Date
February 26, 2022
Location
Japan
Industry
Manufacturing
Access vector
External Remote Services
OT targeting
Indirect: supply chain
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
1 day

Kojima Industries attack and Toyota production halt, 2022

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Kojima Industries attack and Toyota production halt, 2022

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On the night of February 26, 2022, Kojima Industries, a tier-one Toyota supplier of plastic and resin parts, found a virus infection and a threatening message on a file server; early the next day it cut its network links to partners and stopped all its servers[1]. Unable to receive the supplier’s production data, Toyota halted all its domestic plants on March 1 and resumed on March 2[2].

        Why it matters. A ransomware attack on one supplier’s IT systems stopped a carmaker’s production base in Japan for a day, and no source says any plant-floor control system was reached[3][2].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It rests mainly on Kojima’s own notices and investigation report; some details come from Toyota’s release and from press reports, including Bloomberg’s in 2023, which are named in the text. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Kojima’s investigation report says the attacker entered through a vulnerable remote-connection device at a subsidiary, moved into Kojima’s network and encrypted data on some servers and PCs with ransomware[3][4].
        • Toyota halted all its domestic plants on March 1, 2022, and resumed on March 2 using a temporary alternative system[2].
        • The ransom note named no amount, Kojima did not contact the attacker, and Chunichi Shimbun reports that it did not pay. No ransomware family or actor has been named[3][2].
        • Kojima resumed email only on March 22 and was still restoring internal systems in stages on March 31, weeks after Toyota’s one-day halt ended[5][6].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | No public attribution]
        • Access vector: External Remote Services [confirmed | Vulnerable remote-connection device]; Exploit Public-facing Application [inferred | T1190]
        • IT impact: Malware [confirmed | Ransomware]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | All servers stopped]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: Supply Chain [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT reached]
        • OT impact: Not in path [not in path | No OT system reached]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | $375M est., Bloomberg]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]; Reputation Damage [implied]

        What happened

        Kojima found a failure on a file server at about 21:00 on Saturday, February 26, 2022. After a restart at about 23:00 it found a virus infection and a threatening message[1]; its later report dates the first traces of the attack on servers and PCs to about 20:00[4]. Early on February 27, Kojima cut its network links to business partners and outside parties and stopped all its servers. It set up an emergency response headquarters and brought in outside security experts[1][3].

        By Kojima’s own account, production on February 28 went ahead on data exchanged before the cut. That evening it judged it could not exchange the data needed for the next day’s production and contacted the partners concerned[1]. Press reports describe the lost link as the ordering system that coordinates just-in-time parts deliveries with Toyota. Toyota announced the same day that 14 plants and 28 lines in Japan would suspend both shifts on March 1, with some Daihatsu and Hino Motors lines also affected. Production resumed on March 2, using a temporary alternative system[2]. Press reported about 13,000 vehicles of lost output; it is not confirmed that Toyota itself gave that number.

        Kojima resumed email at 09:00 on March 22[5], and on March 31 it was still restoring internal systems in stages, starting with those confirmed safe[6]. Bloomberg reported in 2023 that staff had gone back to paper boards to organize deliveries, and that it took months for Kojima to get operations close to their old routines. Toyota’s chief executive, Akio Toyoda, visited Kojima four days after the attack and said “let us work together to set things right”, according to Toyota’s own outlet, Toyota Times.

        Intent: malicious

        Kojima’s investigation report describes a deliberate intrusion: the attacker used a vulnerable device to get in, moved through two networks and ran ransomware that encrypted data and left a ransom note[3]. The note named no amount, and Kojima says it has not contacted the attacker[3][7]. No source states a goal beyond what ransomware implies, and no source describes Toyota as the attacker’s target.

        Threat actors: not attributed

        No ransomware family, group or state actor has been named by Kojima, Toyota or Japanese authorities. Kojima says it has consulted government agencies and the police, and that it is withholding some findings because of possible secondary impacts[3]. The behavior is that of ransomware, but no actor is highlighted on the map. Two other attacks on automotive suppliers in March 2022, on Denso by the Pandora group and on Bridgestone Americas by LockBit, were separate campaigns against separate victims and are not part of this incident.

        Access vector: a vulnerable remote-connection device

        Kojima’s report says a subsidiary used a remote-connection device for a dedicated link with one specific outside company, that the device had a vulnerability, and that the attacker used it as the entry point[3][4]. From there the attacker moved into the subsidiary’s internal network and then into Kojima’s[3][7]. Kojima has not named the device, the flaw or the outside company.

        No source says the attacker came through the outside company’s own network, so the route is shown as External Remote Services, confirmed. Exploitation of a public-facing application is the closest ATT&CK reading, but the report does not say the device faced the internet, so it is shown as inferred. Bloomberg’s 2023 description of entry through a business partner is superseded by Kojima’s report. No source mentions phishing, stolen VPN credentials or RDP.

        IT impact: ransomware on servers and PCs

        Ransomware encrypted data on some servers and PC terminals at Kojima and its subsidiary, and left a ransom note[3][4]. Kojima then stopped all its servers itself, which also stopped its data exchange with partners[1]. On the map that is Malware, Data Sabotage and System Outage, all confirmed. Kojima found no evidence of data leaving its network[3]. How the attacker moved between networks is not described. Before resuming email, Kojima strengthened security on all its PC terminals[5].

        OT targeting: indirect, through the supply chain

        Toyota was not attacked. It stopped production because a supplier it depends on lost its systems and could not exchange the data for the next day’s production[1][2]. That makes this an indirect supply-chain consequence. Kojima itself was reached through a subsidiary’s link with an outside company, so the chain runs from that link to the subsidiary, to Kojima, to Toyota[3]. The physical process stopped because a business system did, not because a control system was touched.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No OT technique was used, because no OT system was reached. No source describes PLCs, manufacturing execution systems or robotics as compromised at Kojima, and none describes any intrusion at Toyota. With nothing to grade on the OT side, this stage is marked Not applicable.

        OT impact: production stopped, no OT touched

        Toyota’s lines stood idle for a day, but production stopping is not evidence that OT was reached. What went down were Kojima’s servers, PCs and data exchange with partners[3][1]; no source says any plant control system was affected. This stage is marked Not in path, and the flow on the map passes through it without touching any OT technique.

        Perils: no physical event

        Nothing was damaged. No source reports a fire, a release, equipment damage or an injury at Kojima, at Toyota or on the affected Daihatsu and Hino lines. Production halted because ordering and file-server systems were down[1][2]. The map shows No Perils.

        The plants stopped because a supplier’s ordering data stopped, not because anything on the factory floor was touched.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        No party has stated a cost, in yen or any other currency. The only figure in circulation is Bloomberg’s self-described rough calculation, published in 2023, of about $375 million for Toyota, based on Toyota’s sales and output data. It is a journalist’s estimate, not a Toyota disclosure. Kojima, which bore the longer disruption, has disclosed no figure at all.

        Toyota made no claim against Kojima that any source records. Its release apologized to suppliers and customers and contains no penalty or liability language, and Toyota Times describes the incident as having brought the two companies closer. The liability Kojima faced on these facts was real; the injured party chose not to enforce it.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Toyota’s production halt (contingent business interruption)
        • Estimated: $375M Toyota’s lost output, Bloomberg’s own rough calculation (2023)
        • Estimate note: The only estimate comes from Bloomberg, which derived it from Toyota’s sales and output data; neither company has published a figure.
        • Implied: Kojima’s own business interruption; Manual operations and workarounds (paper boards); Network event response and recovery; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network security liability (potential, never claimed); Public relations response; Customer retention
        • Not supported: Business interruption liability; Ransom extortion; Third-party physical and societal impact; Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation liability

        What this incident shows

        One supplier’s file servers stopped 28 production lines within about 48 hours, and Kojima’s own compromise had begun one tier further out, on a link with an outside company[3]. Toyota was reported as saying that restoring the ordering link over backup networks could take a week or two: a backup existed, but it could not carry production volume at the speed just-in-time manufacturing needs.

        The case also shows that a large contingent loss does not automatically become a claim. Whether it does depends on the commercial relationship, and here the party with every commercial reason to claim chose a joint recovery instead. For anyone assessing supplier risk, the exposure a Kojima-shaped event creates matters more than what one customer decided to enforce.

        References

        1. Kojima Press Industry Co., Ltd. “ウィルス感染被害によるシステム停止事案発生のお知らせ [Notice of System Shutdown Due to Virus Infection].” 1 Mar. 2022. kojima-tns.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ウィルス感染被害によるシステム停止事案発生のお知らせ-2.pdf
        2. “子会社機器に脆弱性 サイバー攻撃被害の小島プレス [Subsidiary device had a vulnerability: Kojima Press, victim of cyberattack].” Chunichi Shimbun, 1 Apr. 2022. chunichi.co.jp/article/445050
        3. Kojima Press Industry Co., Ltd. “システム停止事案調査報告書(第1報) [System Shutdown Incident Investigation Report (First Report)].” 31 Mar. 2022. kojima-tns.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/20220331_システム障害調査報告書(第1報).pdf
        4. “小島プレスが調査報告書、外部企業とのリモート接続機器に脆弱性 [Kojima Press investigation report: vulnerability in remote-connection device used with an external company].” MONOist (ITmedia), 5 Apr. 2022. monoist.itmedia.co.jp/mn/articles/2204/05/news064.html
        5. Kojima Industries Corporation. “ホームページならびにメールサーバ復旧のお知らせ [Notice of Website and Email Server Restoration].” 22 Mar. 2022. kojima-tns.co.jp/news/news0003405/
        6. Kojima Press Industry Co., Ltd. “ウィルス感染被害によるシステム停止事案発生のお知らせ(第2報) [Notice of System Shutdown Due to Virus Infection Incident (Second Report)].” 31 Mar. 2022. kojima-tns.co.jp/news/news0003406/
        7. “子会社リモート接続機器脆弱性が標的に、横展開からランサム [Subsidiary remote-connection device vulnerability was the target; ransomware after lateral movement].” Security NEXT, 8 Apr. 2022. security-next.com/135504