Date
June 27, 2022
Location
Iran
Industry
Manufacturing
Access vector
Unknown
OT targeting
Direct
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
Brief, length unknown

Predatory Sparrow attack on Iranian steel mills, 2022

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Predatory Sparrow attack on Iranian steel mills, 2022

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On June 27, 2022, a group calling itself Predatory Sparrow claimed cyberattacks on three Iranian steel producers: Khuzestan Steel, Mobarakeh Steel and Hormozgan Steel[1]. It published video that appears to show equipment damaged and a fire at Khuzestan Steel, where production was reported halted, briefly[2][3]. The company’s chief executive said the attack failed and did no damage to the production line[2].

        Why it matters. It is a public claim of physical damage from a cyberattack on heavy industry that no independent source has confirmed. What is confirmed, a brief production halt and an attack on the steel companies’ IT systems, is much smaller than what was claimed[1][2].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. The physical account rests mainly on the attackers’ own video, and the main denial comes through Iranian state-linked media; both are weighed here, and neither is accepted as settled. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • Production at Khuzestan Steel stopped after the attack and was said to be working again the same day. No source gives the length of the halt[1][3].
        • The molten-steel spill and the fire rest on the attackers’ video. The chief executive said no damage was done, and Mandiant said the footage was “not necessarily indicative of an actual intrusion into the operational technology”[2].
        • Check Point Research found malware, chaplin.exe, that logs the user off and stops the computer from booting correctly. Neither the company nor Iran has confirmed it[4].
        • Israeli press reported leaks hinting that the Israel Defense Forces were behind the attack, and the Defense Minister ordered an investigation of the leaks. Israel has not confirmed any role[5].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Hacktivists [reported | Claimed by Predatory Sparrow]; Nation-State [reported | Israeli press leaks]
        • Access vector: Not disclosed [unknown | No public account of entry]
        • IT impact: Malware [reported | Chaplin, per Check Point]; Credential Manipulation [reported | T1531]; System Outage [reported | Website, per Tasnim]; Data Exfiltration [reported | Emails leaked]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [reported | Claimed, disputed]
        • OT sophistication: Unknown [unknown | OT commands never documented]
        • OT impact: Loss / Denial of Control [reported | T0813]; Manipulate Control [reported | T1692.001]
        • Perils: Loss of Containment [reported | Attackers’ video]; Fire [reported | Attackers’ video]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Products & Materials [implied]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        IranWire says the attack took place between midnight and 6:00 AM Tehran time on June 27, 2022, and Khuzestan Steel’s chief executive, Amin Ebrahimi, said an attack was made on some systems at 5:15 AM[3]. Predatory Sparrow posted video the same day, said to come from a Khuzestan Steel camera. CyberScoop says it “appears to show equipment being damaged and a subsequent fire, with firefighters rushing in to extinguish the flames”[2]. Check Point Research says a steel billet production line at Khuzestan Steel “began to malfunction”[4].

        Iran International says the company “had to stop work until further notice”, and BBC Persian reported that operations were suspended[1][2]. The same day, Tasnim, which Iran International describes as affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard, said the line was “now working”, and the chief executive told IranWire it was “already active”[1][3]. A vendor blog says the attack “triggered a temporary shutdown of facilities”, but no stronger source reports halts at Mobarakeh or Hormozgan[6].

        Iranian state media confirmed that “part of the steel information technology systems of the country was attacked by foreign enemies”[2]. Jamaran reported that no machines were harmed because the factory was offline during an electricity outage[1]. Sources quoted by IranWire said the machinery is switched off at night because of restrictions on the electricity supply, and a Mobarakeh employee said that is the only reason the attack did not cause physical damage to the production line[3]. The group later leaked tens of thousands of company emails[7].

        Intent: malicious

        The attack was deliberate and aimed at several companies at once[1]. Predatory Sparrow said the companies were under international sanctions and that the attacks were “carried out carefully so to protect innocent individuals”[4]. It said the companies were tied to the IRGC, and leaks reported in Israel called the attack retaliation for an Iranian cyberattack that set off rocket sirens in Jerusalem and Eilat[8]. No ransom, extortion or financial motive is documented.

        Accounts of how close workers came differ. CCDCOE describes the video as showing workers leaving part of the plant before the spill, and ThreatDown says it came after workers had left[7][6]. No injury was reported.

        Threat actors: claimed by a group, linked by leaks to Israel

        Predatory Sparrow, Gonjeshke Darande in Persian, claimed the attack[1]. It describes itself as an independent group. Check Point called chaplin.exe a variant of Meteor, a wiper believed used against Iran’s railway system in 2021, and attributed that railway attack to a group called Indra, active since 2019[4].

        Israeli press reported leaks pointing to the Israel Defense Forces. Kan reported that footage of the attack was shown to the IDF Chief of Staff, and on June 30, 2022, Defense Minister Benny Gantz ordered an investigation of leaks, saying they “violate the State of Israel’s ambiguity policy”[5]. Stichting Jason says the leaks named Unit 8200, Israel’s signals-intelligence unit[8]. Israel has not officially confirmed any role. Both a hacktivist group and a nation-state are shown as reported.

        Access vector: not disclosed

        No source says how the attackers got in. Iranian state media said only that the steel companies’ information technology systems were attacked by “foreign enemies”[2]. No source describes how, or whether, the attackers crossed from those IT systems into the control systems, and no source names the control system or controllers involved. This stage is marked Not disclosed, and the flow passes through it without highlighting any vector.

        IT impact: malware that locks users out, and a leak

        Check Point Research found an executable, chaplin.exe, in the attack, and says it shares a codebase with Meteor. It disconnects the network adapters, logs the user off, blocks the user from the computer and deletes the Lsa registry key, “preventing the system from booting correctly”[4]. Stichting Jason adds that Chaplin cannot delete files and that it deletes the user’s login information “to prevent the user from intervening in the attack”[8]. No source says which machines it ran on, and neither the company nor Iran has confirmed the malware.

        Tasnim said the company’s website and information channels were briefly disrupted[1], and the group later leaked tens of thousands of emails on customers and trading practices[7]. All four items are shown as reported.

        OT targeting: a claimed direct compromise, disputed

        The attackers claim they acted on the production process itself, which would make this a direct OT compromise. Whether they reached the control systems is disputed. Mandiant’s John Hultquist said the screenshots and evidence posted were “not necessarily indicative of an actual intrusion into the operational technology”, and that Mandiant was working to validate the claims[2]. No victim, authority or vendor has confirmed that a control system was reached. Direct OT compromise is shown as reported, not confirmed.

        OT sophistication: unknown

        Nothing public settles it. A 2026 analysis on the Stranded on Pylos blog says the OT commands or tools behind the claimed damage have never been documented[9]. Without them, there is no way to tell whether the attackers manipulated a process with care, disrupted it crudely, or never reached it at all. OT sophistication is shown as Unknown.

        OT impact: denial of control and commands, both reported

        Two readings are shown, and both are reported. Researchers describe Chaplin as locking the user out so the user could not intervene while the attack ran[8][4]. Read as denial of control, that is MITRE ATT&CK’s Denial of Control, T0813, but neither source says the user was a control-room operator.

        Predatory Sparrow claims it caused the malfunction, and Check Point says a billet line began to malfunction[4]. That would be an unauthorized command message, T1692.001, shown as Manipulate Control. No source documents the commands sent[9], and MITRE has no software or campaign entry for this incident, for Predatory Sparrow or for Chaplin[10].

        Perils: a spill and a fire, both disputed

        No primary peril is shown, because the physical event is disputed. The only physical events any source describes are molten steel spilling from a machine and a fire, and both come from the attackers’ video: CCDCOE describes a machine “spewing molten steel and fire”[7][2]. Against that, the chief executive said “no structural damage to production lines happened”, and Jamaran said no machines were harmed[1]. He is the best-placed source on his own plant, but he speaks through state-linked media that has a reason to deny damage. Loss of containment and fire are both shown as reported.

        When the only evidence of damage is the attacker’s own video, the damage stays reported, not confirmed.

        Financial losses: no figure disclosed

        No figure in any currency has been disclosed by the three companies, by Iranian authorities or by any source reviewed. Iran’s steel sector is heavily sanctioned and state-linked, with no disclosure obligation that would produce one. The only confirmed loss is the production halt at Khuzestan Steel, with no length or value[1][3]. Every physical loss below depends on whether the video is genuine.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (production halt at Khuzestan Steel)
        • Implied: Cyber-physical event response (firefighting shown in the video); Property damage; Materials and product loss; Equipment repair and replacement; Startup and return-to-service validation; Computer and laptop replacement; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Loss of life; Bodily injury; Network device replacement; Server replacement; Embedded device replacement; Regulatory action or liability; Ransom extortion; Environmental damage

        National figures do not show any plant’s loss: the World Steel Association put Iran’s June 2022 crude steel output at an estimated 2.2 million metric tons, a national total[11].

        What this incident shows

        The steel mills case shows how far a claim of cyber-physical damage can travel ahead of the evidence. What is supported is a brief production halt at one plant, an attack on IT systems that Iranian state media acknowledged, and malware that locks users out of their computers[1][2][4]. What is not supported, despite the video, is an established account of an attack that reached the controls and spilled molten steel.

        If the spill was caused by the attack, nothing independent of the control system stopped it; that is a hypothesis here, not a finding. What may have limited the outcome was not a control at all: sources quoted by IranWire said the machinery is switched off at night because of electricity restrictions[3]. That is a coincidence, not a defense.

        References

        1. “Cyberattack Hits Iran’s Major Steel Companies.” Iran International, 27 June 2022. iranintl.com/en/202206274256
        2. Vicens, AJ. “Iranian steel facilities suffer apparent cyberattacks.” CyberScoop, 27 June 2022, updated 28 June 2022. cyberscoop.com/iran-cyberattack-israel-hacktivist-steel-ics/
        3. Motevali, Javad. “Hacking Group ‘Predatory Sparrow’ Takes Down Steel Plants in Iran.” IranWire, 29 June 2022. iranwire.com/en/technology/105278-hacking-group-predatory-sparrow-takes-down-steel-plants-in-iran/
        4. “Latest Cyberattack Against Iran Part of Ongoing Campaign.” Threatpost, 5 July 2022. threatpost.com/cyberattack-iran-campaign/180122/
        5. Joffre, Tzvi. “Benny Gantz Orders Investigation of Leaks from Defense Establishment.” The Jerusalem Post, 30 June 2022. jpost.com/breaking-news/article-710926
        6. Umawing, Jovi. “Predatory Sparrow massively disrupts steel factories while keeping workers safe.” Malwarebytes Labs (now ThreatDown), 13 July 2022. threatdown.com/blog/predatory-sparrow-massively-disrupts-steel-factories-while-keeping-workers-safe/
        7. CCDCOE. “Predatory Sparrow operation against Iranian steel maker (2022).” International Cyber Law: Interactive Toolkit. cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org/wiki/Predatory_Sparrow_operation_against_Iranian_steel_maker_(2022)
        8. Brink, Niels. “Predatory Sparrow: When Angry Birds Attack.” Stichting Jason, 2 Nov. 2022. jasoninstitute.com/predatory-sparrow-when-angry-birds-attack/
        9. Joe. “Predatory Sparrow, Out in the Cold?” Stranded on Pylos, 25 May 2026. pylos.co/2026/05/25/predatory-sparrow-out-in-the-cold/
        10. MITRE ATT&CK. “Campaigns.” MITRE ATT&CK, checked 21 Oct. 2026, with technique pages T1531, T0813, T1692.001 and T0879. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/
        11. World Steel Association. “June 2022 Crude Steel Production.” worldsteel.org, 22 July 2022. worldsteel.org/media/press-releases/2022/june-2022-crude-steel-production/