- Date
- June 27, 2017
- Location
- United States
- Industry
- Manufacturing
- Access vector
- Supply Chain
- OT targeting
- Indirect: IT dependency
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- More than a month
Merck NotPetya cyberattack and war exclusion case, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. On June 27, 2017, the NotPetya malware reached Merck & Co. through a compromised Ukrainian accounting application and infected over 40,000 machines in its network[1]. Merck said the attack disrupted its worldwide operations, including manufacturing, research and sales[2].
Why it matters. Drug production stopped without any reported attack on a control system: the plants depended on IT that the malware disabled. Most of Merck’s property insurers then refused to pay under a war exclusion, and New Jersey courts ruled that the exclusion required military action[1].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Merck’s 2017 and 2018 annual reports could not be read in full for the underlying research, so their figures are cited through the press that quotes them. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- NotPetya arrived through malicious updates to M.E.Doc, a Ukrainian tax-accounting application, which Merck received through its server in Ukraine. About 10,000 machines were infected within ninety seconds[1][3].
- A month later Merck’s API operations were not yet producing bulk product. Merck went on to report $260 million of lost sales in 2017 and $150 million in 2018[2][4].
- The UK and US governments attributed NotPetya to the Russian military in February 2018, and a 2020 US indictment charged officers of GRU Unit 74455[5][6][7].
- Most of Merck’s property insurers denied cover under a “hostile or warlike action” exclusion. Merck won in 2021 and 2023, and the case settled on confidential terms on January 3, 2024[1][8].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | per the UK and US governments]
- Access vector: Supply Chain [confirmed | T1195.002, M.E.Doc updates]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed]; System Outage [confirmed]; Data Sabotage [reported | T1486, malware-level]
- OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No control system attacked]
- OT impact: Not established [unknown | No control-system effect reported]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | $410M lost sales]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | $285M]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed | $45M recovered]; Reputation Damage [confirmed | share price]; Data Loss [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]
What happened
On June 27, 2017, Merck said on Twitter that its network had been “compromised”[9]. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey later recorded that about 10,000 machines in Merck’s global network were infected within ninety seconds, and over 40,000 in total, and that the malware reached at least sixty-four countries[1]. Bloomberg, citing an unnamed person familiar with the matter, reported more than 30,000 laptop and desktop computers and 7,500 servers among them[10].
A month after the attack, Merck said packaging was “largely restored”, formulation “partially restored” and API (active pharmaceutical ingredient) operations “not yet producing bulk product”. External manufacturing was not affected, and Merck continued to fulfill orders and ship product[2]. In the third quarter, Merck borrowed GARDASIL 9, its HPV vaccine, from the CDC’s Pediatric Vaccine Stockpile. It said the borrowing was “driven in part by the temporary production shutdown resulting from the cyber-attack, as well as overall higher demand than originally planned”[11]. Bloomberg reported 1.8 million doses borrowed and 18 months to replenish[10].
Merck claimed under twenty-six “all risk” property policies with $1.75 billion in total limits above a $150 million deductible, not under a cyber policy. It gave notice of loss in July 2017 and sued on August 2, 2018; on August 20, 2018, most insurers denied coverage under the war exclusion[1]. The trial court granted Merck partial summary judgment on December 6, 2021, and the Appellate Division affirmed on May 1, 2023[1][12]. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed to hear the insurers’ appeal in July 2023[13]. The case settled on January 3, 2024, just before oral argument, and its terms are confidential[8].
Intent: malicious
NotPetya displayed a ransom note, but Cisco Talos judged the attack “destructive in nature”[3]. It overwrote the boot sector of infected machines without saving a copy[14]. No source reports a ransom paid by Merck. The intrusion was deliberate; what the record does not show is that Merck was singled out. NotPetya spread as an indiscriminate worm, and Merck was one of the companies doing business in Ukraine that used M.E.Doc[1].
Threat actors: the Russian military, per two governments
On February 15, 2018, the UK and US governments each attributed NotPetya to the Russian military. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre said “the Russian military was almost certainly responsible”[5], and the White House said that in June 2017 “the Russian military launched the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history”[6]. In October 2020, a US federal indictment charged officers of GRU Unit 74455, which researchers track as Sandworm Team[7].
One caveat matters for this case. In Merck’s insurance dispute the parties disputed attribution, and the courts did not need to decide it[1]. The map shows Nation-State as confirmed, on the two governments’ statements.
Access vector: a poisoned software update
The entry route is stated by the court. Merck “received the malicious updates through its server located in Ukraine” from M.E.Doc, and Kroll, the insurers’ own consultant, reached the same conclusion[1]. Cisco Talos found that an unknown actor had stolen an M.E.Doc administrator’s credentials and redirected the software’s update server to a host it controlled; Talos says 80% of Ukrainian businesses use M.E.Doc[3]. In MITRE ATT&CK terms this is Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1195.002[15]. The map shows Supply Chain as confirmed.
IT impact: a fast, destructive worm
Inside a network, NotPetya spread with the EternalBlue and EternalRomance SMBv1 exploits, whose flaws Microsoft had patched in March 2017. It also ran on other machines through PsExec and WMI, using credentials gathered with a Mimikatz-like tool. It then encrypted files and disk structures and overwrote the boot sector[14][16].
That is how the malware behaved wherever it ran. No source says which of these methods carried the spread inside Merck, and no Merck source describes what happened to the data beyond “infected”[1]. The infection and the outage of Merck’s systems are confirmed; data sabotage is shown as reported, from the malware-level descriptions.
OT targeting: an indirect hit through IT
Merck’s production stopped because the IT it depends on was disabled. No source says that production-line control equipment was itself infected, as distinct from the IT that manufacturing relies on, and no controller is described as corrupted, reflashed or replaced. That makes this an indirect OT consequence through an IT dependency. MITRE’s NotPetya entry maps the halted vaccine production to Loss of Productivity and Revenue, T0828[16][17].
OT sophistication: not applicable
With no attack on a control system described, there is no OT technique to rate. NotPetya was an indiscriminate Windows worm, and its effect on Merck’s plants came through the IT it disabled[14]. This stage is marked Not applicable, consistent with the indirect classification above.
OT impact: production stopped, control systems not shown to be touched
The consequence for production is confirmed by Merck. A month after the attack, API operations were not yet producing bulk product and formulation was only partly restored, while external manufacturing was unaffected[2]. What is not established is whether any control system was reached at all. No source describes an effect on a control system, so no OT impact technique is shown and the stage is marked unknown.
Perils: no physical event
There was no physical event. NotPetya infected and disabled computers, and Merck’s API, formulation and packaging operations stopped and were restored over weeks[2]. No source reports fire, explosion, equipment damage or any other physical peril, and no fatality, injury or environmental consequence is documented.
A plant can stop without a single control system being attacked, if the IT it runs on goes down.
Financial losses: what it cost
Merck’s own releases are the authority for lost sales: $260 million in 2017, about $135 million in the third quarter and $125 million in the fourth, and $150 million in 2018[11][18][4]. Merck’s 2018 annual report, as quoted by Bloomberg and Fierce Pharma, put lost sales at $410 million across the two years, other attack-related expenses at $285 million, and insurance payments recovered at $45 million[19]. By our addition, lost sales and expenses come to about $695 million. Bloomberg described Merck’s initial estimate as $870 million of damages by the end of 2017, and Merck alleged $1.4 billion of losses in its insurance suit[10][8]. The figures have different scopes and are not reconciled.
The GARDASIL 9 borrowing cut third-quarter 2017 sales by about $240 million, but replenishment added about $115 million back in the fourth quarter and $125 million in 2018, and Merck did not say how much of the borrowing the attack caused[11][18][4]. It is not counted as a loss. A 2025 event study by Ryan, Withers and den Hartog found a one-year cumulative abnormal return of −10.5% for Merck’s shares, reversing to +10.2% after two years.
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost sales; Network event response and recovery; Insurance recovery and coverage dispute under the property program; Market valuation
- Reported amounts: $410M Lost sales across 2017 and 2018, according to Merck[4][19]; $260M Lost sales in 2017, part of the $410M, according to Merck[18]; $285M Other attack-related expenses, from Merck’s 2018 annual report as quoted by Fierce Pharma[19]; $45M Insurance payments recovered by the time of that report, from the same source[19]; $1,400M Losses Merck alleged in its insurance suit, not the settlement amount, according to Bloomberg Law[8]
- Estimated: $870M Initial estimate of damages by the end of 2017
- Estimate note: Bloomberg’s description of Merck’s initial estimate[10]; its scope differs from the components above.
- Implied: Manual operations and workarounds; Production data integrity; Proprietary data recovery; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement
- Not supported: Materials and product loss; Ransom payment; Cyber insurance (no cyber policy); Personal data breach response; Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Regulatory action or liability; Third-party physical and societal impact
When the Appellate Division ruled, eight insurers were still contesting $699,475,000 in coverage, just under forty percent of the program[1]. What Merck finally recovered is not known: the January 2024 settlement terms were not disclosed[8][20].
What this incident shows
Merck’s plants stopped without any reported attack on their control systems. One entry point, an accounting application on a server in Ukraine, led to a worm that reached over 40,000 machines, and production depended on that IT[1][2]. The record names two contributing gaps: SMB flaws left exploitable about three months after Microsoft’s patch, and a network that let one infection reach manufacturing, research and sales worldwide. Neither is confirmed for Merck beyond what the scale of the infection implies.
The insurance case is the second lesson. Merck relied on an all-risk property program, and its recovery turned on years of litigation over a war exclusion never drafted for a cyberattack[1][8]. Insurance lawyers say the industry has since added new exclusions in response to the Merck litigation and other NotPetya coverage disputes[21].
References
- Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. “Merck & Co., Inc. v. ACE American Insurance Co.” Opinion, Docket Nos. A-1879-21 and A-1882-21, 1 May 2023. troutman.com/images/content/3/3/337814/Merck-Opinion.pdf
- Merck & Co., Inc. “Merck Announces Second-Quarter 2017 Financial Results.” Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 July 2017. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000310158/000110465917047544/a17-18477_1ex99d1.htm
- Maynor, David, Matt Olney, and Yves Younan. “The MeDoc Connection.” Cisco Talos Blog, 5 July 2017. blog.talosintelligence.com/the-medoc-connection/
- Merck & Co., Inc. “Merck Announces Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2018 Financial Results.” Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1 Feb. 2019. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310158/000110465919004932/a19-3795_1ex99d1.htm
- Sharwood, Simon. “UK Names Russia as Source of NotPetya, USA Follows Suit.” The Register, 15 Feb. 2018. theregister.com/2018/02/15/uk_names_russian_military_as_source_of_notpetya/
- The White House. “Statement by the Press Secretary on the ‘NotPetya’ Cyber-Attack.” The American Presidency Project, 15 Feb. 2018. presidency.ucsb.edu/node/331956
- U.S. Department of Justice. “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace.” Office of Public Affairs, 19 Oct. 2020. justice.gov/opa/pr/six-russian-gru-officers-charged-connection-worldwide-deployment-destructive-malware-and
- Ebert, Alex. “Merck $1.4 Billion Cyberhack Settlement Ends ‘Warlike’ Act Claim.” Bloomberg Law, 4 Jan. 2024. news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/merck-1-4-billion-cyberhack-settlement-ends-warlike-act-claim
- Associated Press. “Merck Hit by Cyberattack.” The Washington Times, 27 June 2017. m.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/27/merck-hit-by-cyberattack/
- Voreacos, David, Katherine Chiglinsky, and Riley Griffin. “Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck Cyber Attack’s $1.3 Billion Insurance Question.” Claims Journal (Bloomberg), 3 Dec. 2019. claimsjournal.com/news/national/2019/12/03/294354.htm
- Merck & Co., Inc. “Merck Announces Third-Quarter 2017 Financial Results.” Merck, 27 Oct. 2017. merck.com/news/merck-announces-third-quarter-2017-financial-results/
- Vittorio, Andrea. “Merck’s $1.4 Billion Insurance Win Splits Cyber from ‘Act of War’.” Bloomberg Law, 19 Jan. 2022. news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/mercks-1-4-billion-insurance-win-splits-cyber-from-act-of-war
- DeField, Andrea, Adriana A. Perez, and Kevin V. Small. “Supreme Court of New Jersey to Hear Merck Cyberattack Case.” Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog, 28 July 2023. hunton.com/hunton-insurance-recovery-blog/supreme-court-of-new-jersey-to-hear-merck-cyberattack-case
- Cisco Talos. “New Ransomware Variant ‘Nyetya’ Compromises Systems Worldwide.” Cisco Talos Blog, 27 June 2017. blog.talosintelligence.com/worldwide-ransomware-variant/
- MITRE. “Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1195.002.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
- MITRE. “NotPetya, Software S0368.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0368/
- MITRE. “Loss of Productivity and Revenue, T0828.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828/
- Merck & Co., Inc. “Merck Announces Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2017 Financial Results.” Merck, 2 Feb. 2018. merck.com/news/merck-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2017-financial-results
- Sagonowsky, Eric. “Merck, Insurers Fight over $1.3B in Damages from Cyberattack: Bloomberg.” Fierce Pharma, 4 Dec. 2019. fiercepharma.com/pharma/merck-insurers-fight-over-1-3-billion-damages-from-cyberattack-bloomberg
- Jones, David. “Merck Reaches Settlement in Closely Watched NotPetya Insurance Case.” Cybersecurity Dive, 8 Jan. 2024. cybersecuritydive.com/news/merck-settlement-notpetya/703922/
- Guilbert, Shelby. “Merck Settlement of $1.4 Billion Coverage Dispute over NotPetya Cyberattack Places Renewed Spotlight on War Exclusions in 2024.” McGuireWoods Pro Policyholder, 29 Feb. 2024. blogs.mcguirewoods.com/2024/02/29/merck-settlement-1-4-billion-coverage-dispute-notpetya-cyberattack-places-renewed-spotlight-war-exclusions-2024/


