- Date
- February 24, 2022
- Location
- Ukraine + 6 more
- Industry
- Telecommunications
- Access vector
- External Remote Services
- OT targeting
- Indirect: supply chain
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- Over a month for customers
Viasat KA-SAT AcidRain modem wiper attack, 2022

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. Early on February 24, 2022, about an hour before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an attacker inside the management network of Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite service sent commands that overwrote flash memory on a large number of modems, and tens of thousands dropped off the network[1][2]. One of the parties that lost the link was Enercon, whose 5,800 wind turbines in central Europe, with 11 GW of capacity, lost remote monitoring and kept running in automatic mode[3].
Why it matters. It is a clear case of an OT loss with no OT intrusion. Nothing touched an industrial control system, yet a wind fleet’s supervision was lost because it depended on a communications service that was attacked.
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. The sources disagree on whether the modems were destroyed or could be restored, and both accounts are kept here. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- Viasat says the attacker came in through a VPN appliance, reached the trusted management segment of the network and ran legitimate management commands on many residential modems at once. No modem vulnerability was used[1].
- SentinelLabs named the wiper AcidRain, and Viasat confirmed its use[4]. Viasat says several thousand customers in Ukraine and tens of thousands of other fixed broadband customers across Europe were affected[1].
- Enercon said its turbines lost the satellite link and SCADA monitoring, but remained in operation in automatic mode and kept producing energy[3].
- The European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States attributed the attack to Russia on May 10, 2022[2][5]. No one has published a cost.
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | Russia, per EU, UK and US]
- Access vector: External Remote Services [confirmed | T1133, VPN appliance]; Credential Theft [confirmed | T1078, valid accounts]
- IT impact: Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1485; T1561.001 reported]; Malware [confirmed | AcidRain]; Denial of Service [confirmed | T1498, DHCP flood]; System Outage [reported | T1529]
- OT targeting: Indirect: Supply Chain [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT logic, no OT intrusion]
- OT impact: Loss / Denial of View [inferred | T0829, downstream of the lost link]
- Perils: Bricking [reported | Disputed by the sources]
- Financial losses: Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Business Interruption [implied]
What happened
Viasat first detected malicious traffic at about 03:02 UTC on February 24. The attacker had reached the trusted management segment of the KA-SAT network through a VPN appliance, moved laterally, and executed legitimate, targeted management commands on a large number of residential modems simultaneously. From about 04:15 UTC, larger numbers of modems across much of Europe left the network over about 45 minutes; ultimately “tens of thousands of modems that were previously online and active dropped off the network”[1]. Viasat’s CISO later said the network then served 110,000 to 120,000 modems[6].
Viasat says several thousand customers in Ukraine and tens of thousands of other fixed broadband customers across Europe were affected, while most users were not[1]. Eutelsat told AFP that around one-third of its bigblu unit’s 40,000 European subscribers were hit, in Germany, France, Hungary, Greece, Italy and Poland, and Orange said nearly 9,000 Nordnet subscribers in France were without internet[7].
Enercon said that since February 24, 5,800 of its wind energy converters in central Europe, with a total power of 11 gigawatts, had lost the satellite link, and that SCADA monitoring was not taking place. The turbines remained in operation in automatic mode, and if a fault occurred a team would have to go on site[3]. Modern Power Systems says over 95% of them were reconnected by April 19[8].
On March 30 Viasat said it had shipped nearly 30,000 modems to distributors to bring customers back online[1]. The next day SentinelLabs named the wiper AcidRain[4]. On May 10 the EU, the UK and the US attributed the attack to Russia[2][5]. In August 2023 Viasat’s CISO said valid credentials had been used against the VPN appliance, and described a second attack that flooded Viasat’s infrastructure[9][10].
Intent: malicious
This was a state operation timed to the invasion. The EU says it took place one hour before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and affected Ukraine and several EU member states[2], and the UK government believes its primary target was the Ukrainian military[5]. No ransom or other demand is reported. Enercon was not the target: it was one of an unknown number of parties that relied on the same network, and the record gives no basis for treating it as the attacker’s aim.
Threat actors: Russia
On May 10, 2022, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States each publicly attributed the attack to Russia, in coordinated statements; the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre assessed it “almost certain” that Russia was responsible[2][5]. None of the three named a unit.
The technical evidence points the same way without settling the unit. SentinelLabs found, with medium confidence, developmental similarities between AcidRain and a plugin of VPNFilter, a campaign the FBI and the Department of Justice attributed to the Russian government in 2018[4]. MITRE associates AcidRain with Sandworm Team, which is a framework entry, not an attribution[11].
Access vector: a VPN appliance and valid credentials
In March 2022 Viasat said the attacker gained remote access by exploiting “a misconfiguration in a VPN appliance”[1]. In August 2023 its CISO gave a fuller account: on February 23 someone tried several sets of valid credentials against the VPN appliance, failed, and logged in successfully about an hour later. Viasat ruled out brute-force guessing, a default password, a zero-day and a flaw in the appliance, and does not know how the credentials were obtained[9]. Both external remote services and the use of valid credentials are shown as confirmed.
SentinelLabs put forward an alternative hypothesis, that the KA-SAT management mechanism was used to push the wiper as a supply-chain attack[4]. It is not charted as an access vector.
IT impact: modem memory wiped, then a flood
Viasat says the commands “overwrote key data in flash memory on the modems”, leaving them unable to reach the network[1]. SentinelLabs describes how AcidRain does it: it works through the device’s storage files, overwrites them or erases them, and then reboots the device; Viasat said that analysis was consistent with its own report[4]. The wipe is confirmed, and the specific disk-wipe and reboot techniques are shown as reported.
Viasat’s CISO also described a second, separate attack that flooded its infrastructure with DHCP requests, “over 100,000 in a 5-minute span”[9]. Treating that as a denial of service is our reading of the stated flood. Viasat says there is no evidence that end-user data was accessed, or that the satellite or its ground infrastructure was directly compromised, and that the network was fully stabilized within several days[1].
OT targeting: indirect, through a supplier
Enercon’s systems were not compromised. Its remote supervision of the turbine fleet ran over a satellite communications service, the provider of that service was attacked, and the loss reached Enercon down that dependency[1][3]. That makes this an indirect effect through the supply chain: an outage at a communications supplier removed the operator’s remote view of its fleet. The IT-OT boundary was never crossed.
OT sophistication: not applicable
AcidRain contains no OT logic: no industrial protocol, no process awareness and no knowledge that wind turbines existed. It wiped storage on Linux-based modems[4]. With no OT intrusion and no OT technique to rate, the stage is marked not applicable.
An 11 GW supervisory outage was produced by malware that knew nothing about electricity.
OT impact: loss of view, by dependency
Enercon said “SCADA monitoring is currently not taking place due to the disruption”[3]. Loss of view is shown as inferred, because the attacker did not act on any industrial control system; the effect arrived through the lost satellite link.
The process itself carried on. Enercon said the turbines remained in operation in automatic mode and were producing energy, and that there was “no risk to the turbines” in that mode[3][12]. Germany’s federal cybersecurity agency, BSI, pointed to grid operators’ redundant communications[12]. No source reports any turbine damaged, stopped or mis-operated, and no source gives a figure for energy lost or not lost.
Perils: bricking, disputed
The two most authoritative sources conflict. Viasat’s overview of March 30, 2022 says the modems were “not permanently unusable” and “can be fully restored via a factory reset”, and Viasat officials said on March 24 that the attack “did not make them permanently inoperable”[1][13]. The UK government’s statement of May 10 quotes Viasat as saying that “tens of thousands of terminals have been damaged, made inoperable and cannot be repaired”, with no date or source for the quotation, and no Viasat statement using those words has been found[5].
Bricking is therefore shown as reported, not established. The loss of service to customers is also reported, but it is not a physical peril. No primary peril is shown.
Financial losses: what it cost
No party has published a money figure. Viasat has disclosed no incident cost, revenue effect or customer-credit figure, Enercon has disclosed none, and no turbine operator or national authority has published one. The only quantities are counts: nearly 30,000 replacement modems and 5,800 turbines, with no unit price attached[1][3].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Third-party physical and societal impact (broadband customers in seven countries; 5,800 turbines without remote monitoring); Network device replacement (nearly 30,000 modems shipped); Network event response and recovery (investigation with Mandiant, infrastructure rebuilt)
- Implied: Direct business interruption (Viasat’s broadband service); Contingent business interruption (Enercon’s lost remote supervision); Manual operations and workarounds (on-site teams for turbine faults); Voluntary improvements
- Not supported: First-party property damage (satellite and ground infrastructure); Equipment repair and replacement (no turbine damaged)
Viasat’s CISO said in 2023 that the company had “rebuilt a whole ton of infrastructure from scratch over the last six months”[10]. Modern Power Systems, in its own narration, says Enercon was replacing damaged hardware and developing LTE-based retrofit packages for wind farms without backup communications[8]. Neither is priced.
What this incident shows
Two of the gaps are ordinary. Remote access through a VPN appliance gave the attacker the management segment, and from that one position it could command a large number of modems at once, with no staging, rate limit or boundary to contain the damage[1]. The third is less often discussed: Enercon’s remote monitoring rode on a single satellite service, and that concentration became visible as a risk only when it failed[8].
What limited the harm is the most useful part of the record. The turbines kept generating in automatic mode when the link died[3]. A supervisory dependency is survivable when the control loop beneath it does not depend on it, and this incident shows that at 11 GW scale with an outcome rather than an argument.
References
- Viasat Inc. “KA-SAT Network cyber attack overview.” 30 Mar. 2022. viasat.com/perspectives/corporate/2022/ka-sat-network-cyber-attack-overview/
- Council of the European Union. “Russian cyber operations against Ukraine: Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union.” Press release, 10 May 2022. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/10/russian-cyber-operations-against-ukraine-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/
- “Satellite outage impacts more than 5,000 wind turbines across Europe.” Data Center Dynamics, 1 Mar. 2022, reporting Enercon’s statement of that day. datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/satellite-outage-impacts-more-than-5000-wind-turbines-across-europe/
- Guerrero-Saade, Juan Andres, and Max van Amerongen. “AcidRain | A Modem Wiper Rains Down on Europe.” SentinelLabs, 31 Mar. 2022, updated 9 Jan. 2025. sentinelone.com/labs/acidrain-a-modem-wiper-rains-down-on-europe/
- UK Government. “Russia behind cyber-attack with Europe-wide impact an hour before Ukraine invasion.” gov.uk, 10 May 2022. gov.uk/government/news/russia-behind-cyber-attack-with-europe-wide-impact-an-hour-before-ukraine-invasion
- CyberScoop. Report of Viasat’s Black Hat 2023 talk, 10 Aug. 2023. cyberscoop.com/viasat-ka-sat-hack-black-hat/
- AFP. “Cyberattack knocks thousands offline in Europe.” 6 Mar. 2022, as republished by The Jakarta Post. thejakartapost.com/world/2022/03/06/cyberattack-knocks-thousands-offline-in-europe-
- “Enercon turbines disrupted by satellite cyber attack.” Modern Power Systems, 9 June 2022. modernpowersystems.com/features/featureenercon-turbines-disrupted-by-satellite-cyber-attack-9935239/
- Brumfield, Cynthia. “Incident response lessons learned from the Russian attack on Viasat.” CSO Online, 16 Aug. 2023. csoonline.com/article/649714/incident-response-lessons-learned-from-the-russian-attack-on-viasat.html
- Greig, Jonathan. “Viasat hack was two incidents and resulted in sanctions.” The Record, 11 Aug. 2023. therecord.media/viasat-hack-was-two-incidents-and-resulted-in-sanctions
- MITRE. “AcidRain, Software S1125.” MITRE ATT&CK, v1.1, last modified 15 Apr. 2025. attack.mitre.org/software/S1125/
- Reuters. “Satellite outage knocks out thousands of Enercon’s wind turbines.” 28 Feb. 2022, as republished by Euronews. euronews.com/next/2022/02/28/ukraine-crisis-cyber-enercon
- Waterman, Shaun. “Hackers Attacked Satellite Terminals Through Management Network, Viasat Officials Say.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 24 Mar. 2022. airandspaceforces.com/hackers-attacked-satellite-terminals-through-management-network-viasat-officials-say/


