Date
August 3, 2018
Location
Taiwan
Industry
Manufacturing
Access vector
Supply Chain
OT targeting
Indirect: supply chain
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
3 days

TSMC fab tool virus outbreak, WannaCry variant, 2018

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: TSMC fab tool virus outbreak, WannaCry variant, 2018

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On the evening of Friday, August 3, 2018, a variant of the WannaCry virus entered TSMC’s network on a new tool that had not been isolated and checked before it was connected[1]. It spread to fab tools and automated materials handling systems running unpatched Windows 7, which crashed or rebooted over and over, and TSMC shut them down[1].

        Why it matters. No attacker was involved: a commissioning mistake put an old worm into production and affected wafer production at TSMC’s fabs in Taiwan[1][2]. TSMC recognized a loss of NT$2,596,046 thousand for the incident[2].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. TSMC’s own disclosures are unusually complete and are its main source. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • TSMC said the outbreak came from “misoperation during the software installation process for a new tool”, which “was not first isolated and confirmed to be virus-free” before it was connected[1].
        • About 80% of impacted tools were back by 14:00 Taiwan time on August 5, and all by August 6[3][2].
        • TSMC put the effect at about 2% of third-quarter revenue and about one percentage point of gross margin, revising a first estimate of 3%[4][3].
        • It was not a ransom event. TSMC describes no demand, and says data integrity and confidential information were not compromised[1][3].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Accidental [confirmed | commissioning mistake]
        • Threat actors: Not applicable [not in path | No adversary action; virus, not a hack]
        • Access vector: Supply Chain [confirmed | T0862, new tool not isolated]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | WannaCry variant]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: Supply Chain [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: None [not in path | No fab-aware logic]
        • OT impact: Inhibit Response [confirmed | T0816]; Loss / Denial of Control [confirmed | T0826, loss of availability]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | NT$2.6B loss]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied | restart validation]

        What happened

        On August 4, TSMC said its tool and production line systems had been hit by a virus, not by a hacker attack[5]. Its Form 6-K of August 6 identified the malware as “a variant of the WannaCry virus, which caused infected tools to crash or continually reboot”. It reached fab tools and automated materials handling systems “which used Windows 7 without patched software for their tool automation interface”[1].

        TSMC “immediately shut down affected tools and automated materials handling systems, and applied patches to all affected tools and systems”[1]. The degree of infection varied by fab[3]. Taiwan press reported Fabs 12, 14 and 15 as affected, without TSMC confirmation[5]. About 80% of impacted tools were recovered by 14:00 on Sunday, August 5, and all by August 6[3][2]. TSMC’s primary computer systems, including production information and customer data, were not affected[1].

        TSMC’s press release of August 5 estimated the impact at about 3% of third-quarter revenue and about one percentage point of gross margin; the next day’s 6-K said “no more than two percent”[3][1]. On October 18, CFO Lora Ho put it at about 2% and 1%, and said TSMC had made up about 75% of the affected shipments within the quarter[4]. The same day, CEO C.C. Wei said: “The infection was due to misoperation and insufficient firewall controls”[6]. In November, TSMC’s financial statements recorded a loss of NT$2,596,046 thousand, first reported by the Taipei Times[7][2].

        Intent: accidental

        TSMC names its own cause: a misoperation while installing software on a new tool, with insufficient firewall controls[1][6]. No adversary action is alleged, and TSMC said on August 4 that this was a virus, not a hacker attack[5]. That makes this an accidental event that happens to involve malware.

        It is also not part of the May 2017 WannaCry campaign. It came fifteen months later, as a variant, through a different entry path and with no ransom component.

        Threat actors: none

        No actor is named by TSMC or by any source. The variant made tools crash or reboot, and TSMC describes no ransom demand, no encryption for payment and no negotiation[1]. Because the malware arrived through a commissioning mistake rather than an intrusion, no threat actor is highlighted on the map, and the stage is marked Not applicable.

        Access vector: a new tool connected unchecked

        The virus came in during “the software installation process for a new tool”, which “was not first isolated and confirmed to be virus-free before connecting to the Company’s computer network”[1]. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms that is Supply Chain Compromise, T0862[8]. TSMC does not name the tool’s supplier, and does not say whether the virus came from the vendor’s software or from installation media. The map shows Supply Chain as confirmed in that sense: the infection arrived with incoming equipment, not through an attacker.

        IT impact: a worm on unpatched Windows 7

        The variant spread from the new tool to fab tools and automated materials handling systems whose tool automation interface ran Windows 7 without patches, and patching was the fix[1]. WannaCry spreads by exploiting SMBv1 on remote systems[9]; TSMC does not name the exploit, so that route is inferred. TSMC says its primary computer systems, including production information and customer data, were not affected, and that data integrity and confidential information were not compromised[1][3].

        OT targeting: indirect, through the supply chain

        The infection reached production assets. TSMC names fab tools and automated materials handling systems: production equipment under computerized control, not corporate IT and not process controllers[1]. The route in was a new tool being commissioned, and no one aimed at the fab, so the targeting is classified as indirect, through the supply chain. TSMC does not describe any process controller being infected.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        A WannaCry variant has no fab-aware logic. Its effect on the tools, crashes and continual reboots, came from generic malware behavior on Windows hosts, not from any manipulation of a manufacturing process[1]. With no attacker and no process-specific technique, there is nothing to grade, and the stage is marked as not in the path.

        OT impact: tools crashing and rebooting

        Infected tools crashed or rebooted over and over, which MITRE classifies as Device Restart/Shutdown, T0816[1][10]. The outbreak also “rendered certain automated materials handling systems unable to function normally”, and TSMC shut down the affected tools and systems[1]. MITRE calls that Loss of Availability, T0826[11]; it is shown on the map as Loss / Denial of Control. Wafer production in Taiwan was impacted[2]. No source describes the manufacturing process itself being acted on.

        Perils: no physical event

        There was no physical event. Tools crashed or rebooted and were shut down, patched and brought back; all impacted tools were recovered by August 6[1][2]. No source reports fire, equipment damage, a release or an injury.

        An unchecked tool arriving at the fab was enough to stop production, with no attacker involved.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        TSMC recognized a loss of NT$2,596,046 thousand, about NT$2.6 billion, for the three months ended September 30, 2018, included in cost of revenue[2]. It is TSMC’s only currency figure for the incident and has no breakdown, so any response, restart and improvement costs are inside it. TSMC also measured the effect on the quarter: about 2% of revenue and about one percentage point of gross margin[4]. It made up about 75% of the affected shipments within the quarter and said the rest would be recovered in the fourth; the revenue effect was mainly delay, not lost sales[4].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost and delayed production (the NT$2,596,046 thousand loss TSMC recognized); Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Implied: Startup and return-to-service validation
        • Not supported: Production data integrity (TSMC says data was not compromised); Ransom or extortion

        The figure of about $250 million that circulates is not TSMC’s. The Hacker News gave TSMC’s first 3% estimate as “approx. 250 Million” and CNBC as “$255 million”[12][13]. The Taipei Times later called a $253.5 million to $256.5 million range company estimates[7], which TSMC’s own documents do not support. TSMC gives no dollar figure.

        What this incident shows

        One control would have prevented this incident: quarantine of incoming equipment before it is connected. TSMC says itself that the new tool was neither isolated nor checked, and that the tools the virus reached ran unpatched Windows 7[1]. From one tool, the virus reached tools in several fabs, and TSMC’s CEO named insufficient firewall controls as a cause[3][6].

        Recovery was fast. About 80% of tools were back less than two days after a Friday-evening outbreak, and TSMC quantified the impact in a securities filing on August 6[3][1]. Its fixes target the same gaps: an automated system to prevent the misoperation from happening again, enhanced firewall controls for fab isolation, and network control for each computer[6].

        References

        1. TSMC. “TSMC Provides Additional Information on August 3 Computer Virus Incident.” Form 6-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 6 Aug. 2018. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000119312518238975/d588173d6k.htm
        2. TSMC. “2018 Annual Report, Note 41: Significant Losses from Disasters.” Financial statements, p. 230. investor.tsmc.com/static/annualReports/2018/english/ebook/files/basic-html/page230.html
        3. TSMC. “TSMC Details Impact of Computer Virus Incident.” Press release, Hsinchu, 5 Aug. 2018. pr.tsmc.com/english/news/1969
        4. TSMC. “TSMC Reports Third Quarter EPS of NT$3.44.” Press release furnished on Form 6-K, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 18 Oct. 2018. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001046179/000119312518301425/d621184d6k.htm
        5. “最新聲明/台積電遭病毒感染 產線預計1天內恢復生產 [Latest statement: TSMC hit by virus infection, production lines expected to recover within one day].” ETtoday Finance, 4 Aug. 2018. finance.ettoday.net/news/1227795
        6. TSMC. Third-quarter 2018 earnings conference call, 18 Oct. 2018, transcript via Roic AI. roic.ai/quote/TSM:US/transcripts/2018-year/3-quarter
        7. Wang, Lisa. “TSMC books post-virus loss of NT$2.6bn.” Taipei Times, 16 Nov. 2018. taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2018/11/16/2003704292
        8. MITRE. “Supply Chain Compromise, T0862.” MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862/
        9. MITRE. “WannaCry, Software S0366.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20. attack.mitre.org/software/S0366/
        10. MITRE. “Device Restart/Shutdown, T0816.” MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816/
        11. MITRE. “Loss of Availability, T0826.” MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826/
        12. Khandelwal, Swati. Report on the TSMC virus outbreak. The Hacker News, 6 Aug. 2018. thehackernews.com/2018/08/tsmc-iphone-computer-virus.html
        13. Report on the TSMC virus and Apple iPhone chip supplies. CNBC, 6 Aug. 2018. cnbc.com/2018/08/06/tsmc-virus-worries-over-apple-iphone-chip-supplies.html