Date
May 7, 2021
Location
United States
Industry
Oil & Gas
Access vector
External Remote Services
OT targeting
Indirect: IT dependency
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
8 days

Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, 2021

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, 2021

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. Just before 5:00 a.m. on May 7, 2021, a Colonial Pipeline employee found a ransom note on a system in the company’s IT network[1]. DarkSide ransomware had been deployed against that network; CISA and the FBI found no indication that the pipeline’s operational technology (OT) networks were directly affected[2]. Colonial still shut the pipeline, which carries about 45% of the East Coast’s fuel, by about 6:10 a.m.[3][1].

        Why it matters. The pipeline stopped because of the operator’s own decision after an IT compromise, not because attackers reached its control systems, and fuel outages followed across the southeast[4]. The incident led to TSA’s first mandatory cybersecurity directives for US pipelines[5].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. There are two accounts of why Colonial stopped the pipeline, its CEO’s sworn testimony and an unnamed-source news report, and both are kept. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • The attackers entered on April 29, 2021, through a legacy VPN account protected only by a password, according to Mandiant and Colonial’s CEO. How they obtained the password is not established[3][1].
        • DarkSide ransomware hit the IT network. CISA and the FBI found no indication that OT was directly affected, yet Colonial halted its mainlines until lines began returning to service on the evening of May 12[2][1].
        • Colonial paid about 75 bitcoins, which its CEO confirmed as $4.4 million. The FBI later seized 63.7 of them, valued at about $2.3 million on June 7, 2021[6][7].
        • More than 15,600 stations ran out of gas on May 13, according to GasBuddy, but a later University of Kansas study put the shutdown’s own price effect at about 4 cents per gallon[4][8].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Cyber Criminals [confirmed | DarkSide, per the DOJ]
        • Access vector: External Remote Services [confirmed | T1133, VPN]; Credential Theft [confirmed | T1078, valid account]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | DarkSide ransomware]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | Finance systems, per the CEO]; Data Exfiltration [confirmed | Share drive data]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: IT Dependency [reported | Billing, per CNN sources]; Indirect: Abundance of Caution [confirmed | Containment, per the CEO]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT technique used]
        • OT impact: Not in path [not in path | OT not reached]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Halt by operator decision]
        • Financial losses: Cyber Incident Response [confirmed | $4.4M ransom]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed | $948,400 penalty]; Business Interruption [confirmed]; Privacy [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]; Reputation Damage [implied]

        What happened

        Mandiant’s Charles Carmakal said the attackers entered Colonial’s network on April 29, 2021, through a VPN account without multifactor authentication[3]. Colonial’s CEO, Joseph Blount, told the Senate it was a legacy VPN profile “not intended to be in use”[1]. Bloomberg reported, citing two people involved in the investigation, that nearly 100 gigabytes of data was taken in two hours on May 6[9]; Blount said data was “exfiltrated off the share drive”[1].

        Just before 5:00 a.m. on May 7, an employee found the ransom note[1], and Colonial shut the pipeline by about 6:10 a.m.[3]. Blount testified that the decision “was driven by the imperative to isolate and contain the attack”[1]. CNN reported, from unnamed sources, that Colonial was also concerned it could not work out how much to bill customers; Colonial did not address that claim[10]. On May 10, Colonial said Lines 1 to 4 were offline while some smaller lateral lines were operating[11].

        Colonial paid about 75 bitcoins on May 8, the day after discovery[6][1], a payment Blount confirmed as $4.4 million[7]. Lines began returning to service on the evening of May 12[1], and on May 15 Colonial said the system was back to normal operations[12]. Bloomberg reported that the attacker’s decryption tool was so slow that Colonial kept using its own backups[13]. On June 7, the FBI seized 63.7 of the bitcoins, which the Justice Department valued at about $2.3 million that day[6]. In August, Colonial notified 5,810 people that their records had been acquired[14]. TSA then issued two security directives for pipelines, announced on May 27 and July 20, 2021[5].

        Intent: malicious and financial

        The intrusion was deliberate and financially motivated. DarkSide ransomware was deployed against Colonial’s IT network[2], a ransom was demanded, and Colonial paid it[6]. Nothing in the sources suggests the attackers aimed at the pipeline itself: CISA and the FBI found no indication that they moved laterally toward the OT networks[2]. The halt of deliveries, which made this incident national news, was Colonial’s own decision after the compromise, not an action by the attackers[1]. The intent is malicious; the physical consequence was not part of it, as far as any source shows.

        Threat actors: DarkSide, a criminal group

        The Justice Department named DarkSide as the ransomware extortionists Colonial paid[6]. It is shown on the map as Cyber Criminals, confirmed on that statement.

        A later arrest does not settle who did what. In January 2022, Russia’s FSB said it had raided the homes of 14 people tied to the REvil ransomware group and detained an unspecified number, and a senior US administration official said the US believed one person arrested was responsible for the Colonial Pipeline attack[15]. No source reviewed explains how that person relates to DarkSide.

        Access vector: one password on a legacy VPN

        Two techniques are confirmed. The attackers logged in through Colonial’s VPN, an external remote service, using the credentials of a legacy profile that had single-factor authentication[1][3]. Carmakal said the account had no multifactor authentication and has since been deactivated[3]. The use of a valid account is shown on the map as Credential Theft.

        How the password was obtained is not established. Carmakal said it later appeared in a batch of leaked passwords on the dark web and that an employee may have reused it, but he was not certain; Mandiant saw no evidence of phishing[3]. In June, Blount told the Senate that the investigation was still trying to determine how the credential was compromised[1].

        IT impact: ransomware and stolen data

        CISA and the FBI say DarkSide ransomware was deployed against Colonial’s IT network[2]. No authority has listed which systems were encrypted. Blount said in June that Colonial was still bringing back “seven finance systems that we have not had since the morning of May 7th”, and that the decryption keys were “helpful” but “not perfect”[1].

        Data was also taken. Bloomberg reported nearly 100 gigabytes, citing two people involved in the investigation[9]. Colonial later notified 5,810 people, mostly current or former employees and their family members, that records had been acquired on May 6[14][16]. The notice lists names, contact details, dates of birth, government ID numbers and health information, not every item for every person[17].

        OT targeting: indirect, with two accounts of why

        Nothing reached the pipeline’s control systems. CISA and the FBI found no sign of lateral movement to OT, and Colonial proactively disconnected certain OT systems itself[2]; Mandiant saw no sign the attackers reached OT[3]. The pipeline stopped because Colonial stopped it.

        Why it did so has two accounts. Blount testified that the shutdown was to isolate and contain the attack, and that if there was a “one percent chance” OT was compromised, shutting down was worth it[1]. That is an abundance of caution, and it is shown as confirmed on his sworn testimony. CNN reported, from unnamed sources, that Colonial could not work out how much to bill customers[10], a dependency of operations on IT systems. The classification in the header, IT dependency, rests on that report, which is shown as reported.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No OT-specific technique was used, and no source shows the attackers acting on pipeline equipment[2]. The attack needed no knowledge of how a pipeline runs: it began with one valid password on a VPN account and ended with ransomware on IT systems[3][2]. The Idaho National Laboratory case study repeats a claim by the security firm Virsec that SCADA-connected information servers were encrypted[18]. No other source states it, and it is not adopted here. This stage is marked Not applicable on the map.

        OT impact: none documented

        CISA and the FBI found no indication that OT networks were directly affected[2]. The mainlines stopped from May 7 until the evening of May 12 because Colonial chose to stop them, and Colonial did operate “small portions of the pipeline manually in order to alleviate some of the fuel shortage”, Blount said[1]. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms, the halt can be read as Loss of Productivity and Revenue. That reading is inferred from a confirmed business effect, not an action by the attacker on the process, so no OT impact technique is shown on the map.

        Perils: no physical event

        No source reviewed reports damage, a release, a fire or an injury. The consequences fell outside the company. GasBuddy counted more than 15,600 stations out of gas on May 13[4], put North Carolina at 69% of stations without fuel that day[19], and Washington, DC, at about 81% on May 16[20]. The White House announced an hours-of-service waiver for fuel drivers in 18 states and DC[21], and a Jones Act waiver followed late on May 12[22]. Only American Airlines is named as changing operations, adding stops to two flights out of Charlotte[23].

        The attribution of those effects is smaller than the headlines. OPIS’s Tom Kloza called the shortages “mostly panic buying”[24], and a University of Kansas study put the shutdown’s own effect at about 4 cents per gallon in affected areas[8].

        A pipeline stopped for days without a single control system being touched.

        Financial losses: a ransom and a penalty

        Two amounts are confirmed: the ransom and a regulatory penalty. Colonial has never put a figure on the shutdown itself, and has disclosed no total. The penalty came from a 2020 inspection of Colonial’s control room management: PHMSA proposed $986,400 in May 2022, alleging that poor planning for manual shutdown and restart contributed to the national impacts after the attack[25]. A 2023 consent order reduced it to $948,400, and PHMSA states it does not allege that Colonial caused the attack[26].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (no amount disclosed); Manual operations and workarounds; Ransom extortion; Network event response and recovery; Industry regulation liability; Sensitive personal data event response; Third-party physical and societal impact (fuel outages)
        • Reported amounts: $4.4M Ransom paid in about 75 bitcoins, confirmed by Colonial’s CEO[7]; $948,400 Final PHMSA civil penalty under the 2023 consent order[26]
        • Implied: Startup and return-to-service validation; Server replacement; Voluntary improvements; Legally mandated improvements (TSA directives); Public relations response
        • Not supported: Operational data response and recovery; Network device replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Embedded device replacement; Network security liability; Bodily injury and loss of life; Property damage

        The FBI’s seizure of 63.7 bitcoins, valued at about $2.3 million on June 7, 2021, is about 85% of the bitcoins paid, but at a lower price[6]. The two dollar figures cannot be subtracted to give a net cost, and the sources do not say whether the seized funds reached Colonial.

        What this incident shows

        Colonial is the clearest case of a pipeline stopping without its control systems being reached. The separation between IT and OT held: CISA and the FBI found no lateral movement to OT[2]. The halt, and the fuel outages that followed, came from the operator’s decision after an IT compromise[1], and PHMSA alleged that weak planning for manual shutdown and restart contributed to the national impacts[25].

        The entry point was a legacy VPN account protected by a single password[1]. Backups existed, according to Bloomberg’s sources[13], yet Colonial paid the day after discovery; Blount said he paid because the company was unsure how long restoration would take[7]. For anyone assessing this kind of risk, the size of the loss depended less on what the attacker could do to the pipeline than on what the operator was prepared to run without its IT systems.

        References

        1. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. “Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Examining the Colonial Pipeline Cyber Attack.” Senate Hearing 117-429, 8 June 2021. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-117shrg46569/html/CHRG-117shrg46569.htm
        2. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation. “DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks.” Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA21-131A, 11 May 2021, revised 8 July 2021. cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-131A_Darkside_Ransomware.pdf
        3. Turton, William, and Kartikay Mehrotra. “Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline with One Compromised Password.” Bloomberg, 4 June 2021, as carried by Al Jazeera. aljazeera.com/economy/2021/6/4/hackers-breached-colonial-pipeline-with-one-compromised-password
        4. “More Than 15,600 Gas Stations on East Coast Out of Fuel.” Kiowa County Press, 15 May 2021. kiowacountypress.net/content/more-15600-gas-stations-east-coast-out-fuel
        5. Congressional Research Service. “Pipeline Cybersecurity -- Updated Directives.” IN12006, 7 Sept. 2022. everycrsreport.com/reports/IN12006.html
        6. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. “Department of Justice Seizes $2.3 Million in Cryptocurrency Paid to the Ransomware Extortionists Darkside.” Justice.gov, 7 June 2021. justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/department-justice-seizes-23-million-cryptocurrency-paid-ransomware-extortionists-darkside
        7. Associated Press. “Report: Colonial Confirms It Paid $4.4M to Pipeline Hackers.” 19 May 2021, as carried by KSTP. kstp.com/associated-press/world/report-colonial-confirms-it-paid-44m-to-pipeline-hackers/
        8. University of Kansas. “Cyberattack on Colonial Pipeline Affected Gas Prices Far Less Than Initially Reported, Study Finds.” KU News, 16 Dec. 2021. news.ku.edu/2021/12/16/cyberattack-colonial-pipeline-affected-gas-prices-far-less-initially-reported-study-finds
        9. Bloomberg News. “Colonial Hackers Stole Data Thursday Ahead of Pipeline Shutdown.” BNN Bloomberg, 8 May 2021. bnnbloomberg.ca/colonial-hackers-stole-data-thursday-ahead-of-pipeline-shutdown-1.1601037
        10. “Colonial Pipeline Shut Down Distribution Because It Couldn’t Bill Customers: Report.” Mediaite, 13 May 2021. mediaite.com/news/colonial-pipeline-shut-down-distribution-because-it-couldnt-bill-customers-report
        11. “Colonial Pipeline Company Provide Update on System Disruption.” World Pipelines, 10 May 2021. worldpipelines.com/business-news/10052021/colonial-pipeline-company-provide-update-on-system-disruption
        12. Associated Press. “Pipeline Operator Says Normal Operations Have Resumed.” 15 May 2021, as carried by WBUR. wbur.org/news/2021/05/15/pipeline-operator-says-normal-operations-have-resumed
        13. Bloomberg News. “Colonial Pipeline Paid Hackers $5M to Get Fuel Flowing: Sources.” 13 May 2021, as carried by Al Jazeera. aljazeera.com/economy/2021/5/13/colonial-pipeline-paid-hackers-5m-to-get-fuel-flowing-sources
        14. Office of the Maine Attorney General. “Colonial Pipeline Company.” Data Breach Notifications, filed 13 Aug. 2021. maine.gov/agviewer/content/ag/985235c7-cb95-4be2-8792-a1252b4f8318/44968239-4f1b-4bb7-927c-775864a3ad07.shtml
        15. Cable News Network. “US Officials Believe Russia Arrested Hacker Responsible for Colonial Pipeline Attack.” 14 Jan. 2022, as carried by WRAL. wral.com/us-officials-believe-russia-arrested-hacker-responsible-for-colonial-pipeline-attack/20078745/
        16. Fung, Brian. “Colonial Pipeline Says Ransomware Attack Also Led to Personal Information Being Stolen.” CNN Business, 16 Aug. 2021. edition.cnn.com/2021/08/16/tech/colonial-pipeline-ransomware
        17. “Colonial Pipeline Notifying 5,810 People Whose PII and PHI Were Caught Up in DarkSide Breach.” DataBreaches.Net, 16 Aug. 2021. databreaches.net/2021/08/16/colonial-pipeline-notifying-5810-people-whose-pii-and-phi-were-caught-up-in-darkside-breach/
        18. Idaho National Laboratory, CyOTE Program. “Case Study: DarkSide Ransomware Attack on Colonial Pipeline.” INL/RPT-22-67337, 31 Mar. 2022. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_Colonial-Pipeline.pdf
        19. “AAA Urges People Not to ‘Panic Buy’ Gasoline.” 6abc, 13 May 2021. 6abc.com/post/gas-shortage-colonial-pipeline-2021-station-prices/10621772/
        20. Cable News Network. “Gas Shortage DC.” CNN Business, 16 May 2021. edition.cnn.com/2021/05/16/business/gas-shortage-dc
        21. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The Biden-Harris Administration Has Launched an All-of-Government Effort to Address Colonial Pipeline Incident.” 11 May 2021. bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/11/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administration-has-launched-an-all-of-government-effort-to-address-colonial-pipeline-incident
        22. “Biden Admin Grants Jones Act Waiver to Ease Fuel Shortages.” Axios, 13 May 2021. axios.com/2021/05/13/colonial-restarts-biden-admin-jones-act-waiver-ship-fuel
        23. Reuters. “American Airlines Adds Stops to Two Flights after Pipeline Outage.” 12 May 2021, as carried by World Airline News. worldairlinenews.com/2021/05/12/reuters-american-airlines-adds-stops-to-two-flights-after-pipeline-outage/
        24. “Panic Buying Is Driving the Fuel Shortage after Colonial Pipeline Hack, Expert Says.” PBS NewsHour, 11 May 2021. pbs.org/newshour/show/panic-buying-is-driving-the-fuel-shortage-after-colonial-pipeline-hack-expert-says
        25. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. “PHMSA Issues Proposed Civil Penalty of Nearly $1 Million to Colonial Pipeline Company for Control Room Management Failures.” PHMSA.dot.gov, 5 May 2022. phmsa.dot.gov/news/phmsa-issues-proposed-civil-penalty-nearly-1-million-colonial-pipeline-company-control-room
        26. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. “Consent Agreement and Order, In the Matter of Colonial Pipeline Company.” CPF No. 3-2022-026-NOPV and 3-2022-028-NOA, 1 Sept. 2023. primis.phmsa.dot.gov/enforcement-documents/32022026NOPV/32022026NOPV_Consent%20Agreement%20and%20Order_09012023_(20-173062).pdf