Date
February 5, 2021
Location
United States
Industry
Water & Wastewater
Access vector
External Remote Services
OT targeting
Unknown
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
Minutes, on one day

Oldsmar water treatment plant incident, disputed hack, 2021

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Oldsmar water treatment plant incident, disputed hack, 2021

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On February 5, 2021, someone used the SCADA software at the water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, to raise the setting for sodium hydroxide (lye). Plant staff saw the change and reversed it, and the treatment process was not affected[1]. Officials first described it as an outside hack, and the sheriff said the setting went from about 100 to 11,100 parts per million[2].

        Why it matters. It became one of the most widely cited examples of a cyberattack on a public water supply and was later cited as a driver of US water-sector cybersecurity rules[3]. In 2023 the FBI said it could not confirm that a targeted intrusion started it[3][4].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. The cause is disputed between an outside intrusion, an employee and a data-entry mistake, and this analysis does not choose among them. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • The sheriff said there were two remote sessions that day, at about 8 a.m. and 1:30 p.m., and that it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the water to reach the supply system[5][4].
        • A joint advisory from CISA, the FBI, the EPA and MS-ISAC treated the event as unauthorized access, likely through poor password security and an outdated operating system[1]. MassDEP, relaying a joint situational report, said the plant computers ran Windows 7, shared one remote-access password and appeared to have no firewall[6].
        • In 2023 the FBI said it “was not able to confirm that this incident was initiated by a targeted cyber intrusion of Oldsmar,” and the former city manager said the employee credited with catching the change was likely its cause[3][4].
        • No injury, contamination or service interruption occurred, and no loss figure exists[1].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Disputed [unknown | Hack, employee or entry mistake]
        • Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | Intrusion not confirmed]
        • Access vector: External Remote Services [reported | T0822, TeamViewer, disputed]
        • IT impact: Not established [unknown | No IT impact described]
        • OT targeting: Unknown [unknown | Depends on whether an intrusion occurred]
        • OT sophistication: Unknown [unknown | Depends on whether an intrusion occurred]
        • OT impact: Manipulate Control [reported | T0836, T0831, disputed]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Change reversed, process unaffected]
        • Financial losses: Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        Sodium hydroxide is used in small amounts to control water acidity[1]. On February 5, 2021, the setting for it was raised through the plant’s SCADA software. Pinellas County Sheriff Bob Gualtieri said there were two remote sessions, at about 8 a.m. and about 1:30 p.m.[5], and that the setting went from about 100 to 11,100 parts per million[2]. Plant staff saw the change and reversed it before the SCADA software alarmed[1]. Mayor Eric Seidel said redundant pH alarms would have caught the change[5].

        Gualtieri announced the event at a news conference on February 8[2]. “Somebody hacked into the system... Not just once, but twice and controlled the system, took control of the mouse,” he said[4]. A Sheriff’s Office spokesperson said the software used was TeamViewer[5]. The Sheriff’s Office, the US Secret Service and the FBI responded on site, and on February 11 the joint advisory AA21-042A said unidentified cyber actors had obtained unauthorized access to the SCADA system[1]. City Manager Al Braithwaite said remote access programs had been disabled[5].

        In March 2023, Braithwaite, by then the former city manager, called the event a “non-event” resolved in two minutes[7]. He said “The FBI concluded there was nothing, no evidence of any access from the outside”[3], and “It was likely the employee, the same employee that was kind of purported to be a hero for catching it”[4]. In April 2023 the FBI was more cautious: it said it could not confirm that a targeted cyber intrusion started the incident[3][4]. The Sheriff’s Office says its case is still open[4]. No official findings from any of the investigations have been published.

        Intent: unknown

        Three accounts compete, and no source settles which is right. Officials in 2021 described an outside hack[4][1]. Braithwaite said in 2023 that the employee who caught the change likely made it[4]. Water-ISAC’s early analysis raised a third reading, “an authorized connection with an intentional change to an unintentional value”: an intended change from 100 to 110 or 111 that became the reported value through a trailing-zero entry mistake[3]. Because the dispute is over whether a malicious event happened at all, intent is shown as unknown.

        Threat actors: not attributed

        The 2021 advisory spoke of “unidentified cyber actors”[1]. No actor has been named since, and the FBI said in 2023 that it could not confirm a targeted intrusion[3]. CyberScoop reports, citing CyberNews, that email addresses and passwords tied to two Oldsmar domains leaked days before the event; no source links the leak to it[3]. No threat actor is highlighted on the map.

        Access vector: remote-access software, reported and disputed

        In 2021 the Sheriff’s Office said the software used was TeamViewer[5]. MassDEP, relaying the joint situational report of the FBI, DHS, US Secret Service and the Sheriff’s Office, said the actors reached the SCADA controls through TeamViewer, that “all computers shared the same password for remote access”, and that the computers ran the 32-bit version of Windows 7 and appeared to be connected directly to the internet without a firewall[6][8]. The joint advisory was more cautious, saying only that such software “may have been used”[1]. CyberScoop reports that the TeamViewer route was never confirmed[3]. External Remote Services is therefore shown as reported. If the employee account is right, there was no outside access at all.

        IT impact: not established

        No source describes data being encrypted, stolen or destroyed, or any IT system being disrupted. The only remediation documented is that remote access programs were disabled[5]. No source says the Windows 7 plant computers were rebuilt or replaced, and if no outsider connected, there may have been no compromised machine at all. This stage is marked Not established.

        OT targeting: unknown

        If an outsider made the change, this was a direct OT compromise: the SCADA software that runs the treatment process was used to change a chemical setting[1]. If an employee made it, by mistake or otherwise, no attacker targeted anything. The sources give no independently verified basis to choose, so targeting is Unknown. Idaho National Laboratory’s 2022 case study maps the event as an intrusion, but it was built from public sources before the 2023 statements[9].

        OT sophistication: unknown

        Even on the intrusion reading, the method described is ordinary: a remote-access tool and the operator’s own screen. Gualtieri said the intruder “took control of the mouse”[4], and INL maps the cursor sightings to the Graphical User Interface technique[9]. Whether any of it was an attacker’s work is what is in doubt, so OT sophistication is Unknown. MITRE’s own campaign page for the incident now carries a deprecation warning and lists no techniques[10].

        OT impact: one setting changed, then reversed

        The setpoint change itself is confirmed: the SCADA software was used to increase the amount of sodium hydroxide[1]. INL maps it to Modify Parameter and Manipulation of Control[9], shown on the map as Manipulate Control. It is shown as reported, not confirmed, because who made the change is disputed[3]. Staff reversed it before the software alarmed, and the treatment process was not affected[1].

        Perils: none

        No physical event occurred. The change was reversed, the treatment process was not affected, and no consumer received affected water[1]. Gualtieri said it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the water to reach the supply system[4]. No source reports a release, contamination, damage or injury. The map shows No Perils.

        Whatever caused the change, the operator watching the screen caught it before anything reached the water.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        No loss figure exists, and the direct loss may be close to zero. The documented costs are investigative and remedial, and none is quantified. The Sheriff’s Office, the US Secret Service and the FBI responded on site[1]; Braithwaite said the FBI investigation included a federal grand jury subpoena, and that state officials, including the Florida Office of Information Technology, also investigated[4][7]. Much of that effort was presumably borne by federal and state agencies rather than by Oldsmar.

        The incident’s largest effect was on policy. CyberScoop reports that it was cited as a driver of the Biden administration’s March 2023 water-sector cybersecurity rules, whose compliance cost fell on other utilities[3].

        Loss evidence

        • Implied: Network event response and recovery (investigations); Voluntary improvements (remote access disabled); Legally mandated improvements (sector-wide rules, cost borne by other utilities)
        • Not supported: Direct business interruption; Cyber-physical event response; Third-party physical and societal impact; Network device replacement; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation liability

        What this incident shows

        Oldsmar is one of the most-cited OT incidents and one of the smallest actual losses on record, and it may not have been an attack at all[3]. Its influence on policy came from the first account, and that influence continued after the FBI and the former city manager cast doubt on it[3].

        What does not depend on the cause is the state of the plant. Officials documented a remote-access tool on plant computers that shared one password, an outdated operating system and no apparent firewall[6][1]. Those gaps would have made an outside compromise straightforward, whether or not one happened here.

        References

        1. CISA, FBI, EPA and MS-ISAC. “AA21-042A: Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility.” Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, 11 Feb. 2021. cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2021/02/11/compromise-us-water-treatment-facility
        2. Chappell, Bill. “FBI Called In After Hacker Tries To Poison Tampa-Area City’s Water With Lye.” NPR, 9 Feb. 2021, as carried by WUNC. wunc.org/2021-02-09/fbi-called-in-after-hacker-tries-to-poison-tampa-area-citys-water-with-lye
        3. Vasquez, Christian. “Did someone really hack into the Oldsmar, Florida, water treatment plant? New details suggest maybe not.” CyberScoop, 10 Apr. 2023. cyberscoop.com/water-oldsmar-incident-cyberattack/
        4. “‘Hack’ of Oldsmar water plant reported two years ago could have been employee error.” FOX 13 Tampa Bay, 11 Apr. 2023. fox13news.com/news/hack-of-oldsmar-water-plant-reported-two-years-ago-could-have-been-employee-error
        5. Culafi, Alexander. “Florida city’s water nearly poisoned in TeamViewer attack.” TechTarget, 9 Feb. 2021. techtarget.com/cybersecurity/news/252496102/Florida-citys-water-nearly-poisoned-in-TeamViewer-attack
        6. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. “Cybersecurity Advisory for Public Water Suppliers.” Feb. 2021. mass.gov/info-details/cybersecurity-advisory-for-public-water-suppliers
        7. Teale, Chris. “Florida city water cyber incident allegedly caused by employee error.” Route Fifty, 21 Mar. 2023. route-fifty.com/cybersecurity/2023/03/florida-city-water-cyber-incident-allegedly-caused-employee-error/384267
        8. Culafi, Alexander. “Oldsmar water plant computers shared TeamViewer password.” TechTarget, 11 Feb. 2021. techtarget.com/cybersecurity/news/252496259/Oldsmar-water-plant-computers-shared-TeamViewer-password
        9. Idaho National Laboratory / DOE CyOTE Program. “CyOTE Case Study: Oldsmar.” INL/RPT-22-70551, 31 Dec. 2022. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_Oldsmar.pdf
        10. MITRE. “Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion, Campaign C0009.” MITRE ATT&CK, deprecated at v20. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0009/