- Date
- May 12, 2017
- Location
- United Kingdom
- Industry
- Healthcare
- Access vector
- Internet Accessible Device
- OT targeting
- Indirect: IT dependency
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 7 days
NHS WannaCry ransomware disruption, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. On May 12, 2017, the WannaCry worm affected at least 80 of England’s 236 NHS trusts and infected 603 primary care and other NHS organizations, 595 of them GP practices[1]. It locked 34 trusts out of devices, infected 1,220 pieces of diagnostic equipment and led five trusts to divert emergency ambulances[1].
Why it matters. An IT worm with no healthcare-aware logic degraded the delivery of a physical service: NHS England estimated that around 19,494 appointments and operations were canceled[1]. The government’s £92 million cost estimate is a model built after the fact, and no cost data was collected during the incident[2][3].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage, and rests mainly on the National Audit Office (NAO) investigation and the Department of Health and Social Care’s (DHSC) cost estimate. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- Microsoft patched the flaw WannaCry used on March 14, 2017, and NHS Digital told trusts to patch on March 17 and April 28. The outbreak came 59 days after the patch[4][1].
- Every infected NHS organization had unpatched or unsupported Windows, and the NAO says managing internet-facing firewalls would have guarded against infection[1].
- No NHS organization paid the ransom, no patient data is believed to have been stolen, and NHS organizations reported no cases of patient harm[1].
- The UK and the US attributed WannaCry to North Korea’s Lazarus Group in December 2017[5][6].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | Lazarus Group, North Korea]
- Access vector: Internet Accessible Device [confirmed | Spread via the internet]; Exploit Public-facing Application [inferred | T1190]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | WannaCry worm, T1210]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | 34 trusts locked out]
- OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT-aware logic]
- OT impact: None [not in path | No control-system compromise]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | £19M est.]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | £73M est.]
What happened
Microsoft published the MS17-010 security update on March 14, 2017[4]. On April 14, a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers released the EternalBlue exploit, which Microsoft said MS17-010 addressed[7][8]. NHS Digital issued CareCERT alerts asking trusts to patch on March 17 and April 28[1]. US-CERT logged the first reports of WannaCry around 4:00 AM EDT on May 12[9]. NHS trusts began reporting problems in the late morning, and NHS England declared a major incident at 4 pm[1].
The NHS was not the target. The NAO says the attack “particularly affected the NHS, although it was not the specific target,” and that the worm spread via the internet, including through the NHS’s N3 network[1]. Of at least 80 trusts affected, 34 were infected and locked out of devices, 25 of them acute trusts, and 46 were disrupted without infection. Locked or isolated equipment disrupted radiology and pathology, including diagnostic imaging such as MRI scanners and the testing of blood and tissue samples[1].
That evening a security researcher triggered the kill-switch, and WannaCry stopped locking devices. Five trusts diverted emergency ambulances; by May 16 only two hospitals were still diverting patients. NHS England stood the incident down at 17:30 on May 19[1]. NHS England identified 6,912 canceled appointments and operations and estimated the total at around 19,494, and told the NAO it did not plan to identify the actual number[1].
Intent: malicious
WannaCry was deliberate malware: it encrypts victims’ files and demands a ransom of about $300 in bitcoin[9]. But nobody chose the NHS. It was a self-spreading worm, and the NAO says the NHS was not the specific target[1]. The intent was malicious; the victim was collateral. No NHS organization paid[1].
Threat actors: North Korea’s Lazarus Group
On December 19, 2017, the UK Foreign Office said the National Cyber Security Centre “assesses it is highly likely that North Korean actors known as the Lazarus Group were behind the WannaCry ransomware campaign”[5]. The US publicly attributed WannaCry to North Korea the same day, and the White House said the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan had joined it[6].
The US Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint against Park Jin Hyok on June 8, 2018, and made it public on September 6, 2018. It describes WannaCry 2.0 as “significantly impacting the United Kingdom’s National Health Service”[10].
Access vector: SMB services reachable from the internet
The NAO says WannaCry spread via the internet, and that managing internet-facing firewalls would have guarded against infection regardless of patch status[1]. US-CERT says it propagated “via the MS17-010/EternalBlue SMBv1.0 exploit,” on TCP ports 139 and 445[9]. Internet exposure is shown as confirmed.
The narrower reading, that the worm exploited Windows file-sharing services reachable from the internet, is shown as inferred. It follows from the NAO and US-CERT accounts taken together, but no source names which NHS hosts were exposed.
IT impact: files encrypted, trusts locked out
Inside and between NHS bodies, the worm exploited weaknesses in the parts of Windows used to share files and spread through the N3 network, hitting only unpatched or unsupported machines[1]. US-CERT describes scanning of the local network and file encryption[9]. Most infected devices ran Windows 7, which was supported but unpatched; the Public Accounts Committee found that the NHS estate on Windows XP was down to 4.7% at the time[1][11].
The result was a confirmed outage: 34 trusts locked out of devices, 603 primary care and other organizations infected and unable to reach records and systems, and 1,220 diagnostic devices infected[1]. NHS Digital believes no patient data was compromised or stolen[1].
OT targeting: through the IT the service depends on
This is an indirect case. The NHS was collateral to an indiscriminate worm, and the consequence for patients arrived through the IT estate that care depends on[1]. Uninfected trusts were disrupted too, and worked on with pen-and-paper records and limited external email[1].
What crossed was not a boundary between IT and OT but one between IT and the delivery of a physical service. Ambulances went elsewhere, and operations did not happen.
OT sophistication: not applicable
WannaCry contained no OT-aware or healthcare-aware logic of any kind. It infected Windows machines wherever it found them unpatched, and the NHS’s diagnostic equipment was hit because some of it ran Windows: the NAO notes MRI scanners with Windows XP embedded in them[1]. There is no OT technique to grade, so the stage is marked not in path.
OT impact: none on control systems
The infected diagnostic equipment ran Windows, and none of it is an industrial control system. No NAO, DHSC or parliamentary source claims a control-system compromise[1][2][11], and this analysis does not imply one. The equipment was locked or isolated, which stopped imaging and testing, but nothing in a physical process was manipulated. The stage is marked not in path.
Perils: none
There was no physical event. Devices were encrypted and locked, care was canceled and five trusts diverted ambulances, but no source reports damage to equipment, a fire, a release or an injury[1]. NHS organizations reported no cases of patient harm, although no source describes a systematic review for harm[1]. The harm was to the delivery of care, which is counted below as a societal impact, not as a peril.
Every infected organization was running Windows that was unpatched or no longer supported.
Financial losses: £92 million, modeled after the fact
DHSC put the cost to the NHS at £92 million: about £19 million of lost patient care during the attack week and £73 million of IT support, £0.5 million during the attack and £72 million afterwards to restore data and systems[2]. DHSC is candid about the figure: “It is not possible to estimate with certainty the financial impact of the WannaCry attack.” The lost output rests on an assumption that “1% of care was disrupted over a one week period”[2].
The Cabinet Office confirmed in October 2018 that no data was collected during the incident on recovery costs or disrupted care, and that the £92 million excludes organizations outside health and care[3]. The NAO adds that the NHS had not calculated the total cost of canceled appointments[1].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost output of patient care; Manual operations and workarounds; IT support during and after the attack (network event response and recovery); Legally mandated improvements (the national review and DHSC program); Third-party and societal impact (canceled appointments and operations, diverted ambulances)
- Estimated: £73M IT support, £0.5M during the attack and £72M afterwards to restore data and systems; £19M Lost output of patient care during the attack week
- Estimate note: Both come from DHSC’s October 2018 update[2], built from an assumed 1% disruption of one week’s care and from average IT resource levels per organization, with no cost data collected at the time[3].
- Not supported: Ransom extortion (no NHS organization paid)
The reforms that followed, including a Windows 10 licensing agreement with Microsoft and a working group on patching standards for diagnostic equipment, are confirmed, but their cost is not separated from the £92 million[2].
What this incident shows
The patch window is the clearest lesson. Microsoft published the fix on March 14, NHS Digital issued two written warnings, and the worm arrived on May 12, 59 days after the patch[4][1]. Every infected organization had unpatched or unsupported Windows, and a flat, reachable network let one exploit produce a national outage[1]. Care continued on paper where trusts could keep working, and the national incident was stood down within a week[1].
The cost figure carries its own lesson. The most authoritative published loss for this incident is a model built after the fact from an assumed 1% disruption rate and anecdotal cost reports, by the department that bore the loss[2][3]. Anyone calibrating a loss model against £92 million is calibrating against that assumption.
References
- National Audit Office. “Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the NHS.” HC 414, Session 2017-19, 27 Oct. 2017. nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cyber-attack-and-the-NHS.pdf
- Department of Health and Social Care. “Securing cyber resilience in health and care: Progress update October 2018.” GOV.UK, 11 Oct. 2018. gov.uk/government/publications/securing-cyber-resilience-in-health-and-care-october-2018-update
- UK Parliament. Written Question UIN 181321, tabled 18 Oct. 2018 by Jo Platt MP, answered 23 Oct. 2018 by David Lidington for the Cabinet Office. questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2018-10-18/181321
- Microsoft. “MS17-010: Security update for Windows SMB Server: March 14, 2017.” KB 4013389. support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4013389/
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Foreign Office Minister condemns North Korean actor for WannaCry attacks.” GOV.UK, 19 Dec. 2017. gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-condemns-north-korean-actor-for-wannacry-attacks
- The White House. Press briefing by Tom Bossert and Jeanette Manfra on the attribution of the WannaCry malware attack to North Korea, 19 Dec. 2017, via The American Presidency Project. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331986
- Cisco Talos. “Shadow Brokers.” Cisco Blogs, 15 Apr. 2017. blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/2017-04-14-shadow-brokers
- Microsoft Security Response Center. “Protecting customers and evaluating risk.” 15 Apr. 2017. microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2017/04/protecting-customers-and-evaluating-risk
- US-CERT / CISA. “Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware.” Alert TA17-132A, 12 May 2017. cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A
- US Attorney’s Office, Central District of California. “North Korean Regime-Backed Programmer Charged With Conspiracy to Conduct Multiple Cyber Attacks and Intrusions.” Press Release 18-140, US Department of Justice, 6 Sept. 2018. justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/north-korean-regime-backed-programmer-charged-conspiracy-conduct-multiple-cyberattacks
- House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. “Cyber-attack on the NHS.” Thirty-Second Report of Session 2017-19, HC 787, 18 Apr. 2018. publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubacc/787/787.pdf


