Date
June 27, 2017
Location
United States
Industry
Food & Beverage
Access vector
Supply Chain
OT targeting
Indirect: IT dependency
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
About 9 days

Mondelez NotPetya cyberattack, 2017

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Mondelez NotPetya cyberattack, 2017

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

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    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On June 27, 2017, the NotPetya malware outbreak hit Mondelez International, the snack-food company behind Cadbury and Oreo, and left about 1,700 servers and 24,000 laptops permanently dysfunctional, according to the company’s later lawsuit[1]. Production stopped that night at Cadbury’s Claremont factory in Hobart, Tasmania, after the site’s IT systems went down[2][3].

        Why it matters. It is a clear documented case of a production line stopping because of an IT-only outage, with no sign that the factory’s control equipment was touched. It also produced one of the best-known insurance disputes over a cyberattack, which ended in 2022 with no ruling on the war exclusion at its center[4][5].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Most of what is known about the techniques comes from analyses of NotPetya in general, not of Mondelez, and this account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • NotPetya affected “a significant portion of the company’s global Windows-based applications and its sales, distribution and financial networks”, Mondelez said; staff worked offline and the company kept up sales and production “at a reduced capacity”[6][3].
        • Cadbury’s Claremont factory stopped on the night of June 27 and was expected back in full production about three days later. No source says its production equipment was infected[2].
        • Mondelez reported $84 million of incremental recovery expenses and a 0.4% negative impact on 2017 net revenue growth[7].
        • Mondelez sued its property insurer, Zurich American Insurance Co., for more than $100 million after Zurich invoked a war exclusion; the case settled mid-trial in October 2022 on undisclosed terms[1][4].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | Russian military, per the US government]
        • Access vector: Supply Chain [reported | M.E.Doc route of the outbreak; Mondelez entry not established]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | NotPetya]; System Outage [confirmed]; Data Sabotage [inferred | T1486, T1485]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | Indirect impact, no OT technique]
        • OT impact: Not established [unknown | No OT system shown to be touched]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | $103.6M est.]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | $84M]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed]; Reputation Damage [confirmed]

        What happened

        On June 27, 2017, Mondelez was struck by the same NotPetya outbreak that hit Merck and Maersk. Across the outbreak, NotPetya entered through a trojanized update to M.E.Doc, Ukrainian accounting software[8]. No source says how it entered Mondelez’s own network. A Mondelez spokesman said: “Our teams are working offline in an effort to maintain business continuity with our customers and consumers around the world”[3].

        At Cadbury’s Claremont factory in Hobart, the site’s IT systems went down on the night of June 27 and production stopped[3][2]. On June 29, John Short of the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union told ABC News that boiler rooms and other peripheral facilities were running, limited production had restarted, and full production was expected by the Friday afternoon shift[2].

        On July 6, Mondelez said “a critical majority of the affected systems are up and running again”. It said its ability to ship and invoice was disrupted in the last four days of the quarter, and gave a preliminary estimate of a negative 300 basis points on second-quarter revenue growth[9]. On August 2 it put the impact at 2.3% of net revenue growth and 2.4% of Organic Revenue growth[6], and its CEO said the business was not yet “back to normal”[10]. In the third quarter, recovered shipments added 0.6% to net revenue, but slower restoration in North America lost more revenue[11]. The 10-K for 2017 reported a 0.4% negative impact on net revenue growth and $84 million of incremental recovery expenses, and called the recovery “largely resolved”[7].

        In October 2018, Mondelez sued Zurich American Insurance Co. in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois[12]. Zurich had denied the claim under the policy’s exclusion for “hostile or warlike action” by a government or its agents[1]. The case settled in late October 2022, in the second week of the jury trial[4].

        Intent: malicious

        NotPetya was a deliberate attack. It encrypted files and disk structures and left machines unusable, and the US government described it as the work of the Russian military[13][14]. No source says Mondelez was chosen as a target. It was one of many victims of a self-spreading outbreak. No ransom was paid.

        Threat actors: the Russian military

        On February 15, 2018, the White House said: “In June 2017, the Russian military launched the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history”[14]. On October 19, 2020, as six officers of GRU Military Unit 74455 were indicted, the US State Department said NotPetya had been attributed to Russian military intelligence[15]. Security researchers call that unit Sandworm.

        The attribution concerns the NotPetya outbreak as a whole, not Mondelez specifically. It is shown as confirmed because it rests on formal government statements.

        Access vector: the M.E.Doc route, reported for Mondelez

        Across the outbreak, an actor stole an M.E.Doc administrator’s credentials and redirected the software’s update traffic. Cisco Talos concluded that “all installations came through the M.E.Doc update system”[8]. Computing, covering Mondelez’s lawsuit, says the malware spread from that route to multinationals operating in Ukraine[16]. That is the outbreak’s route, reported for Mondelez, not confirmed: no source states how NotPetya entered Mondelez’s network, or which of its systems were unpatched.

        Once inside a network, NotPetya spread with the EternalBlue and EternalRomance SMB exploits and with stolen credentials[13]. Control Engineering says the attack on Mondelez “included the theft of thousands of user credentials”[17]; no investigator with access has confirmed how it spread inside Mondelez.

        IT impact: a global Windows outage

        The IT damage is confirmed by Mondelez itself. The malware affected a significant portion of its global Windows-based applications and its sales, distribution and financial networks[6]. Its complaint against Zurich says the attack “rendered permanently dysfunctional approximately 1700 of MDLZ’s servers” and about 24,000 laptops[1]. ABC News reported that the virus “shut computers down” at the Cadbury factory[2].

        MITRE maps NotPetya’s encryption of files and the master boot record to Data Encrypted for Impact[13]. For Mondelez, data sabotage is inferred from the confirmed effect, machines that never came back; no Mondelez forensics are public. Mondelez said it had not found any instances of company or personal data released externally[6].

        OT targeting: an IT dependency

        NotPetya was a broad, indiscriminate Windows worm with no OT-specific technique. The Claremont halt is described as following from the site’s IT systems going down[3][2]. No source states that NotPetya infected the factory’s PLCs, SCADA or other process-control equipment. The production line may never have been touched by the malware, but it still could not run without the IT layer the malware destroyed. That makes this an indirect OT impact through an IT dependency.

        The production line may never have been touched, but it could not run without the IT systems that were.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No OT technique is documented. The production stoppage came from the loss of IT systems the plant relied on, not from any action on process-control equipment, so there is no OT capability to classify. This stage is marked Not applicable.

        OT impact: not established

        Production genuinely stopped at Claremont, and Mondelez ran sales and production at reduced capacity elsewhere[2][6]. Those are losses of production, not effects on control systems. No source describes a loss of view or control, or any manipulation, on plant-floor equipment at any Mondelez site. Whether any plant-floor system was touched remains unknown.

        Perils: no physical event

        NotPetya destroyed data and disabled Windows computers. No source reports fire, explosion, equipment damage, a release or an injury at any Mondelez site. The Claremont stoppage was a production halt caused by the IT outage, not a physical peril.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        Mondelez disclosed its recovery expenses in dollars and its revenue impact as percentages. For the full year it reported $84 million of incremental expenses, “predominantly during the second half of 2017 as part of the recovery effort”, and a 0.4% negative impact on net revenue growth[7]. The quarterly figures are the path to that total, not additions to it: $7.1 million of expenses in the second quarter, $54 million for the first nine months[6][11]. Third parties land in the same range as our estimate: Security Ledger put the full cost “closer to $180 million”, and ICS STRIVE between $150 million and $188 million[18][19].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity; Manual operations and workarounds; Contract violation obligation (unfulfilled customer orders, as pleaded); Network event response and recovery; Server replacement (about 1,700 servers); Computer and laptop replacement (about 24,000 laptops); Cyber-physical cover response (denied property claim and litigation); Market valuation
        • Reported amounts: $84M Incremental recovery expenses in 2017, from Mondelez’s 10-K[7]; $140M Second-quarter organic net revenue impact, according to the CFO on the August 2 investor call, most of which was recovered in the third quarter[10]
        • Estimated: $103.6M Lost 2017 revenue (not lost profit), from the 10-K’s 0.4% on a base of about $25.9 billion
        • Estimate note: The revenue estimate is our arithmetic on the 10-K’s percentage, using the revenue base Security Ledger used[18]; with the $84M of expenses it gives about $188M.
        • Not supported: Sensitive personal data response; Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation liability

        Mondelez’s complaint claimed losses “well in excess of $100,000,000” under an all-risk property policy, including the servers and laptops, unfulfilled orders and reduced margins[1]. That amount was sought, not lost. The case ended when Judge Mary Roberts granted a joint motion to dismiss; terms were not disclosed and each side bears its own costs[4][20]. No court ruled on whether the war exclusion applied, and no recovery is recorded[5]. An academic event study found a one-year abnormal return of minus 13.0% on Mondelez shares, reversing to plus 6.0% after two years[21].

        What this incident shows

        Claremont is the lesson. The factory floor had no documented fallback that let production continue without the corporate IT layer, so an attack that touched no control system still stopped a production line the same night[2]. The gap here is dependency, not segmentation: keeping malware away from the plant network would not have kept the line running.

        The rest of the case is about recovery and who pays. The site was back in limited production in about two days, while the company-wide rebuild of servers and laptops ran past August[2][10]. The four-year dispute with Zurich, settled without a ruling, left no ruling on whether the war exclusion applied to NotPetya[5].

        References

        1. “Zurich Rejects Mondelez’ $100 Million NotPetya Insurance Claim Citing ‘Act of War’.” SecurityWeek. securityweek.com/zurich-rejects-mondelez-100-million-notpetya-insurance-claim-citing-act-war/
        2. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. “Cadbury’s Tasmania Factory Returning to Normal After Cyber Attack, Union Says.” ABC News, 29 June 2017. abc.net.au/news/2017-06-29/cadburys-tasmanian-factory-returns-to-normal-after-cyber-attack/8663234
        3. “Food Manufacturers Hit by New Cyber Attack.” Food Manufacture, 30 June 2017. foodmanufacture.co.uk/Article/2017/06/30/Food-manufacturers-hit-by-new-cyber-attack/
        4. “Oreo Maker Settles With Insurer Over NotPetya Damages Claim.” BankInfoSecurity, 2 Nov. 2022. bankinfosecurity.net/oreo-maker-settles-insurer-over-notpetya-damages-claim-a-20396
        5. “Zurich and Mondelez Reach NotPetya Settlement, but Cyber-Risk May Increase.” Infosecurity Magazine, 3 Nov. 2022. infosecurity-magazine.com/news/notpetya-settlement-may-increase/
        6. Mondelez International. “Mondelez International Reports Q2 Results.” Earnings release, Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1, 2 Aug. 2017. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001103982/000119312517244956/d435557dex991.htm
        7. Mondelez International. Form 10-K for fiscal year 2017, Feb. 2018. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001103982/000119312518037332/d466496d10k.htm
        8. Cisco Talos. “The MeDoc Connection.” 5 July 2017. blog.talosintelligence.com/the-medoc-connection/
        9. Mondelez International. “Mondelez International Provides Update on Cyber-Attack and Preliminary Estimate of Financial Impacts.” Press release, 6 July 2017. ir.mondelezinternational.com/news-releases/news-release-details/update-cyber-attack-and-preliminary-estimate-financial-impacts
        10. “Mondelez Not Yet Back to Normal from Cyber Attack.” Food Business News, 8 Aug. 2017. foodbusinessnews.net/articles/9725-mondelez-not-yet-back-to-normal-from-cyber-attack
        11. Mondelez International. Third-quarter 2017 earnings release, Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1, 30 Oct. 2017. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001103982/000119312517324893/d471784dex991.htm
        12. Corcoran, Brian. “What Mondelez v. Zurich May Reveal About Cyber Insurance in the Age of Digital Conflict.” Lawfare, 8 Mar. 2019. lawfaremedia.org/article/what-mondelez-v-zurich-may-reveal-about-cyber-insurance-age-digital-conflict
        13. MITRE. “NotPetya, Software S0368.” MITRE ATT&CK (accessed 22 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/software/S0368/
        14. The White House. “Statement from the Press Secretary.” 15 Feb. 2018. trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25
        15. US Department of State. Statement by Secretary Michael R. Pompeo on the indictment of six GRU Military Unit 74455 officers, 19 Oct. 2020, as carried by GlobalSecurity.org. globalsecurity.org/intell/library/news/2020/intell-201019-state01.htm
        16. “Cadbury Owner Mondelez Sues Zurich for Refusing to Pay Up over NotPetya Cyber Attack.” Computing, 11 Jan. 2019. computing.co.uk/news/3069250/cadbury-owner-mondelez-sues-zurich-for-refusing-to-pay-up-on-cyber-security-insurance-policy
        17. “Throwback Attack: The NotPetya Malware Causes Serious Damage to Snack Giant Mondelez.” Control Engineering / Industrial Cybersecurity Pulse, undated. controleng.com/throwback-attack-the-notpetya-malware-causes-serious-damage-to-snack-giant-mondelez/
        18. “Sour Patch: NotPetya’s Cost to Mondelez Tops $80 Million.” Security Ledger, 14 Feb. 2018. securityledger.com/2018/02/sour-patch-notpetyas-cost-mondelez-tops-80-million/
        19. ICS STRIVE. “Mondelez Ransomware Attack.” icsstrive.com/incident/mondelez-ransomware-attack/
        20. “Mondelez Settlement in NotPetya Case Renews Concerns About Cyber Insurance Coverage.” Cybersecurity Dive, 8 Nov. 2022. cybersecuritydive.com/news/mondelez-zurich-notpetya-cyber-insurance-settlement/636029/
        21. Ryan, Matthew, Glenn Withers, and Frank den Hartog. “The Impact of Extreme Cyberattacks on Market Valuations: An In-Depth Economic Analysis.” Australian Journal of Management, 2025. doi.org/10.1177/03128962251383120