Date
June 27, 2017
Location
Denmark
Industry
Transportation
Access vector
Supply Chain
OT targeting
Indirect: IT dependency
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
10 days

Maersk NotPetya cyberattack, June 2017

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Maersk NotPetya cyberattack, June 2017

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On June 27, 2017, the NotPetya malware reached A.P. Moller - Maersk through a corrupted update to M.E.Doc, a Ukrainian tax program, and encrypted machines across the company[1][2]. Its booking system went down, port terminals it operated were closed or disrupted, and its chairman said it had to install 4,000 new servers and 45,000 new PCs over ten days[3][4].

        Why it matters. A global shipping and port operator kept about 80% of its volume moving by hand while its IT was rebuilt, and no source reports the malware reaching port control systems[4]. Maersk still put the effect on profit at $250 million to $300 million[5].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Parts of the recovery story rest on Wired’s reporting from unnamed Maersk staff, read through excerpts, and are marked as such. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Maersk’s technology chief said a corrupted M.E.Doc update is “basically how it got onto our network”; the malware then spread mainly on stolen credentials, according to CSO Online[1].
        • Terminals were reported closed or disrupted in Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey, Rotterdam, Barcelona, Algeciras and near Mumbai. The Los Angeles terminal was shut for three days[3][6].
        • Chairman Jim Hagemann Snabe said Maersk installed 4,000 new servers, 45,000 new PCs and 2,500 applications in ten days, and managed 80% of its volume manually[4].
        • Maersk put the effect on profit at $250 million to $300 million, the vast majority temporary lost business in July and August 2017[5][7].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | per the UK and US governments]
        • Access vector: Supply Chain [confirmed | T1195.002, M.E.Doc update]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed]; System Outage [confirmed | booking system down]; Data Sabotage [reported | T1486, malware-level]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No control system attacked]
        • OT impact: Not in path [not in path | No OT compromise reported]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | $250M–$300M]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed | servers and PCs]; Reputation Damage [confirmed | share price]

        What happened

        Maersk took a number of systems down as a precaution when the attack began on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 27, and its booking system was inaccessible from late that evening. APM Terminals, the group’s port business, which ran 76 ports, had sites reported closed or disrupted in Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey, Rotterdam (two terminals), Barcelona, Algeciras and JNPT near Mumbai[3]. The Los Angeles terminal, the port’s largest, was shut for three days and reopened on June 30[6]. At Aarhus, terminal managing director Steen Davidsen said: “We have found a solution where we work outside the Maersk network”[3].

        Maersk’s Active Directory was lost almost entirely. Control Engineering says Maersk had about 150 domain controllers, and CSO Online says all 147 Active Directory instances were lost[8][1]. Wired reports, from unnamed Maersk staff, that one domain controller survived, in Ghana, because a blackout had knocked it offline before the attack[9]. CSO Online places that office in Lagos, Nigeria, and quotes chief technology and information officer Adam Banks: “A full, unencrypted copy of Active Directory was available”[1].

        In January 2018, Snabe told the World Economic Forum in Davos: “We had to install 4,000 new servers, 45,000 new PCs, 2,500 applications. And that was done in a heroic effort over ten days.” He added: “We only had a 20% drop in volume, so we managed 80% of that volume manually”[4]. Maersk said business volumes were hit “for a couple of weeks in July”[10]. Its first impact estimate, in August 2017, was $200 million to $300 million; it narrowed this to $250 million to $300 million in November and repeated it in its 2017 annual report[10][5][7].

        Intent: malicious

        NotPetya is a wiper disguised as ransomware. Cisco Talos says it encrypted critical files and hard drives “with no way to decrypt” them, and judged the attack destructive[2]. No ransom was paid. NotPetya was a self-spreading wiper, not an attack aimed at Maersk: every installation Talos traced came through the M.E.Doc update system[2]. The intent behind the campaign was malicious, and Maersk was one of the companies it reached.

        Threat actors: the Russian military, per two governments

        On February 15, 2018, the White House said that in June 2017 “the Russian military launched the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history”, and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre judged the Russian military “almost certainly responsible”[11][12]. On October 19, 2020, the US Justice Department announced charges against six officers of GRU Unit 74455 over NotPetya and other attacks; its release does not name Maersk[13]. MITRE ATT&CK attributes NotPetya’s distribution to Sandworm Team[14]. Nation-State is shown as confirmed, on formal government attribution and an indictment.

        Access vector: a corrupted software update

        Banks said in 2019 that the corrupted M.E.Doc update is “basically how it got onto our network”[1]. Cisco Talos found that all NotPetya installations came through the M.E.Doc update system[2], which MITRE classifies as Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1195.002[14]. Wired reports, from unnamed staff, that the software ran on a single computer in Maersk’s Odessa, Ukraine office[9]; no named Maersk source gives the office. The map shows Supply Chain as confirmed, on Maersk’s own account.

        IT impact: credentials, then encrypted machines

        According to CSO Online, Maersk had patched against the EternalBlue exploit about three months before the attack, and the malware spread mainly on stolen credentials. Banks said “one of our domain admins had logged onto that box”[1]. NotPetya’s documented way of taking credentials, a modified Mimikatz reading them from memory, is not stated for Maersk[15].

        The payload encrypts files and disk structures[15][2]. Maersk did not describe it; the need to install 4,000 new servers and 45,000 new PCs fits it[4]. Whether those were new machines or reimaged ones is not settled: Control Engineering says the drives were wiped and Windows reinstalled[8]. The outage of Maersk’s systems is confirmed; data sabotage is shown as reported, from the malware-level description.

        OT targeting: an indirect hit through IT

        No source reports NotPetya reaching APM Terminals’ operational technology. What the stronger sources show is the IT layer failing: the booking system went down and terminals worked by hand, outside the Maersk network[3][4]. The disruption to port operations came through that dependency, which makes this an indirect OT consequence.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No control system was attacked, so there is no OT technique to rate. NotPetya was a broad, indiscriminate Windows wiper with no OT-specific technique[15], and its effect on the terminals came through the IT they depend on. This stage is marked Not applicable.

        OT impact: not in this attack’s path

        One vendor blog says terminal operating systems, crane controls, berth management and vessel traffic services “largely survived” because they ran other platforms[16]. That blog cites no source, so the claim is weak, but no source reports the opposite. If the OT did survive, the reason given is platform diversity, not a designed security boundary. The stage is marked Not in path.

        Perils: no physical event

        There was no physical event. Terminals slowed or closed and then reopened; the Los Angeles terminal was back on June 30[6]. No source reports damage to cranes, vessels, cargo or port equipment, a fire, a release or an injury.

        When the IT layer fails, the cost lands as lost business even if every crane still works.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        Maersk gave one figure: the attack’s negative effect on profit was $250 million to $300 million, “the vast majority related to Maersk Line”, and the vast majority of it “temporary lost business in July and August”[5]. It also includes higher costs. Maersk Line volumes fell 2.5% in the third quarter, and Maersk said volumes and unit cost would have been about flat without the attack[5]. CSO Online reports that Banks later put the total cost of the outage at $350 million, including about $30 million of recovery costs. That is the article’s paraphrase, and it does not say how it relates to Maersk’s own figure[1].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost business; Manual operations and workarounds; Network event response and recovery; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Market valuation
        • Reported amounts: $250M–$300M Effect on profit, mostly lost business in July and August 2017, according to Maersk[5][7]; $200M–$300M First estimate, August 2017, later superseded, according to Maersk[10]; $350M Total cost of the outage, as CSO Online paraphrases Adam Banks, not reconciled with Maersk’s figure[1]; $30M Recovery costs within that total, same source[1]
        • Implied: Contract obligations to customers (delayed vessels and cargo)
        • Not supported: Cyber insurance claim or dispute; Ransom payment; Personal data breach response; Third-party physical and societal impact; Network device replacement; Network security liability; Embedded device replacement; Regulatory action or liability

        No source reviewed documents an insurance claim, coverage dispute or payout for Maersk, and the pages of its 2017 annual report that were read mention no insurance recovery[7]. A 2025 event study by Ryan, Withers and den Hartog measured a one-year cumulative abnormal return of −50.7% for Maersk’s shares, widening to −63.9% after two years; the paper does not attribute it to the attack alone.

        What this incident shows

        Maersk’s terminals slowed or closed without any attack on their control systems. The booking system and the IT that coordinates the terminals failed, and about 80% of volume moved by hand[3][4]. The record names the gaps behind the scale: a privileged domain credential on the machine the update reached, and a globally flat directory in which one entry point led to near-total loss of Active Directory[1][8].

        Recovery hinged on luck. The one clean copy of Active Directory survived only because a power cut had taken it offline, as Wired and CSO Online both report, in different places[9][1]. No source describes a designed offline backup. Even the reported survival of terminal OT, if true, came from platform diversity rather than a designed boundary[16].

        References

        1. Swinhoe, Dan. “Rebuilding after NotPetya: How Maersk moved forward.” CSO Online, 9 Oct. 2019. csoonline.com/article/3444620/rebuilding-after-notpetya-how-maersk-moved-forward.html
        2. Maynor, David, Matt Olney, and Yves Younan. “The MeDoc Connection.” Cisco Talos Blog, 5 July 2017. blog.talosintelligence.com/the-medoc-connection/
        3. Reuters. “Maersk-Operated Port Terminals, Booking System Crippled by Cyber-Attack.” 28 June 2017, as carried by gCaptain. gcaptain.com/maersk-operated-port-terminals-booking-system-crippled-cyber-attack/
        4. Cimpanu, Catalin. “Maersk Reinstalled 45,000 PCs and 4,000 Servers to Recover From NotPetya Attack.” BleepingComputer, 25 Jan. 2018. bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/maersk-reinstalled-45-000-pcs-and-4-000-servers-to-recover-from-notpetya-attack/
        5. A.P. Moller - Maersk. “Interim Report Q3 2017.” 7 Nov. 2017. investor.maersk.com/static-files/dd40f683-6991-4d7f-85de-4833fceda9f1
        6. CBS News Los Angeles. “White House: Russia Behind Cyber-Attack Which Shut Down Port Of LA.” 16 Feb. 2018. cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/russia-cyber-attack-port-of-la/
        7. A.P. Moller - Maersk. “Annual Report 2017.” 9 Feb. 2018. investor.maersk.com/static-files/250c3398-7850-4c00-8afe-4dbd874e2a85
        8. “Throwback Attack: How NotPetya Accidentally Took Down Global Shipping Giant Maersk.” Control Engineering, undated. controleng.com/throwback-attack-how-notpetya-accidentally-took-down-global-shipping-giant-maersk/
        9. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History.” WIRED, 22 Aug. 2018, as excerpted by Boing Boing. boingboing.net/2018/08/22/andy-greenberg.html
        10. A.P. Moller - Maersk. “Interim Report Q2 2017.” Company announcement, 16 Aug. 2017. investor.maersk.com/news-releases/news-release-details/interim-report-q2-2017
        11. The White House. “Statement from the Press Secretary” on the NotPetya cyber-attack. The American Presidency Project, 15 Feb. 2018. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331956
        12. “UK names Russian military as source of NotPetya.” The Register, 15 Feb. 2018. theregister.com/2018/02/15/uk_names_russian_military_as_source_of_notpetya/
        13. U.S. Department of Justice. “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace.” 19 Oct. 2020. justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and
        14. MITRE. “Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1195.002.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
        15. MITRE. “NotPetya, Software S0368.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0368/
        16. Blastwave. “The Maersk Massacre: How NotPetya Rewrote the Rules.” Vendor blog, undated (2026). blastwave.com/blog/the-maersk-massacre-how-notpetya-rewrote-the-rules