- Date
- June 19, 2017
- Location
- Japan
- Industry
- Manufacturing
- Access vector
- Unknown
- OT targeting
- Indirect: IT dependency
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 1 day
Honda Sayama plant WannaCry production halt, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. On Sunday, June 18, 2017, five weeks after the global WannaCry outbreak, Honda found the worm on its networks across Japan, North America, Europe, China and other regions, despite efforts to secure its systems in mid-May[1]. The next day, production stopped at its Sayama plant in Saitama Prefecture, Japan, because several older production-line computers infected with WannaCry had shut down[2]. Production resumed on Tuesday, June 20, and Honda says approximately 1,000 units were not produced as planned[3][2].
Why it matters. Honda had already responded to WannaCry in May, yet older computers serving a production line were still exposed five weeks later: a failure of how far the remediation reached, not of whether there was one[1][4].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Honda’s statements are short, and it never said how the worm got in, whether files were encrypted, or why only Sayama stopped. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- Honda found WannaCry on networks in several regions on June 18, five weeks after the outbreak began on May 12 and despite efforts to secure its systems in mid-May[1][5].
- Honda says production at Sayama was interrupted by “the shutdown of several older production line computers infected with the ‘Wannacry’ virus”[2].
- The plant stopped on Monday, June 19, and restarted on Tuesday. Honda says approximately 1,000 units were not produced as planned, and gave no monetary figure[3][2].
- Only Sayama stopped: production at Honda’s other plants was not affected, and Honda has not said why[1].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | WannaCry, per US government]
- Access vector: Not established [unknown | Entry route not stated]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | WannaCry]; System Outage [confirmed | line computers shut down]
- OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT technique]
- OT impact: Not established [unknown | Production halt, T0828; no controller shown affected]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | about 1,000 vehicles]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]
What happened
Honda discovered on Sunday, June 18, that the virus had affected networks across Japan, North America, Europe, China and other regions[1][6]. MONOist reports that Honda dated the ransomware attack on its production sites in Japan and abroad to June 18[4]. The Sayama plant stopped on Monday, June 19, and restarted on Tuesday, June 20; Reuters reports Honda halted it “for a day”[3][1]. Dark Reading’s own narration calls it a “nearly 48-hour shutdown”, counting from Sunday’s discovery[7].
Honda’s statement explains the mechanism: “On June 19, 2017, Honda’s Sayama Auto Plant experienced a short interruption in normal production caused by the shutdown of several older production line computers infected with the ‘Wannacry’ virus”[2]. Dark Reading attributes the same wording to Honda North America[7]. MONOist describes the machines as PCs that handle the systems controlling the production lines[4]. Sayama builds models including the Accord, Odyssey and Step Wagon, with a daily output of around 1,000 vehicles[1].
A Honda spokeswoman told AFP that “The malware affected the production of about 1,000 cars”, and that Honda was investigating whether overseas facilities were infected[3]. Honda said it had “taken steps to reinforce its virus protection regimen to avoid any similar occurrences in the future”[2]. On June 23, it told MONOist it was still investigating which PC vulnerability had been targeted and was coordinating future countermeasures; MONOist reported that replacement of old PCs had not progressed[4].
Intent: malicious
WannaCry is deliberate malware, built to spread itself and to encrypt files[5]. No operator chose Honda, though. The worm spread on its own, and Honda was collateral to an infection still present five weeks after the outbreak.
No source says files were encrypted at Honda. Honda describes the computers shutting down, and production stopping as a result[2].
Threat actors: North Korea, per the US government
On December 19, 2017, the United States publicly attributed WannaCry to North Korea, and said the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan had seen its analysis and joined in denouncing North Korea[8]. MITRE ATT&CK associates WannaCry with the Lazarus Group[9].
The attribution concerns the malware, not this incident. Honda was not a chosen target.
Access vector: not established
No source says how WannaCry entered Honda’s network or reached the Sayama hosts. WannaCry spreads by the MS17-010 SMBv1 exploit, scanning TCP ports 139 and 445, and Microsoft patched the flaw on March 14, 2017[5].
Honda said on June 23 that it was still investigating which PC vulnerability had been targeted, and no later statement was found[4]. Spread by that exploit is therefore inferred, not confirmed, and the access vector is marked unknown.
IT impact: older line computers shut down
The infection is confirmed by Honda: several older production-line computers were infected and shut down[2]. Whether files were encrypted is not stated.
The worm was also found on Honda networks across several regions, and Honda checked for damage at sites other than Sayama, but no source describes an effect anywhere else; a spokeswoman said production at other plants was not affected[1][4].
OT targeting: an IT dependency
The line depended on Windows hosts, and when they shut down, production stopped. Honda calls the machines older production-line computers, and MONOist describes them as PCs that handle the systems controlling the lines[2][4]. Those are hosts serving the line, not controllers.
Dark Reading records that Honda did not say whether its ICS network, its IT network or both were affected[7]. On what is known, this is an IT-dependency case.
OT sophistication: not applicable
No OT-specific technique was used. A generic, self-spreading worm reached Windows machines that a production line depended on[2][9]. There is nothing on the OT side to grade, and this stage is marked not in path.
OT impact: production stopped, controllers not shown to be affected
What is confirmed is the effect on production: the plant stopped on June 19 and resumed on June 20[3][1]. MITRE describes this kind of effect as loss of productivity and revenue, which covers loss of production caused by an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments[10].
No source establishes that any controller was affected, so no technique of lost or manipulated control or view is claimed, and the stage is marked unknown.
Perils: no physical event
No physical event occurred. Infected computers shut down and vehicle production stopped for a day, then resumed[2][1]. No source reports damage to equipment or product, a fire, a release or an injury. The map shows No Perils.
Responding to an outbreak is not the same as reaching every machine that matters.
Financial losses: about 1,000 vehicles, no money figure
Honda published a unit count, not money: “A total of approximately 1,000 units were not produced as planned as a result of this interruption”[2]. Converting that into currency would need a model mix and a per-vehicle margin that Honda has not disclosed, so we do not. The loss stands as about 1,000 vehicles and one production day.
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (approximately 1,000 vehicles not produced, one production day); Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements (reinforced virus protection)
- Not supported: Equipment repair and replacement
The response was Honda’s second against the same malware, after its efforts in mid-May. No scope or cost was disclosed for either[1][4].
What this incident shows
Honda responded to WannaCry in May, and five weeks later several older production-line computers were still exposed; replacement of old PCs had not progressed[1][4]. Asked whether it had responded to WannaCry, Honda could have said yes. The question that would have found the gap is what share of its production-line hosts, including the oldest, that response actually reached.
The open question is why only Sayama stopped when the worm was found in several regions[1]. No source explains it. It could be architecture, the age of Sayama’s line hosts or an operational choice, so no credit is given to segmentation that may or may not have existed.
References
- Reuters. “Honda halts Japan car plant after WannaCry virus hits computer network.” 21 June 2017, as carried by IT Security Guru. itsecurityguru.org/2017/06/21/honda-halts-japan-car-plant-wannacry-virus-hits-computer-network/
- Honda statement, quoted by The Detroit Bureau, June 2017. thedetroitbureau.com/?p=116976
- AFP. “Honda halts production at Japan plant after cyber attacks.” IndustryWeek, 21 June 2017. industryweek.com/technology-and-iiot/cybersecurity/article/22020489/honda-halts-production-at-japan-plant-after-cyber-attacks
- Saito, Yuki (齊藤由希). Report on the ransomware attack on Honda’s production sites [in Japanese]. MONOist (ITmedia), 23 June 2017. monoist.itmedia.co.jp/mn/spv/1706/23/news029.html
- US-CERT (CISA). “Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware.” Alert TA17-132A, 12 May 2017. cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A
- Reuters. “Honda halts Japan car plant after WannaCry virus hits computer network.” 22 June 2017, as carried by Nextgov. nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2017/06/malware-wannacry-ransomware-stops-honda/144094/
- Vijayan, Jai. “WannaCry Forces Honda to Take Production Plant Offline.” Dark Reading, 21 June 2017. darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/wannacry-forces-honda-to-take-production-plant-offline
- The White House. “Press Briefing by Tom Bossert on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Korea.” The American Presidency Project, 19 Dec. 2017. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331986
- MITRE. “WannaCry, Software S0366.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/software/S0366/
- MITRE. “Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Technique T0828 - ICS.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828/


