- Date
- March 18, 2019
- Location
- Norway
- Industry
- Mining
- Access vector
- Phishing
- OT targeting
- Indirect: abundance of caution
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- Several weeks
Norsk Hydro LockerGoga ransomware attack, 2019

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. Just after midnight CET on March 19, 2019, Norsk Hydro detected unusual server activity and disconnected all servers and PCs across its global organization[1]. LockerGoga ransomware, pushed from Hydro’s own domain controllers with captured administrative credentials, had locked files on thousands of servers and PCs[2][3]. Hydro isolated its plants and ran them manually where it could, paid no ransom, and puts the total cost at around NOK 800 million[3][2][4].
Why it matters. Hydro describes no infection of its plant control systems, yet output in its extrusion business fell sharply for weeks, because the company cut its plants off from the compromised IT network and ran them by hand[3][5].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Most of it comes from Hydro itself, and its figures are given in Norwegian kroner, as Hydro reported them. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- About three months before the attack, an employee opened an infected email from a trusted customer that installed a Trojan. The attackers later captured administrative credentials and pushed LockerGoga from Hydro’s domain controllers[2].
- Hydro isolated all plants and moved to manual operations, and said the problem had not led to any safety-related incidents. One week in, Extruded Solutions ran at 70 to 80%[3][5].
- Hydro paid no ransom and rebuilt encrypted PCs and servers from backups, with help from Microsoft’s Detection and Response Team[2][4].
- Hydro puts the total cost at around NOK 800 million. It recognized NOK 216 million of insurance compensation in 2019, and Hydro Extrusions’ 2020 results include NOK 496 million more[4][6][7].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Cyber Criminals [confirmed | per Kripos]
- Access vector: Phishing [confirmed | T1566.001]; Credential Theft [confirmed | T1078.002, admin credentials]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | LockerGoga]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | servers and PCs disconnected]
- OT targeting: Indirect: Abundance of Caution [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | OT not reached]
- OT impact: Loss / Denial of Control [reported | T0827, per MITRE]; Loss / Denial of View [reported | T0829, per MITRE]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event attributed]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | NOK 800M total]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Reputation Damage [confirmed]; Privacy [confirmed]
What happened
Hydro’s security chief, Torstein Gimnes Are, later told Microsoft how it began. In December 2018, about three months before the attack, an employee unknowingly opened an infected email from a trusted customer, and its payload installed a Trojan on the PC; Hydro’s antivirus found the Trojan a few days later[2]. The attackers compromised standard users, then captured administrative credentials and pushed the ransomware manually from Hydro’s own domain controllers[2]. Norway’s National Security Authority confirmed the ransomware was LockerGoga, and NorCERT warned that the attack was combined with an attack on Active Directory[3][8]. All 35,000 employees in 40 countries were affected[2].
Hydro isolated all plants and operations and switched to manual operations “as far as possible”[3]. Staff worked with pen and paper in the first days, and retired employees who knew the old paper system volunteered to return to their plants. Microsoft’s Detection and Response Team (DART), which rated the case “maximum severity”, helped Hydro develop safe ways to restore its servers. Executives held daily press conferences and webcasts and let journalists into operations control rooms[2].
One week in, Primary Metal and Rolled Products ran at normal capacity with more manual operation, while Extruded Solutions ran at 70 to 80% and its Building Systems unit was almost at a standstill[5]. By April 12, Extruded Solutions averaged 85 to 90%, and Hydro said operations had largely returned to normal by the end of the second quarter[1][9]. On April 1, Hydro’s Karmøy aluminum plant had a power failure. Hydro listed it in its attack timeline but said the cause was not clear, and no source ties it to the attack[1][10].
Intent: malicious
A criminal group deployed ransomware on purpose, after about three months of access: it captured credentials and then pushed the ransomware to thousands of machines from the domain controllers[2]. That is a planned operation, not an accident.
Hydro refused to pay. Its security chief said “Paying the ransom will not help you out of the situation”, and the company restored its data from trusted backups instead[2]. The sources in this record do not describe the ransom demand itself.
Threat actors: criminals identified by police
In an operation announced by Europol in October 2021, police from eight countries targeted 12 individuals in raids in Ukraine and Switzerland; Norway’s Kripos confirmed that the targeted individuals were responsible for the Hydro attack[11].
In September 2025, the US Department of Justice charged Ukrainian national Volodymyr Viktorovich Tymoshchuk as an administrator of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex and Nefilim ransomware schemes[12]. The DOJ release does not name Norsk Hydro, and it dates the alleged LockerGoga compromises from July 2019, after the Hydro attack. No state attribution exists, and no government has issued a formal attribution statement for this attack.
Access vector: an infected email from a trusted customer
Phishing is confirmed by the victim. Hydro’s security chief told Microsoft that an employee opened an infected email from a trusted customer, which carried a payload that installed a Trojan[2]. Whether it was an attachment or a link is not stated, nor is the employee’s location. At the time of the attack, Recorded Future reported phishing as suspected but unconfirmed[13].
The attackers then captured administrative credentials, “allowing the hackers to command the entire IT infrastructure”[2]. Norway’s Data Protection Authority found the attacker had accessed Active Directory usernames and passwords[14]. How the credentials were captured is not published.
IT impact: thousands of machines encrypted
Encryption is confirmed. Hydro says encrypted PCs and servers were rebuilt from backups, and Microsoft reports files locked on thousands of servers and PCs[4][2]. When it detected the attack, Hydro disconnected all servers and PCs across its global organization[1]. LockerGoga samples tied to the attack appeared to be signed with an “ALISA LTD” certificate, since revoked; Hydro has not commented[13].
The exact mechanism used to push the ransomware is not published. Researcher Kevin Beaumont suggested scheduled tasks or services in Active Directory[15]. No server or PC count has been disclosed.
OT targeting: an abundance of caution
Production fell because Hydro chose to cut its plants off and run them by hand, not because the plants could not run without the encrypted systems. Hydro said it “isolated all plants and operations” and moved to manual operations where it could[3]. Nozomi Networks found LockerGoga has no functionality aimed at industrial devices or protocols and cannot spread on its own[16].
One source disagrees. MITRE’s ATT&CK page for LockerGoga says some of Hydro’s production systems were impacted[17]. Hydro’s own pages do not say so, and no public forensic report settles the point.
OT sophistication: not applicable
There is no OT technique to grade. On Hydro’s account the attack did not reach plant control systems, and the ransomware had no industrial capability[16]. This stage is marked not in path.
The attack’s skill lay on the IT side: months of quiet access, captured administrative credentials, and a push of the ransomware from the company’s own domain controllers[2].
OT impact: lost control only on MITRE’s reading
MITRE’s procedure examples for LockerGoga state that some of Hydro’s production systems were impacted and that the loss of control forced manual operations, citing Hydro’s cyber-attack page and a blog by Kevin Beaumont[17]. The Hydro page, as read for this analysis, does not say this. Loss of control and loss of view are therefore shown as reported, not confirmed.
What is confirmed is the effect of Hydro’s own decision: Extruded Solutions at 70 to 80% one week in, Building Systems almost at a standstill, and other business areas running at normal capacity with more manual work[5].
Perils: no physical event
No physical event is attributed to the attack. Hydro said the problem had not led to any safety-related incidents[3].
The one event that might suggest otherwise is a power failure at the Karmøy aluminum plant on April 1, 2019, which cost production capacity. Hydro listed it in its attack timeline, but said the cause was not clear and that no one was injured, and no source ties it to the attack[1][10]. The map shows No Perils.
The plants that kept producing did so because people could run them by hand while the IT network was rebuilt.
Financial losses: around NOK 800 million
Hydro reported the cost each quarter, in Norwegian kroner: NOK 300 to 350 million for the first quarter of 2019, NOK 250 to 300 million for the second, of which NOK 150 to 200 million in Extruded Solutions, and around NOK 650 to 750 million for the full year[18][9][19]. Its cyber-attack page later put the total at around NOK 800 million[4]. Hydro said most of the cost came from lost margins and volumes in Extruded Solutions[5]; the total also includes response and recovery costs, which Hydro has not split out. The figures overlap and are not additive.
An academic event study found a one-year cumulative abnormal return of -20.2% for Hydro’s shares after the disclosure, and +17.5% over two years[20].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (inside Hydro’s total of around NOK 800 million, with response and recovery costs); Manual operations and workarounds; Network event response and recovery (Microsoft DART); Server replacement (rebuilt from backups); Computer and laptop replacement (rebuilt from backups); Market valuation (share price study); Cyber insurance (compensation recognized); Sensitive personal data event response (breach notification to Datatilsynet)
- Implied: Contract violation obligation (reduced output for weeks, no penalties quantified)
- Not supported: Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation or liability; Bodily injury; Environmental damage
AIG was lead insurer[5][21]. Hydro recognized NOK 216 million of insurance compensation in 2019, most of it in Extruded Solutions’ result, and Hydro Extrusions’ 2020 results include NOK 496 million more[6][7]. Together that is at least NOK 712 million, a sum Hydro has not stated itself. No litigation or war-exclusion dispute is documented. Norway’s Data Protection Authority closed its breach case on May 12, 2021, without a fine[14].
What this incident shows
The ransomware did not need to reach a controller to cut production. Once the IT network could not be trusted, Hydro cut its plants off and ran them by hand, and Extruded Solutions, where most of the cost fell, ran below normal for weeks[3][5]. What turned one infected PC into a company-wide event was privileged access: captured administrative credentials and Hydro’s own domain controllers[2].
What limited the loss is documented in Hydro’s own words: plants isolated from IT, people able to run them manually, trusted backups that made a ransom payment unnecessary, and an outside response team[3][2]. When it closed its case, the Data Protection Authority cited Hydro’s measures on access management, detection and response, and security capability[14].
References
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “The Cyber Attack on Hydro in Brief.” Hydro, updated 12 Apr. 2019. hydro.com/globalassets/07-media/news/2019/cyber-attack/general-cyber-attack-presentation-april-12.pdf
- Briggs, Bill. “Hackers Hit Norsk Hydro with Ransomware. The Company Responded with Transparency.” Microsoft Source, 16 Dec. 2019. news.microsoft.com/source/features/digital-transformation/hackers-hit-norsk-hydro-ransomware-company-responded-transparency/
- “Norsk Hydro Cyber Attack: What Happened?” Help Net Security, 20 Mar. 2019, updated 21 Mar. 2019. helpnetsecurity.com/2019/03/20/norsk-hydro-cyber-attack/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Cyber-Attack on Hydro.” Hydro, updated 15 May 2024. hydro.com/en/global/media/on-the-agenda/cyber-attack/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Update on Cyber Attack March 26.” Hydro, 26 Mar. 2019. integration.hydro.com/en/global/media/news/2019/update-on-cyber-attack-march-26/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Financial Statements and Board of Directors’ Report 2019.” Hydro, 2020. hydro.com/globalassets/download-center/investor-downloads/ar19/financial-statements-and-board-of-directors-report-2019-web.pdf
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Financial Statements and Board of Directors’ Report 2020.” Hydro, 2021. hydro.com/globalassets/06-investors/information-for-shareholders/agm2021/english/appendix-1-financial-statements-and-board-of-directors-report-2020.pdf
- “LockerGoga Ransomware Sends Norsk Hydro into Manual Mode.” BleepingComputer, 19 Mar. 2019. bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/lockergoga-ransomware-sends-norsk-hydro-into-manual-mode/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Second Quarter 2019: Results Down on Lower Realized Prices.” Hydro, 23 July 2019. hydro.com/en/global/media/news/2019/second-quarter-2019-results-down-on-lower-realized-prices/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Power Failure at Hydro Karmøy.” Hydro, 1 Apr. 2019. integration.hydro.com/en/global/media/news/2019/power-failure-at-hydro-karmoy/
- “Europol Detains Hackers Behind 2019 Norsk Hydro Ransomware Attack.” TechCrunch, 29 Oct. 2021. techcrunch.com/2021/10/29/europol-hackers-norsk-hydro/
- US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. “LockerGoga, MegaCortex and Nefilim Ransomware Administrator Charged with Ransomware Attacks.” Press release, 9 Sept. 2025. justice.gov/opa/pr/lockergoga-megacortex-and-nefilim-ransomware-administrator-charged-ransomware-attacks
- Recorded Future. “LockerGoga Ransomware Disrupts Operations at Norwegian Aluminum Company.” Recorded Future, 20 Mar. 2019. recordedfuture.com/blog/lockergoga-ransomware-insight
- Datatilsynet (Norwegian Data Protection Authority). “Closure of Case, Norsk Hydro ASA, Personal Data Breach.” Case 20/01770-4, 12 May 2021, published by the European Data Protection Board. edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-09/no_2021-05_personal_data_breach_decisionpublic.pdf
- Varghese, Sam. “Norwegian Firm Attack Likely through Microsoft Active Directory: Claim.” iTWire, 21 Mar. 2019. itwire.com/security/86455-norwegian-firm-attack-likely-through-microsoft-active-directory-claim.html
- Nozomi Networks. “Breaking Research: LockerGoga Ransomware Impacts Norsk Hydro.” Nozomi Networks, 19 Mar. 2019, updated 3 Mar. 2020. nozominetworks.com/blog/breaking-research-lockergoga-ransomware-impacts-norsk-hydro
- MITRE. “LockerGoga, Software S0372.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/software/S0372/
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “First Quarter 2019 Report.” Hydro, 5 June 2019. hydro.com/globalassets/06-investors/reports-and-presentations/quarterly-reports/2019/q1nv64jz/report-q1-2019.pdf
- Norsk Hydro ASA. “Fourth Quarter 2019: Firm Response in Weak Markets.” Hydro, 7 Feb. 2020. hydro.com/en/global/media/news/2020/fourth-quarter-2019-firm-response-in-weak-markets/
- Ryan, Matthew, Glenn Withers, and Frank den Hartog. “The Impact of Extreme Cyberattacks on Market Valuations: An In-Depth Economic Analysis.” Australian Journal of Management, published online 2 Dec. 2025. doi.org/10.1177/03128962251383120
- “AIG Leads Norsk Hydro’s Cyber Coverage, Losses May Top $40 Million.” Business Insurance, 26 Mar. 2019. businessinsurance.com/aig-leads-norsk-hydros-cyber-coverage-losses-may-top-40-million/


