Date
May 13, 2017
Location
Indonesia
Industry
Healthcare
Access vector
Unknown
OT targeting
Indirect: IT dependency
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
4 days

Dharmais Cancer Hospital WannaCry infection, Jakarta, 2017

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Dharmais Cancer Hospital WannaCry infection, Jakarta, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. At about 05:00 on Saturday, May 13, 2017, WannaCry ransomware locked computers at Dharmais Cancer Hospital in Jakarta, Indonesia’s national cancer referral hospital[1]. The hospital shut down all its systems and ran registration, records and billing by hand, with long queues into at least Tuesday, May 16[2][3]. By the hospital’s later count, about 60 of its 600 computers were infected; it paid no ransom and recovered from backups[4][5].

        Why it matters. It is a clear case of backups deciding the size of a ransomware loss: the hospital recovered without paying, and no source reviewed reports a cancelled procedure or harm to a patient[6][4].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It rests on press reports quoting named hospital and ministry officials; there is no government incident report, audit or official loss figure, and the hospital’s own statements changed between May 13 and 16. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • The hospital’s first statements spoke of nearly all, or around 600, computers affected. By May 16, its spokesperson and its president director both said about 60 of 600 had been infected[7][1][4][8].
        • Patients could not take queue numbers and registration was done by hand. On May 16, outpatient services that usually open at 07:00 opened at 10:00[9][1][3][10].
        • The ransom screen demanded USD 300 in Bitcoin. The hospital refused to pay and reinstalled its systems on backup computers and servers[1][5][7].
        • The communications ministry named a second Jakarta hospital, Harapan Kita, “based on reports received”; two of Harapan Kita’s own officials denied it had been hit[11][12][6].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | WannaCry, per US government]
        • Access vector: Not established [unknown | Entry route not stated]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | WannaCry]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | systems shut down]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT involved]
        • OT impact: Not in path [not in path | No clinical device infected]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]

        What happened

        The hospital learned of the attack at about 05:00 on May 13[1]. Patients could not take queue numbers[9]. To stop further damage, the hospital shut down all its systems and ran operations by hand, according to Triputro Nugroho, its director of general affairs and operations[2]. The spokesperson, Chaeruddin, later said most infected machines were staff personal computers connected to the internet, not service computers, though some service computers were hit[4]. Kominfo, the communications ministry, confirmed the attack on the hospital the same day[13].

        Registration, patient records and billing went manual. One visitor waited three hours to register[1]. Long queues were seen at registration on Monday, May 15[14], and on Tuesday, May 16, services opened three hours late and hundreds of patients waited longer[3][10]. On May 15, IT head Widi Budianto said: “This is the second day since the attack occurred and we have checked and isolated 70 percent of our computers”[1]. The hospital reinstalled its system on backup computers and servers, starting with the emergency department, registration and cashier[7][2].

        When service returned to normal is not clear. On May 16, Widi Budianto said, in translation, that it was “now back to normal”; on May 17, President Director Abdul Kadir said he hoped services would be normal “in the next day or two”[10]. Communications Minister Rudiantara called Dharmais the only significant attack the government had seen in Indonesia, and said it was hit “but not all of it”[15][16].

        Intent: malicious

        WannaCry is deliberate malware: it encrypted files and displayed a ransom demand, here USD 300 in Bitcoin, which The Jakarta Post gave as about Rp 4 million[1].

        No operator chose this hospital, though. WannaCry spread itself from machine to machine, and Dharmais was collateral to an indiscriminate worm[17]. The malice is in the worm, not in any decision to target cancer care.

        Threat actors: North Korea, per the US government

        On December 19, 2017, the United States publicly attributed WannaCry to North Korea, and the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan joined it[18]. MITRE ATT&CK lists the Lazarus Group as WannaCry’s associated group[17].

        The attribution covers the worm as a whole, not this infection in particular. No source suggests the hospital was a chosen target.

        Access vector: not established

        Neither the hospital nor the ministry has said how the worm first reached the hospital’s network. Kominfo described the malware as targeting Windows PCs with a weakness in the SMB function[11], the flaw Microsoft patched as MS17-010 on March 14, 2017[19].

        The hospital tied the infections to internet connection: most infected machines were staff PCs connected to the internet, and Abdul Kadir said only 70 percent of the 600 computers were connected[4][10]. That is consistent with worm spread, but it is not a finding about entry, so this stage is marked unknown.

        IT impact: records and bills locked

        The encryption is confirmed by the hospital. Widi Budianto said the ransomware locked access to patients’ medical records and bills, and a ransom screen demanded USD 300 in Bitcoin[1]. The hospital then shut down all its systems itself to stop further damage[2].

        WannaCry spreads between machines over SMBv1, which MITRE lists as exploitation of remote services[17]. The outbreak came 59 days after Microsoft released the patch[19]. No source states the patch status of the infected machines.

        OT targeting: an IT dependency

        The worm reached the administrative IT that the hospital’s front desk depends on: the queue system, registration, medical records, billing and the emergency department’s system[9][1][2]. Care depended on those systems, so it slowed when they went down.

        No diagnostic imaging system, infusion pump, biomedical or embedded clinical device is named as infected in any source reviewed, Indonesian or English. This is an indirect, IT-dependency case, not an OT compromise.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No operational technology was touched, so there is no OT technique to grade. This stage is marked not in path.

        The worm’s technique was generic: an SMBv1 exploit to spread and file encryption for impact, the same at a hospital as anywhere else[17].

        OT impact: none

        No OT impact is reported. The affected services were administrative, and the spokesperson said most infected machines were staff PCs rather than service computers[4]. No source reviewed names a clinical device as infected. This stage is marked not in path.

        Perils: no physical event

        No physical event occurred. No source reports damage to equipment, property, people or the environment, and care continued on manual processes[2][8]. No source reviewed reports a cancelled procedure or harm to a patient. The map shows No Perils.

        Backups that existed, were current and were used decided how small this incident stayed.

        Financial losses: no figure published

        No cost figure exists from the hospital, the Ministry of Health, Kominfo, Indonesia’s Audit Board or any other body. The only amounts in the sources are the USD 300 ransom demand and its rupiah equivalent, and neither is a loss: the ransom was not paid[1][5].

        The documented burden fell on patients, as longer queues and administrative delay for at least four days, counted rather than priced[3][10].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Manual operations and workarounds; Network event response and recovery (checking, isolating and reinstalling computers); Third-party physical and societal impact (longer queues and delays for patients)
        • Not supported: Ransom extortion (demand shown, not paid); Sensitive personal data event response; Bodily injury

        Abdul Kadir said: “I can ensure that the data of patients is safe because it is backed up”, and no source alleges that patient data was taken[6].

        What this incident shows

        The difference the sources describe is recoverability. Abdul Kadir described real-time backups, the hospital had three backup servers, and it rebuilt onto backup computers and servers without paying[6][4][7]. The incident stayed at several days of paper registration and long queues.

        It also shows how an incident account can grow in the retelling. The hospital’s early figure of around 600 computers was the size of its fleet, not the number infected, and a ministry statement that named a second hospital on the basis of reports received has been read as a finding, though that hospital’s own officials denied it[1][4][11][12].

        References

        1. “Ransomware Attacks Nation’s Largest Cancer Hospital.” The Jakarta Post, 15 May 2017. thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/15/ransomware-attacks-nations-largest-cancer-hospital
        2. “Dapat ‘Serangan Fajar’ Ransomware, RS Dharmais Amankan Data [Hit by a ‘Dawn Attack’ of Ransomware, Dharmais Hospital Secures Its Data].” Detik Health, 13 May 2017. health.detik.com/read/2017/05/13/170958/3500051/763/dapat-serangan-fajar-ransomware-rs-dharmais-amankan-data
        3. “Antrean di RS Kanker Dharmais [Queues at Dharmais Cancer Hospital].” Republika, 16 May 2017. news.republika.co.id/berita/oq1b7d335/antrean-di-rs-kanker-dharmais
        4. “RS Dharmais Sebut Lebih Banyak Komputer Pribadi Terserang Ransomware [Dharmais Hospital Says Mostly Personal Computers Were Hit by Ransomware].” Republika, 16 May 2017. news.republika.co.id/berita/oq1f43359/rs-dharmais-sebut-lebih-banyak-komputer-pribadi-terserang-ransomware
        5. “Dharmais Hospital Refuses to Pay Ransom.” Republika English, 16 May 2017. en.republika.co.id/berita/oq1qf5414/dharmais-hospital-refuses-to-pay-ransom
        6. “Patient Data Backed Up to Counter Ransomware Attacks, Hospital Managements Claim.” The Jakarta Post, 15 May 2017. thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/15/patient-data-backed-up-to-counter-ransomware-attacks-hospital-managements-claim
        7. Reuters. “Indonesian Hospitals Attacked in Ransomware Storm.” Tempo English, 13 May 2017. en.tempo.co/amp/875032/indonesian-hospitals-attacked-in-ransomware-storm
        8. “Serangan Ransomware WannaCry Berdampak ke Pelayanan RS Dharmais [WannaCry Ransomware Attack Affects Dharmais Hospital’s Services].” Republika, 16 May 2017. ekonomi.republika.co.id/berita/oq1qbf382/serangan-ransomware-wannacry-berdampak-ke-pelayanan-rs-dharmais
        9. “Sistem Antrean RS Dharmais Diserang Ransomware WannaCry [Dharmais Hospital’s Queue System Attacked by WannaCry Ransomware].” Detik Inet, 13 May 2017. inet.detik.com/security/d-3499926/sistem-antrean-rs-dharmais-diserang-ransomware-wannacry
        10. “Pelayanan Rawat Jalan RS Dharmais Mundur 3 Jam [Dharmais Hospital Outpatient Services Delayed 3 Hours].” Rakyat Merdeka Online, 17 May 2017. rmol.id/read/2017/05/17/291693/pelayanan-rawat-jalan-rs-dharmais-mundur-3-jam
        11. “Serangan Siber Global: Indonesia Juga Diserang. Ini Penjelasan Resmi Kemkominfo [Global Cyberattack: Indonesia Was Also Attacked. Here Is the Ministry’s Official Explanation].” Bisnis.com, 14 May 2017. teknologi.bisnis.com/read/20170514/105/653286/serangan-siber-global-indonesia-juga-diserang.-ini-cara-pencegahan-menurut-kemkominfo
        12. “RS Harapan Kita: Kami Tak Diserang Virus Wanna Cry [Harapan Kita Hospital: We Were Not Attacked by the WannaCry Virus].” JawaPos.com, 14 May 2017. jawapos.com/humaniora/1705140078/rs-harapan-kita-kami-tak-diserang-virus-wanna-cry
        13. “Ransomware WannaCry Serang Rumah Sakit Dharmais dan Harapan Kita [WannaCry Ransomware Attacks Dharmais and Harapan Kita Hospitals].” Kumparan, May 2017. kumparan.com/aditya-panji/ransomware-wannacry-serang-rumah-sakit-dharmais-dan-harapan-kita
        14. “Imbas Serangan WannaCry, Antrean Panjang Terlihat di RS Dharmais [After the WannaCry Attack, Long Queues Seen at Dharmais Hospital].” Detik News, 15 May 2017. news.detik.com/berita/d-3500892/imbas-serangan-wanncry-antrean-panjang-terlihat-di-rs-dharmais
        15. “Malware Causes Minor Glitches.” The Jakarta Post, 16 May 2017. thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/16/malware-causes-minor-glitches
        16. “Menkominfo Klaim Indonesia Sudah Bebas dari Ransomware [Communications Minister Claims Indonesia Is Now Free of Ransomware].” Tirto.id, 17 May 2017. tirto.id/menkominfo-klaim-indonesia-sudah-bebas-dari-ransomware-coVp
        17. MITRE. “WannaCry, Software S0366.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0366/
        18. The White House. “Press Briefing by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Tom Bossert on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea.” The American Presidency Project, 19 Dec. 2017. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331986
        19. Microsoft. “MS17-010: Security Update for Windows SMB Server: March 14, 2017.” Microsoft Support, 14 Mar. 2017. support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4013389/