Date
May 12, 2017
Location
France + 4 more
Industry
Manufacturing
Access vector
Unknown
OT targeting
Indirect: IT dependency
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
4 days

Renault-Nissan WannaCry plant stoppages, 2017

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Renault-Nissan WannaCry plant stoppages, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. From the night of May 12, 2017, the WannaCry ransomware worm halted or reduced vehicle production at Renault plants in France, Slovenia and Romania and, according to local press, in India[1][2]. It briefly halted Nissan’s plant in Sunderland, UK[3]. Douai, the last plant to restart, reopened on May 16[4].

        Why it matters. A worm that was not aimed at the carmakers stopped production in several countries, and no source places it on a single control system. The stoppages also produced no public loss figure at all: Renault said the financial impact had yet to be calculated[1].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. The plant facts come from press reports of May 13 to 15, 2017, quoting the companies and a union; neither company has said how the worm got in. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Renault said it had taken “proactive measures”, including “the temporary suspension of industrial activity at some sites”, and that infected sites were unplugged from the network[5][1].
        • Douai was kept shut on Monday, May 15, as a precaution, with about 3,500 workers idled while IT staff updated the plant’s computers[4].
        • In December 2017 the United States, joined by the UK and four other governments, attributed WannaCry to North Korea; the UK named the Lazarus Group[6][7].
        • No source places WannaCry on a controller at any Renault or Nissan site, and no loss figure from either company has been found[1].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | US and UK attribution to North Korea]
        • Access vector: Not disclosed [unknown | Entry point not known]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | WannaCry ransomware]; System Outage [confirmed | Infected sites unplugged]; Data Sabotage [inferred | T1486]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No industrial logic]
        • OT impact: Not established [unknown | No controller named]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        The worm arrived on Friday, May 12, 2017, 59 days after Microsoft patched the flaw it exploits, MS17-010, and 28 days after the EternalBlue exploit was made public[8]. Only plants working that weekend were hit[2]. Sandouville, which normally builds about 640 utility vehicles a day, stopped overnight from Friday to Saturday[9][2]. Revoz in Novo Mesto, Slovenia, stopped overnight after problems “on certain parts of Revoz’s information system”, and was still stopped on Saturday[9]. Dacia’s Pitesti plant in Romania and Novo Mesto were partially stopped over the weekend, and Chennai, the plant Renault shares with Nissan in India, was affected according to local press[2]. At Nissan Sunderland, which employs about 7,000 people, systems were hit on Friday night and production was briefly halted[3][10].

        Renault’s Saturday-evening statement said: “Proactive measures have been put in place, including the temporary suspension of industrial activity at some sites”[5]. Renault said the stoppages were deliberate and preventive, and that infected sites were unplugged from the network[1]. Nissan said on May 13 that there had been “no major impact on our business”[10], and Reuters reported Sunderland operating normally by May 15[1].

        On Monday, May 15, a Renault spokesman said all sites would be operational that day except Douai, which would restart on Tuesday morning[2]. Douai, which builds about 160,000 vehicles a year and does not work weekends, was kept shut on Monday as a precaution. About 3,500 workers were put on partial unemployment or a collective day off while IT staff updated the plant’s several hundred computers[4]. Douai reopened on Tuesday, May 16[4][11].

        Intent: malicious

        WannaCry is ransomware: its function is to encrypt files[12]. Nissan described what happened as “a ransomware attack affecting some of our systems”[3]. The alliance was collateral damage from an indiscriminate worm, not a chosen target: only plants working that weekend were hit[2]. The malice belongs to the worm’s authors; no source suggests these plants were singled out.

        Threat actors: North Korea, per governments

        On December 19, 2017, the United States publicly attributed WannaCry to North Korea, and the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan joined it[6]. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre assessed it “highly likely” that North Korean actors known as the Lazarus Group were behind it[7]. The attribution is to the worm as a whole, not to any choice of these plants. Nation-State is shown as confirmed.

        Access vector: entry point not known

        Renault could not say whether the attack came in through one or several geographic entry points[2]. WannaCry spreads over SMBv1 using the EternalBlue exploit[12]. Idaho National Laboratory’s reconstruction assesses EternalBlue as the technique used against Renault-Nissan systems, but it was built from press reporting, and neither company has said so[8]. That describes how the worm spread, not where it first entered, so this stage is marked Not disclosed.

        IT impact: ransomware on Windows computers

        Nissan said its UK plant “was subject to a ransomware attack affecting some of our systems”[3], and Revoz reported problems “on certain parts of Revoz’s information system”[9]. Malware is shown as confirmed. Renault said infected sites were unplugged from the network and that “there is a diversity of operating systems in use”[1]; that is shown as System Outage.

        File encryption, WannaCry’s ransomware function, is inferred rather than observed: no source describes encrypted files at a named site[12]. It is shown as Data Sabotage, inferred.

        OT targeting: an IT dependency

        No source places WannaCry on a controller, a control system or a SCADA application at any Renault or Nissan site. What stopped the lines was the unavailability of computers the lines depend on, together with deliberate management decisions to stop[5][1]. At Douai, IT staff updated the plant’s several hundred computers before the restart[4]. Windows computers on plant networks are not the same as a control-system compromise, and this analysis does not treat them as one. The targeting is shown as an indirect consequence through an IT dependency.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        WannaCry has no industrial logic of any kind. It encrypts files and spreads itself; whatever it reached at the plants, no source says it acted on a process[12]. Sophistication is graded only for direct compromises of OT, so this stage is marked Not in path.

        OT impact: not established

        Whether the worm touched any OT is not established. Renault and Nissan said nothing about controllers, and Idaho National Laboratory’s description of effects on operator screens or controllers is generic, not an observation at these plants[8]. The production loss itself is confirmed. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms it is Loss of Productivity and Revenue, T0828, a business effect rather than an action on equipment[12]. The OT impact stage is shown as unknown.

        Perils: none

        There was no physical event. Renault suspended production at some sites as a deliberate, preventive step and restarted them within days[5][2]. No source reports damage to equipment or product, a fire, a release or an injury. The lines stopped and restarted.

        The decision to stop the lines was the control that worked.

        Financial losses: no figure published

        A Renault spokesman said “the financial impact has yet to be calculated” and that lost production would be made up[1]; no later figure from Renault or Nissan has been found. Nissan said there had been no major impact on its business[10]. Neither company published a count of vehicles lost. The output rates Renault gave, about 640 vehicles a day at Sandouville and 160,000 a year at Douai, are not loss figures. Multiplying them by days stopped would ignore the partial stoppages and the catch-up production Renault promised[9][4].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (production halted or reduced at six named sites)
        • Implied: Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Equipment repair and replacement; Third-party physical and societal impact

        The silence is itself the finding. Days of stoppages across several plants at one of the world’s largest automakers left no public loss figure, and the company’s own spokesman said the number had not yet been calculated[1]. A loss record built from public disclosure will under-count exactly this kind of industrial event.

        What this incident shows

        Renault-Nissan shows how an IT worm can stop a factory without any source placing it on the machines. The lines depended on Windows computers that were still exposed 59 days after the patch, and Douai’s computers were updated before its restart[8][4]. Whatever separation existed between the office network and the plant-floor computers did not prevent the production consequence.

        It also shows a response that worked. Renault chose to suspend activity at some sites and unplug infected ones[5][1], and every plant had restarted within four days. A company that can make that decision quickly limits how far a worm spreads, whatever its patch posture.

        References

        1. Frost, Laurence, and Naomi Tajitsu (Reuters). “Renault-Nissan resume nearly all production after cyberattack.” Automotive News Europe, 14 May 2017. europe.autonews.com/article/20170514/ANE/170519877/renault-nissan-resume-nearly-all-production-after-cyberattack
        2. Guillaume, Gilles, and Laurence Frost (Reuters). “Cyberattaque: toutes les usines Renault redémarrent, Douai mardi [Cyberattack: all Renault plants restart, Douai on Tuesday].” BFM Bourse / Tradingsat, 15 May 2017. tradingsat.com/forvia-ex-faurecia-FR0000121147/actualites/forvia-ex-faurecia-cyberattaque-toutes-les-usines-renault-redemarrent-douai-mardi-738977.html
        3. “Nissan’s Sunderland plant hit by cyber-attack.” ITV News, 13 May 2017. itv.com/news/update/2017-05-13/nissans-sunderland-plant-hit-by-cyber-attack
        4. AFP. “Attaque cyber: 3500 salariés arrêtés aujourd’hui à l’usine Renault de Douai [Cyberattack: 3,500 employees stopped today at Renault’s Douai plant].” Solutions Numériques, 15 May 2017. solutions-numeriques.com/attaque-cyber-3500-salaries-arretes-aujourdhui-a-lusine-renault-de-douai/
        5. “European Car Plants Halted by WannaCry Ransomware Attack.” NBC News, 15 May 2017. nbcnews.com/business/autos/european-car-plants-halted-wannacry-ransomware-attack-n759496
        6. The White House. Press briefing by Tom Bossert and Jeanette Manfra on the attribution of WannaCry to North Korea. The American Presidency Project, 19 Dec. 2017. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331986
        7. UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Foreign Office Minister condemns North Korean actor for WannaCry attacks.” GOV.UK, 19 Dec. 2017. gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-condemns-north-korean-actor-for-wannacry-attacks
        8. Idaho National Laboratory / DOE CyOTE. “Precursor Analysis Report: WannaCry Ransomware Attack.” CyOTE Case Study, INL/RPT-22-67339, 31 Mar. 2022. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_WannaCry.pdf
        9. AFP. “Renault shuts sites hit by cyberattack.” Capital FM, 13 May 2017. capitalfm.africa/renault-shuts-sites-hit-cyberattack/
        10. Reuters. “Carmaker Nissan says UK plant hit by cyber attack.” Investing.com, 13 May 2017. investing.com/news/stock-market-news/carmaker-nissan-says-uk-plant-hit-by-cyber-attack-483945
        11. dpa. “Cyber-Angriff: Renault-Werk in Frankreich geschlossen [Cyberattack: Renault plant in France closed].” Autohaus, 15 May 2017. autohaus.de/nachrichten/autohersteller/cyber-angriff-renault-werk-in-frankreich-geschlossen-2725060
        12. MITRE ATT&CK. “WannaCry, Software S0366,” and “Loss of Productivity and Revenue, T0828.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0366/