- Date
- Mar – Jun 2020
- Location
- United States
- Industry
- Information Technology
- Access vector
- Unknown
- OT targeting
- None
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- Unknown
SolarWinds SUNBURST supply-chain compromise, 2020

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. On December 14, 2020, SolarWinds disclosed that the build system for its Orion IT-monitoring software had been compromised, and that Orion updates released between March and June 2020 carried malicious code; fewer than 18,000 customers may have installed an affected version[1]. The US Government later named Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as the actor[2][3].
Why it matters. No source documents any OT or industrial control system being reached. The incident is on file for SolarWinds’ own investor disclosures, which are unusually clear public evidence of a breach’s effect on customer retention[4][5].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It is an IT-only incident, and its figures should not be compared with losses from incidents that reached operational technology. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- An implant on SolarWinds’ build server swapped an Orion source file during compilation, and the tampered file was signed with SolarWinds’ legitimate code-signing certificate[6][3].
- How the attacker first got into SolarWinds is not known. “We do not know precisely when or how the threat actor first gained access to our environment,” the company said[7].
- SolarWinds guided its 2021 maintenance renewal rate down from over 90% to the “low to mid-80s”. The year ended at about 88%[4][5].
- SolarWinds’ yearly net incident costs add up to about $68.4 million from 2020 to September 2024, and a $26 million securities class action was settled with directors’ and officers’ insurance[8][9].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | SVR, per the US Government]
- Access vector: Not established [unknown | First access to SolarWinds not known]
- IT impact: Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1565.001]; IP Theft [confirmed | T1213.003]
- OT targeting: None [confirmed | No OT reached]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT reached]
- OT impact: Not in path [not in path | No OT reached]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
- Financial losses: Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | $68.4M net, summed]; Reputation Damage [confirmed | $26M settlement]; Business Interruption [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed | SEC case, no figure]
What happened
SolarWinds found suspicious activity on its systems from September 2019 and a test change in an October 2019 Orion release[10]; it later said the actor had access at least nine months before that test[11]. Injection of the SUNBURST code began on February 20, 2020[10]. An implant later named SUNSPOT watched the build server for the compiler, replaced an Orion source file with a malicious variant during each build, and then put the original back[6]. The code “was not present in the source code repository”, SolarWinds said[1].
The tampered DLL was signed with SolarWinds’ legitimate code-signing certificate and reached customers through normal Orion updates released between March and June 2020[3][1]. CISA issued Emergency Directive 21-01, “Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise”, on December 13[12]. The next day SolarWinds disclosed the compromise: it had notified about 33,000 Orion customers, said fewer than 18,000 may have installed an affected build, and reported that its Office 365 email had been compromised[1].
Far fewer customers were exploited. Microsoft identified more than 40 of its own customers that had been targeted, about 80% of them in the US, and nine federal agencies and about 100 companies disclosed follow-on compromises[13][2]. The FBI, CISA, ODNI and NSA called the actor “likely Russian in origin” on January 5, 2021, and the US Government named the SVR on April 15, 2021[14][2].
For SolarWinds itself the consequences were commercial and legal. License revenue fell 32.7% year over year in the first quarter of 2021, renewal guidance was cut, a securities class action was settled for $26 million, and the SEC sued the company and its chief information security officer in 2023[15][4][9][16].
Intent: malicious
The build tampering was deliberate and engineered: an implant that swapped a source file during each build and restored it afterwards, so that releases signed by SolarWinds carried a backdoor[6]. The actor also took source code and had access to the company’s email[17][1]. No source suggests an accident. The record does not set out a purpose for the campaign beyond the intrusion itself, and none is stated here.
Threat actors: Russia’s foreign intelligence service
The FBI, CISA, ODNI and NSA called the actor “likely Russian in origin” on January 5, 2021[14]. On April 15, 2021, the US Government formally named the SVR, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service[2][3]. MITRE tracks the campaign as APT29’s, a group also called UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle and Dark Halo[18]. SolarWinds itself says it has not independently attributed the incident[17]. The map shows a nation-state actor, on the US Government’s attribution.
Access vector: not established
SolarWinds does not know how the attacker got in: “we do not know precisely when or how the threat actor first gained access to our environment”[7][11]. What followed is documented. The actor “compromised credentials and conducted research and surveillance”[7], and had persistent access to the software development environment and internal systems, including Office 365[11].
Supply-chain compromise is how the backdoor reached SolarWinds’ customers, not how the attacker reached SolarWinds; MITRE maps that delivery to Compromise Software Supply Chain[18]. This analysis treats SolarWinds as the victim, so its access vector is shown as Unknown.
IT impact: a tampered build and stolen code
The main IT effect was on the integrity of SolarWinds’ own product. SUNSPOT ran from a scheduled task set to start when the build server booted, replaced the Orion file InventoryManager.cs during compilation and restored it afterwards[6]. That is shown as Data Sabotage, confirmed. SolarWinds also says the actor “had access to our source code across our products and exfiltrated source code from our systems”, shown as IP Theft[17]. Its email was compromised as well; which mailboxes were read, and how, is not stated, so email collection is only inferred[1]. No source describes SolarWinds’ own systems being encrypted, wiped or taken down.
OT targeting: none
Orion is IT and network infrastructure-monitoring software. No source documents the backdoor being used to reach any SCADA system, DCS, PLC, historian or engineering workstation. Dragos’s chief executive, Robert M. Lee, said in December 2020 that many organizations had compromised versions of Orion in their ICS networks, but that he was not aware of any case in which the attackers had access to ICS networks. The OT concern was architectural: Orion stores privileged credentials broadly, so CISA and OT security vendors advised rebuilding OT-adjacent Orion instances and everything they held credentials to. That was precaution, not a response to an OT compromise.
OT sophistication: not applicable
With no OT reached, there is no OT technique to grade. The skill in this attack lies in the IT build pipeline: an implant timed to the compiler, a backdoor signed with the vendor’s own certificate, and delivery through the vendor’s normal release channel[6][3][1]. None of it acted on a physical process. This stage is marked Not applicable.
OT impact: none
No source reviewed describes any OT system’s ability to produce or deliver being affected, at SolarWinds or at any of its customers. There is no loss of view, loss of control or manipulation of an industrial process anywhere in the record. This stage is marked Not in path, and the flow on the map passes through it without touching any OT technique.
Perils: no physical event
No source reports a fire, a release, damage to equipment or an injury, at SolarWinds or anywhere downstream. The loss is SolarWinds’ own commercial and legal cost from a compromise of its software build[1][17]. The map shows No Perils.
When the build pipeline itself is compromised, a correctly signed update is no proof of a safe one.
Financial losses: what it cost
SolarWinds reports “Cyber Incident costs, net” of insurance each year: $3.5 million for 2020, $33.1 million for 2021, $26.2 million for 2022, a net credit of $2.1 million for 2023 and $7.6 million for the first nine months of 2024[19][20][21][22][8]. They cover investigation and remediation, legal and professional services, and consulting given to customers at no charge. Added together, they come to about $68.4 million. No figure was located after September 2024.
The commercial effect is why this incident is on file. Maintenance renewal rates were “over 90%” in the fourth quarter of 2020; the CFO guided 2021 to the “low to mid-80s” and gave no full-year outlook, saying “it is still too early to predict the range of outcomes”[4]. Renewal rates ended 2021 at about 88%[5]. The 32.7% fall in first-quarter license revenue was tied by the company to the incident and the pandemic together[15][7].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost license revenue (direct business interruption); Future sales loss (renewal rates); Customer retention (free consulting to customers); Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements (security investment); Cyber insurance response; Securities class-action settlement (market valuation); SEC investigation and lawsuit (industry regulation liability)
- Reported amounts: $26M Securities class-action settlement, funded entirely by directors’ and officers’ insurance, according to SolarWinds[9]; $20M to $25M Security-related investment the CFO expected for 2021, guidance rather than incurred cost[4]; $20.4M Gross incident expenses in the first quarter of 2021, partly offset by $10.2M of expected insurance proceeds[7]; $3.5M Pretax incident expenses through December 31, 2020[17]
- Estimated: $68.4M Incident costs net of insurance, 2020 to September 2024 (sum of company figures)
- Estimate note: The $68.4M is DeNexus’s sum of SolarWinds’ yearly reported net incident costs; separately, Bitsight and Kovrr estimate about $90M of insured losses for affected customers, mainly incident response and forensics, a third-party loss that is not SolarWinds’ own and is not added[23].
- Implied: Network security liability (no customer claim against SolarWinds was located); Public relations response
- Not supported: Third-party physical and societal impact; Proprietary data response and recovery; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement
SolarWinds held $15 million of cybersecurity insurance, a limit rather than a recovery, and showed first-quarter 2021 costs net of $10.2 million of insurance proceeds deemed probable of recovery[17][15]. In July 2024 a judge dismissed three of five SEC claims against the company and three of seven against its CISO[16]; the case was later dismissed with prejudice, on November 20, 2025, with no penalty named. Its defense cost is not disclosed separately.
What this incident shows
No downstream control at the customers could have caught this. The malicious build was correctly signed and arrived through the vendor’s own release channel, so no recipient could tell it from a legitimate update[3][1]. The record treats the integrity of a vendor’s release process as a control surface of its own, not as a subset of patch management.
For OT, the lesson is a pathway that was described but never used: Orion holds privileged credentials across the environments it monitors, including OT-adjacent networks, which is why asset owners were told to rebuild those instances. On the loss side, post-breach churn was real and measurable, but smaller and shorter than the company expected: about 88% renewals against a forecast in the low to mid-80s, with the CEO expecting retention to approach the low 90s again in 2022[5].
References
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 8-K.” US Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 Dec. 2020. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000162828020017451/swi-20201214.htm
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center. “SolarWinds Orion Software Supply Chain Attack.” Last updated 19 Aug. 2021. archive.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/SolarWinds%20Orion%20Software%20Supply%20Chain%20Attack.pdf
- CISA. “AA20-352A: Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations.” Alert, 17 Dec. 2020, updated 15 Apr. 2021. us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-352a
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Q4 2020 Earnings Call.” Transcript, 25 Feb. 2021, as carried by AllMind. allmind.ai/earnings/event/1577297
- “SolarWinds (SWI) Q4 2021 Earnings Call Transcript.” The Motley Fool, 17 Feb. 2022. fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2022/02/17/solarwinds-corporation-swi-q4-2021-earnings-call-t
- CrowdStrike Intelligence. “SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process.” CrowdStrike, 11 Jan. 2021. crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2021.” US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2021. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994221000080/swi-20210331.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Third quarter 2024 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 31 Oct. 2024. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994224000119/swi-2024930xex991.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 8-K.” US Securities and Exchange Commission, 3 Nov. 2022. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994222000091/swi-20221028.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 8-K (investigation update).” US Securities and Exchange Commission, 11 Jan. 2021. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994221000015/swi-20210111.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 10-K for 2021.” US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2022. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994222000020/swi-20211231.htm
- CISA. “Emergency Directive 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise.” 13 Dec. 2020. cisa.gov/emergency-directive-21-01
- “Microsoft Says 40 Customers Hit By Ongoing Hack Of Government Agencies.” NPR, 18 Dec. 2020, as carried by KUNC. kunc.org/npr-news/2020-12-18/microsoft-says-40-customers-hit-by-ongoing-hack-of-government-agencies
- FBI, CISA, ODNI and NSA. “Joint Statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Security Agency (NSA).” 5 Jan. 2021. cisa.gov/news/2021/01/05/joint-statement-federal-bureau-investigation-fbi-cybersecurity-and-infrastructure
- SolarWinds Corporation. “First quarter 2021 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 29 Apr. 2021. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994221000069/swi-2021331xex991.htm
- “Federal Court Dismisses Bulk of SEC’s Complaint Against SolarWinds in Cyberattack Case.” Cooley, 23 July 2024. cooley.com/news/insight/2024/2024-07-23-federal-court-dismisses-bulk-of-secs-complaint-against-solarwinds-in-cyberattack-case
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Form 10-K for 2020.” US Securities and Exchange Commission, filed 1 Mar. 2021. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994221000043/swi-20201231.htm
- MITRE. “SolarWinds Compromise, Campaign C0024.” MITRE ATT&CK. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0024/
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Fourth quarter 2020 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 25 Feb. 2021. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994221000037/swi-20201231xex991.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Fourth quarter 2021 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 17 Feb. 2022. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994222000015/swi-20211231xex991.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Fourth quarter 2022 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 9 Feb. 2023. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994223000006/swi-20221231xex991.htm
- SolarWinds Corporation. “Fourth quarter 2023 results.” Form 8-K exhibit 99.1, 8 Feb. 2024. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739942/000173994224000009/swi-20231231xex991.htm
- Bitsight. “The Financial Impact of SolarWinds: A Cyber Catastrophe But Insurance Disaster Avoided.” 12 Jan. 2021. bitsight.com/blog/the-financial-impact-of-solarwinds-a-cyber-catastrophe-but-insurance-disaster-avoided


