the BlackEnergy and KillDisk tools used in Ukraine in 2015[7]. Dragos tracked the operator as ELECTRUM, with high-confidence ties to Sandworm Team[2]. In October 2018, ESET called a TeleBots backdoor “an improved version of the main Industroyer backdoor”, the first public evidence linking Industroyer to TeleBots, NotPetya and BlackEnergy[14].
On October 19, 2020, the US Department of Justice indicted six officers of GRU Unit 74455 and named Industroyer among the malware used against Ukraine’s grid from December 2015 to December 2016[10]. The UK government says the unit runs Sandworm and lists Industroyer among its work[15][16]; the Council of the European Union sanctioned the unit, citing attacks on a Ukrainian power grid in the winters of 2015 and 2016, without naming Industroyer[17]. A 2021 update to CISA’s CrashOverride alert attributes the activity to Russian nation-state cyber actors[18], and MITRE tracks the incident as campaign C0025, attributed to Sandworm Team[19].
Access vector: not established, phishing reported
How the attackers got in is not established. ESET says “the infection vector remains unknown”, Dragos’s 2017 report does not say, and Ukrenergo has not published the entry method[7][2].
INL offers an assessment, not a finding. It says the attackers “likely first gained access” to Ukrenergo’s enterprise networks in early 2016, after spearphishing across the Ukrainian power sector, and describes a malicious Office attachment with macros sent to a user on a device connected to both the IT and OT networks[9]. It also says they likely used captured legitimate credentials, possibly from the 2015 attack, and that credential capture began on December 1, 2016; MITRE lists Mimikatz in the campaign[9][19]. Both routes are shown as reported.
IT impact: malware, a wiper and lost backups
The malware itself is confirmed. Ukrenergo said a preliminary analysis found that workstations and SCADA servers had been disrupted by “external influences”, and Dragos assesses with high confidence that the malware caused the outage[12][2].
The wiper is known from analysis of the code: ESET describes how it empties service registry values, overwrites files and crashes the host, and Dragos says the launcher waits two hours before running it[7][2]. INL says the attackers “also destroyed data backups that were vital to recovery”[9]. Ukrenergo did not describe data destruction, so both are shown as reported. INL and MITRE say the relay tool put the device into firmware update mode; ESET does not mention it, and the attempt failed[9][20].
OT targeting: a direct compromise
The attackers reached and commanded the substation’s own control systems: the breakers, the SCADA hosts the wiper hit, and the protective relays they tried to disable. That makes this a direct OT compromise.
INL says captured credentials reached the substation’s control network through a device “most likely” connected to both the IT and control networks, and MITRE says the attackers used valid accounts to move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems[9][19]. INL’s dates put first access about ten months before the attack, although INL gives no dwell figure; investigators told Motherboard the attackers stayed “for months”[9][1].
OT sophistication: sophisticated
Two things decide it. Industroyer’s four protocol modules required real engineering knowledge of how each substation protocol issues legitimate commands; ESET judged it “very unlikely anyone could write and test such malware without access to the specialized equipment used in the specific, targeted industrial environment”[7]. And the attackers built a tool to disable protective relays, which requires understanding the process well enough to defeat its protection[8].
The grade rests on intent and technique, not on the outcome: the relay tool failed. Not every part was refined. The wiper is blunt destruction, not deception.
OT impact: breakers opened, control and view lost
The manipulation of control is confirmed. Ukrenergo’s acting head said the substation’s control automation failed, with external interference through data networks the main working version, and Ukrenergo later told Reuters the blackout was a cyber attack[5][13]. MITRE says Industroyer toggles breakers open with unauthorized command messages[20]. INL says operators lost control over and view of the control environment; that is shown as reported[9].
The relay attack is reported but had no effect. ESET describes an 18-byte UDP packet that leaves a SIPROTEC relay unresponsive until it is rebooted manually, without saying whether it was used. Dragos’s 2017 report could not validate that the module exists. INL says the target IP addresses were configured incorrectly, and Dragos’s 2019 reassessment found four hardcoded addresses read backwards in the code[7][2][9][8]. It is shown as Inhibit Response and Loss of Protection, reported.
Perils: no physical peril
The consequence was a loss of supply: a transmission substation was de-energized and customers downstream lost power[2][5]. No source reports fire, arcing or equipment damage. The relay attack that could have damaged equipment when lines were re-energized did not work, so no physical peril is implied either[9][8]. The map shows No Perils.
The most dangerous part of the attack failed because of the attackers’ own error, not because anything stopped it.
Financial losses: no figure disclosed
No money figure has been disclosed for any part of this incident. Ukrenergo described the outage as a load and a duration, about 200 MW for 1 hour 15 minutes, and nobody has put a cost on it[3][5]. The one confirmed spend is investment: in 2023, Ukrenergo’s IT director, Serhiy Halahan, said the 2016 attack was the impetus for developing cyber security at the company, and that “we began to invest in our information security and hire high-profile specialists”[21]. No amount is given.
The notable zero is equipment. The relay attack was meant to leave lines unprotected, and no equipment needed repair[8][9].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (200 MW undelivered, no money figure); Third-party physical and societal impact (customers in northern Kyiv and nearby towns without power); Voluntary improvements (security investment)
- Implied: Manual operations and workarounds; Startup and return-to-service validation; Computer and laptop replacement; Server replacement; Proprietary data response and recovery; Network event response and recovery
- Not supported: Equipment repair and replacement; Embedded device replacement; Network device replacement; Ransom extortion; Industry regulation or liability; Bodily injury; Environmental damage; Cyber-physical event response
Ukrenergo hired investigators, and UNIAN reported that the firm ISSP was investigating on its behalf. No cost for that work, or any compensation or liability figure, has been disclosed[13][22].
What this incident shows
Industroyer moved the attack onto the substation’s own protocols, and its operators went after the protection meant to keep equipment safe. What limited the harm was not a defense. Manual restoration brought power back within 1 hour 15 minutes on a single-substation footprint, and the relay attack failed through the attackers’ own error[5][9][8].
The gaps the sources point to are a route from the IT network into the control network through a dual-homed device, months inside the network without detection, and protective relays reachable from the same environment that could already command the breakers[9][8]. The relay flaw the attackers targeted had been published in July 2015, with a firmware fix; no source says whether the relays at Pivnichna were vulnerable[23].
References
- Williams, Brad D. “Hackers’ methods feel familiar in Ukraine power grid cyberattack.” C4ISRNET, 29 Jan. 2017. c4isrnet.com/home/2017/01/29/how-a-power-grid-got-hacked/
- Dragos. “CRASHOVERRIDE: Analyzing the Threat to Electric Grid Operations.” 12 June 2017, archive copy at the National Security Archive. nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/3869008/Dragos-CRASHOVERRIDE-Analyzing-the-Threat-to.pdf
- “Ukraine probes suspected cyberattack on Kyiv power grid.” UNIAN, 21 Dec. 2016, carrying Reuters. unian.info/economics/1689806-ukraine-probes-suspected-cyberattack-on-kyiv-power-grid.html
- “Ukraine Investigates Suspected Cyberattack on Power Grid.” Nextgov, 21 Dec. 2016, carrying Reuters. nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2016/12/cyber-espionage-ukraine-investigates-suspected/144015
- “В ‘Укренерго’ не виключають кібератаку на підстанцію ‘Північна’, через яку частину Києву було знеструмлено [Ukrenergo does not rule out a cyberattack on the Pivnichna substation that left part of Kyiv without power].” UNN, 18 Dec. 2016. unn.ua/news/v-ukrenergo-ne-viklyuchayut-kiberataku-na-pidstantsiyu-pivnichna-cherez-yaku-chastinu-kiyevu-bulo-znestrumleno
- “У Київській області стався масштабний збій в енергосистемі [A major power system failure occurred in Kyiv Oblast].” LB.ua, 18 Dec. 2016. lb.ua/society/2016/12/18/353777_kievskoy_oblasti_proizoshel.html
- Cherepanov, Anton. “Win32/Industroyer: A New Threat for Industrial Control Systems.” ESET, 12 June 2017. web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf
- Slowik, Joe. “CRASHOVERRIDE: Reassessing the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Event as a Protection-Focused Attack.” Dragos, 15 Aug. 2019. dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE.pdf
- Idaho National Laboratory / DOE CESER CyOTE Program. “Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016.” CyOTE Case Study, INL/RPT-23-72371, 31 Dec. 2022. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_Industroyer.pdf
- US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace.” Press release, 19 Oct. 2020. justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and
- Report on the Ukraine electricity outage. The Register, 21 Dec. 2016. theregister.com/2016/12/21/ukraine_electricity_outage/
- Kovacs, Eduard. “Ukraine Power Company Confirms Hackers Caused Outage.” SecurityWeek, 19 Jan. 2017. securityweek.com/ukraine-power-company-confirms-hackers-caused-outage/
- “Reuters: Ukrenergo says Ukraine’s power outage was a cyber attack.” Kyiv Post, 18 Jan. 2017, excerpting Reuters. kyivpost.com/post/10622
- Lipovsky, Robert, and Anton Cherepanov. “New TeleBots backdoor: First evidence linking Industroyer to NotPetya.” ESET WeLiveSecurity, 11 Oct. 2018. welivesecurity.com/2018/10/11/new-telebots-backdoor-linking-industroyer-notpetya/
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office. “UK condemns Russia’s GRU over Georgia cyber-attacks.” GOV.UK, 20 Feb. 2020. gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-russias-gru-over-georgia-cyber-attacks
- Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office. “UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games.” GOV.UK, 19 Oct. 2020. gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games
- Council of the European Union. “Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1125 of 30 July 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States.” Official Journal of the European Union, L 246/4, 30 July 2020. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R1125
- US-CERT/CISA. “Alert (TA17-163A): CrashOverride Malware.” 12 June 2017, updated 20 July 2021. us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A
- MITRE. “2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Campaign C0025.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0025/
- MITRE. “Industroyer, Software S0604.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/software/S0604/
- Chayka, Olha. “Російські хакери координують дії з військовими та посилюють атаки напередодні зими. Як Україна протистоїть кібератакам на енергосистему [Russian hackers coordinate with the military and step up attacks before winter. How Ukraine counters cyberattacks on the power system].” Forbes Ukraine, 15 Nov. 2023. forbes.ua/company/rosiyski-khakeri-koordinuyut-dii-z-viyskovimi-ta-posilyuyut-ataki-naperedodni-zimi-yak-ukraina-protistoit-kiberatakam-na-energosistemu-08112023-17242
- “Ukraine power cut was cyberattack: research.” UNIAN, 11 Jan. 2017. unian.info/kyiv/1719342-ukraine-power-cut-was-cyberattack-research.html
- ICS-CERT. “Advisory ICSA-15-202-01: Siemens SIPROTEC 4 and SIPROTEC Compact (EN100 Ethernet module).” July 2015. ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01


