- Date
- April 8, 2022
- Location
- Ukraine
- Industry
- Energy
- Access vector
- Unknown
- OT targeting
- Direct (sophisticated)
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 0 days (prevented)
Industroyer2 Ukrainian substation attack, 2022

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. In April 2022, the Sandworm group staged Industroyer2, malware built to send commands to electrical equipment over the IEC-104 protocol, inside the network of a Ukrainian energy provider, timed to run at 16:10 UTC on April 8[1]. Defenders stopped it first: CERT-UA said “implementation of the malicious plan has so far been prevented”, and no outage is reported[2].
Why it matters. The US Idaho National Laboratory says the attack could have caused a blackout for more than two million people in Ukraine[3]. It is a well-documented case of detection and response changing the outcome of an attack that had already reached the control network.
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Much of the technical detail describes what the staged code was built to do, not what it did, and this account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- The attackers had access on or before February 17, 2022, and were in the environment for at least 51 days, according to the Idaho National Laboratory (INL)[3].
- Industroyer2 carried the addresses of eight devices, at what INL calls eight high-voltage electrical substations, and a wiper was set to run ten minutes after it to erase its traces[1][3].
- ESET attributes the attack with high confidence to Sandworm, which MITRE ties to Russia’s GRU military unit 74455[1][4].
- How the attackers got in, and how they crossed from the IT network to the industrial control network, is not known. ESET says so directly[1].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [confirmed | Sandworm, per ESET]
- Access vector: Not established [unknown | ESET does not know how the victim was breached]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | staged wipers, T1485, T1561.002, no data loss reported]
- OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Sophisticated [confirmed]
- OT impact: Inhibit Response [confirmed | T0881, staged code]; Manipulate Control [reported | T1692.001, designed, not executed]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Payload stopped before it ran]
- Financial losses: Cyber Incident Response [confirmed]; Data Loss [implied]
What happened
INL says the adversary had access to the energy provider’s environment on or before February 17, 2022, and stayed for at least 51 days[3]. CERT-UA dates the initial compromise to no later than February 2022[2]. ESET, which worked with CERT-UA on the case, says it does not know how the initial compromise occurred, or how the attackers moved from the IT network to the industrial control network[1].
Industroyer2 is a stripped-down successor to the Industroyer malware used against a Kyiv substation in 2016. Where the original spoke four industrial protocols, this one speaks only IEC-104, and the analyzed sample carried the IP addresses of eight devices in its configuration. ESET says the equipment it targets includes protection relays used in substations, and that the scheduled run was meant “to cut power in an Ukrainian region”[1].
Around it sat a set of wipers: CaddyWiper on Windows, loaded by ARGUEPATCH, ORCSHRED and AWFULSHRED on Linux, and SOLOSHRED on Solaris. The operator created a scheduled task to run Industroyer2 at 16:10 UTC on April 8, with CaddyWiper set for 16:20 on the same machine “to erase Industroyer2 traces”[1]. CERT-UA said CaddyWiper was distributed and launched through the Windows Group Policy mechanism[5].
It did not run. INL says defenders “stopped the attack in progress and prevented the adversary from achieving their intended impact”, and MITRE says the sample was discovered before it was deployed[3][6]. CERT-UA and ESET published on April 12, four days after the scheduled time[1][2]. No source reports that a wiper destroyed data or that power was cut.
Intent: malicious
The intent is not in doubt. The payload was configured with the addresses of specific substation devices and scheduled to run, and ESET says the aim was to cut power in a Ukrainian region[1]. A wiper was set to follow it ten minutes later to erase the evidence[1]. It was set to run in the seventh week of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Threat actors: Sandworm
ESET attributes the attack to Sandworm with high confidence[1], and MITRE attributes Sandworm Team to Russia’s GRU military unit 74455[4][6]. The same actor carried out the 2015 and 2016 attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, and Industroyer2 is a direct successor to the malware used in 2016.
Access vector: not established
How the first system was breached is unknown. ESET says plainly that it does not know how the initial victim was compromised[1]. INL dates access to on or before February 17, 2022[3]. ESET believes the attacker already had credentials before the attack, because its Linux worm tries SSH logins with a credential list supplied with the script[1]. CERT-UA said the attackers moved between network segments through chains of SSH tunnels[5]. Those describe movement inside the network, not the way in, so the access vector is shown as unknown.
IT impact: wipers staged across three platforms
The IT side of the attack was built to destroy. CaddyWiper erases user data and partition information, AWFULSHRED destroys the whole content of attached disks on Linux, and SOLOSHRED deletes databases and files on Solaris[1][7]. The Linux wiper was set to launch through a cron job, CaddyWiper through a scheduled task, and CERT-UA says Group Policy was used to spread CaddyWiper[1][5].
The map shows malware and data sabotage as confirmed, because the code and its schedule are documented. What the record does not show is any data actually lost: no source reports that a wiper destroyed data at the energy provider, and CERT-UA says the plan was prevented[2].
OT targeting: a direct compromise
The adversary reached the industrial control network and staged Industroyer2 on a host able to speak IEC-104 to substation equipment[1]. The objective was the substations themselves, which INL counts as eight high-voltage electrical substations[3]. That makes this a direct OT compromise. The classification records what was targeted, not what was achieved, and nothing was achieved.
OT sophistication: sophisticated
Industroyer2 carried, for each of its eight target devices, the protocol addresses needed to command it, which means the adversary had mapped the target equipment before the payload was built[1]. The sample also stops a legitimate process used in daily operations and renames it so it cannot restart, and a wiper was timed to erase its traces ten minutes after it ran[1][6]. That is preparation specific to this process and this site. We classify it as sophisticated.
The attack was at its most severe on every dimension except one: what actually happened.
OT impact: designed, staged and stopped
Nothing happened on the grid. The OT techniques are documented as code behavior, not as observed outcomes. Before connecting to devices, the sample terminates a legitimate process and renames it by adding “.MZ” so it cannot restart; MITRE names the targets as PServiceControl.exe and PService_PDD.exe[1][6]. That is shown as Inhibit Response, confirmed as code behavior, though no source says it ran at the victim.
ESET believes Industroyer2 “is able to control specific ICS systems in order to cut power”, by sending IEC-104 command messages to the eight devices in its configuration[1]. That is shown as Manipulate Control, reported: a designed capability that was removed before it was used[6].
Perils: none, because the payload never ran
There was no physical event. Industroyer2 was staged but did not run, and no source reports a breaker operation, an outage, a fire or damage[2][6]. INL says the attack could have caused a blackout for more than two million people[3]. That is a statement of what could have happened, and eight hardcoded substation addresses are a capability, not an outcome.
Financial losses: what it cost
The only loss this incident produced is response cost. An adversary present for at least 51 days across IT and industrial control networks had to be investigated and removed, with staged payloads on Windows, Linux and Solaris systems[3][1]. INL credits a coordinated response by defenders at the energy company, CERT-UA and ESET[3]. Nobody has published a cost, an hours figure or a headcount.
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Network event response and recovery
- Implied: Proprietary data response and recovery (restoring systems where destructive payloads were staged); Voluntary improvements
- Not supported: Lost revenue and productivity; Third-party physical and societal impact; Cyber-physical event response
The figure that matters here is the one that was not incurred: in INL’s words, a blackout that “could have” reached more than two million people in a country under invasion[3]. This analysis does not estimate counterfactual losses.
What this incident shows
Industroyer2 is the strongest documented case of OT detection and response changing an outcome. INL is candid that it does not claim early detection: “it is unknown at which point in the attack timeline detection occurred”, and the victim likely understood the attack “just before the malware sent unauthorized command messages”[3]. This is detection inside the window that still mattered, followed by a response that found and removed payloads across three platforms, under time pressure, in a country at war.
The gap is just as clear. The adversary crossed from the IT network to the industrial control network and stayed for weeks, and nobody knows how[1][3]. No source says what detected the attack, so the success cannot be credited to any specific technology. For anyone valuing OT security, the case also shows a limit of impact measures: a prevented blackout and a quiet day both score as no loss.
References
- ESET Research. “Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded.” WeLiveSecurity, 12 Apr. 2022. welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
- Claroty Team82. “Industroyer2 Variant Surfaces in Foiled Attack Against Ukraine Electricity Provider.” Claroty, 13 Apr. 2022, quoting CERT-UA. claroty.com/team82/blog/industroyer2-variant-surfaces-in-foiled-attack-against-ukraine-electricity-provider
- Idaho National Laboratory / DOE CESER CyOTE Program. “Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper.” INL/RPT-23-71546, 31 Mar. 2023. cyote.inl.gov/content/uploads/24/2025/12/CyOTE-Case-Study_Industroyer2.pdf
- MITRE. “Sandworm Team, Group G0034.” MITRE ATT&CK (accessed 22 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034/
- “Russia-linked Sandworm APT targets energy facilities in Ukraine with wipers.” Security Affairs, 12 Apr. 2022, quoting CERT-UA. securityaffairs.com/130123/apt/russia-sandworm-targets-energy-facilities-ukraine.html
- MITRE. “Industroyer2, Software S1072.” MITRE ATT&CK (accessed 21 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/software/S1072/
- MITRE. “CaddyWiper, Software S0693.” MITRE ATT&CK (accessed 21 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/software/S0693/


