- Date
- August 2022
- Location
- Russia
- Industry
- Oil & Gas
- Access vector
- Unknown
- OT targeting
- Unknown
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- Unknown
Khanty-Mansiysk gas SCADA attack claim, 2022 (unverified)

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. In August 2022 a pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group calling itself Team OneFist claimed to have destroyed the SCADA system of the natural-gas network of Khanty-Mansiysk, a Russian regional capital, and a backup system at the city’s airport[1]. The only source for any part of it is the group, through one interview-based news article, and the regional emergencies ministry’s daily bulletins for those days report no emergency[1][2].
Why it matters. It shows how far a claim of OT sabotage can travel with nothing behind it but the claimants’ word, at a time when hacktivists were increasingly claiming attacks on industrial systems[3].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Here even the basic occurrence of an event, not only its cause, is unconfirmed, and every description of the attack below is the group’s own account. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- International Business Times (IBTimes) published the claim on August 23, 2022, from an interview with the group’s founder, “Voltage”, and cited no other source[1].
- The group said it destroyed the gas SCADA system and a backup at the airport. IBTimes wrote, in its own voice, that the attack also knocked out the city’s power plant and caused a blackout at its airport[1].
- The regional emergencies ministry’s bulletins for August 21 to 25 report no emergency and say fuel-energy and housing-utilities facilities were working in normal mode[2].
- Mandiant assessed, with moderate confidence, that hacktivists have more often than not overstated the effects of their attacks, and CyberScoop wrote that Team OneFist “has been caught exaggerating before”[3][4].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [reported | claimants’ account]
- Threat actors: Hacktivists [reported | Team OneFist, own claim]
- Access vector: Not disclosed [unknown | No method in any source]
- IT impact: Data Sabotage [reported | T0809, claimed]; Inhibit Recovery [reported | backup destroyed, claimed]
- OT targeting: Unknown [unknown | Only the claimants say SCADA was reached]
- OT sophistication: Unknown [unknown | No technical detail]
- OT impact: Loss / Denial of Control [reported | T0826, claimed]; Loss / Denial of View [reported | claimed]
- Perils: Not established [unknown | No physical event established]
- Financial losses: Not established [unknown | No evidenced loss]
What happened
Everything in this section is the claimants’ account. IBTimes published it on August 23, 2022, from an interview with Voltage, whom it names as Team OneFist’s founder, and embedded a social-media post dated August 22 that makes the same claim[1]. Per Voltage, the group targeted the SCADA system of the natural-gas network of Khanty-Mansiysk, the capital of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. Voltage called it a “priority mission” and a “joint training-mission” for new Ukrainian members[1].
The group says it took “weeks” to “understand and interpret the SCADA system”, and that the operation lasted four hours, three of them spent fighting a counter-attack by a Russian operative it called “Vlad”. Voltage says the group could not see a backup system at the airport until the attack began, then destroyed it and “deleted the database”. The group says a check 18 hours later found “the systems are still down”, and that the city “had no other backups and will have to rebuild from scratch”[1]. No screenshots, technical logs or malware samples were published.
The official record for the same days says something else. The regional directorate of Russia’s emergencies ministry (MChS) published daily bulletins for August 21 to 25, 2022. Each says no emergency occurred in the past 24 hours and that fuel-energy and housing-utilities facilities in the okrug were working in normal mode, and none mentions gas supply, the airport, a power plant or a cyber incident[2]. The bulletins also list a heightened-readiness regime set by the rural settlement of Tsingaly on August 19, linked to an accident or emergency in life-support systems, which they do not connect to gas supply or a cyber event[2].
Later sources repeat the claim without adding evidence. Check Point Research wrote in September 2022 that the group damaged the city’s natural gas power plant and caused a blackout at its airport, in a figure captioned as the group’s claims[5]. ICS-STRIVE lists the incident under August 23, 2022, with the IBTimes article as its only reference[6].
Intent: malicious, as claimed
The claim describes a deliberate, planned action, not an accident, so the intent is recorded as malicious. That holds either way: a false claim of an attack is also a deliberate act. Because the attack itself is not established, the map shows Malicious as reported, on the claimants’ account[1]. No ransom, extortion or other demand is claimed.
Threat actors: Team OneFist, by its own claim
Team OneFist describes itself as a pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group. IBTimes, relaying the group, says it was founded on April 23, 2022; Forescout says it was founded in March 2022[1][7]. Mandiant names it, also as Joint Cyber Center, “the most active group we tracked in 2022”[3].
The attribution rests entirely on the group’s own claim of responsibility. There is no independent technical link between any observed effect and this actor, because no effect has been observed. Hacktivists is shown as reported.
Access vector: not disclosed
No source names an entry point. IBTimes says only that the group “forced their way into the natural gas SCADA system”[1]. Forescout describes Team OneFist’s general methods, including default or weak credentials, known router vulnerabilities and internet-accessible devices, but does not tie any of them to this claim, so none is recorded as the route here[7]. ICS-STRIVE’s profile of the group states “No malware identified for this threat actor”[8].
IT impact: claimed destruction of data and backups
Voltage says the Russian operative “was good” until the group “deleted the database”, and that the group destroyed the operative’s backup system at the airport[1]. On the map that appears as data sabotage and the destruction of recovery capability, both reported. They are the group’s own claims relayed by one outlet, and no authority, victim or vendor confirms either of them.
OT targeting: unknown
Only the claimants say a SCADA system was reached. No independent source confirms it, and the only official record of the period reports no emergency and normal operation of fuel-energy and housing-utilities facilities, which does not fit the claimed destruction[2]. Whether any control system was touched, and whether the IT-OT boundary was crossed, are both unknown.
OT sophistication: unknown
A technique cannot be graded, or even confirmed, from a single uncorroborated self-report with no technical detail. The group’s statement that it spent weeks learning the SCADA system says something about its own description of the effort[1], but nothing that can be checked about the method. The stage is marked Unknown.
OT impact: claimed, not shown
The group says the systems were still down 18 hours later and that there were no other backups[1]. If true, that would be a loss of control and of view over the gas network, and both are shown as reported on that basis. The MChS bulletins for August 21 to 25 record no emergency, and no local press report of a gas, power or airport outage was found[2].
Perils: none established
No physical event is established. The claimed destruction of the gas control system, the power-plant outage and the airport blackout would be a service interruption if true, but the only source is the claimants, and the official bulletins report facilities working in normal mode[1][2]. No peril is listed, not even as reported.
A claim of sabotage is not evidence of sabotage, and here it is the only evidence there is.
Financial losses: what it cost
No financial figure is claimed by any source, including the attackers, in any currency. Every subcategory was screened and none shows an evidenced loss. That means no evidenced loss, not proof that nothing happened. If independent technical analysis, official acknowledgment or credible local reporting of an outage ever emerges, several categories would move at once.
Loss evidence
- Not supported: Direct business interruption; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation liability; Ransom extortion
A gas-network failure of the claimed scale would normally leave an official trace. The only official record found is the set of MChS bulletins, and they record none[2].
What this incident shows
Other disputed incidents usually have a confirmed core, an explosion or an outage whose cause is in doubt. This one has none: no source other than the claimants confirms a compromise, an outage or a disruption in Khanty-Mansiysk at the time. The group’s other claims carry similarly large figures, such as some 13,000 devices destroyed[9], and Mandiant cites a June 2022 case in which the group claimed a power-plant outage whose primary cause was reportedly a fire at a different plant nearly 400 miles away[3].
Self-reported hacktivist claims are not automatically false. But a group in wartime has an obvious incentive to overstate its impact, and nothing in the sources offers a way to tell exaggeration from fact here. For risk assessment, a claim like this one belongs in a watch list, not in a loss dataset, until something independent supports it.
References
- Osorio, Nica. “Team OneFist Destroys Natural Gas System At Russian Oil Hub, Knocks Power Plant And Airport Offline.” International Business Times, 23 Aug. 2022. ibtimes.com/team-onefist-destroys-natural-gas-system-russian-oil-hub-knocks-power-plant-airport-offline-3604641
- MChS Russia, Main Directorate for the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra. “Сводка ЧС на 06:00 21 [22, 23, 24, 25] августа 2022 г. [Emergency summary at 06:00, 21 (22, 23, 24, 25) August 2022].” MChS Rossii, five daily bulletins, 21–25 Aug. 2022. 86.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/svodka-chs-i-proisshestviy/4820307; 86.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/svodka-chs-i-proisshestviy/4820846; 86.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/svodka-chs-i-proisshestviy/4821853; 86.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/svodka-chs-i-proisshestviy/4822695; 86.mchs.gov.ru/deyatelnost/press-centr/operativnaya-informaciya/svodka-chs-i-proisshestviy/4823415
- Kapellmann Zafra, Daniel, Keith Lunden, and Nathan Brubaker. “We (Did!) Start the Fire: Hacktivists Increasingly Claim Targeting of OT Systems.” Mandiant / Google Cloud Blog, 22 Mar. 2023. cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/hacktivists-targeting-ot-systems
- Vasquez, Christian. “Fact or fiction, hacktivists’ claims of industrial sabotage in Russia or Ukraine get attention online.” CyberScoop, 22 Mar. 2023. cyberscoop.com/hacktivist-target-operational-technology/
- Check Point Research. “The New Era of Hacktivism: State-Mobilized Hacktivism Proliferates to the West and Beyond.” Check Point Research, 29 Sept. 2022. research.checkpoint.com/2022/the-new-era-of-hacktivism/
- ICS-STRIVE. “Russian Natural Gas Network System Attacked by pro-Ukrainian Hacker Group.” ICS-STRIVE, 5 July 2023. icsstrive.com/incident/russian-natural-gas-network-system-attacked-by-pro-ukrainian-hacker-group/
- Forescout Research, Vedere Labs. “The Increasing Threat Posed by Hacktivist Attacks: An Analysis of Targeted Organizations, Devices and TTPs.” Forescout, 1 Dec. 2022. forescout.com/blog/the-increasing-threat-posed-by-hacktivist-attacks-an-analysis-of-targeted-organizations-devices-and-ttps/
- ICS-STRIVE. “Team OneFist.” ICS-STRIVE, threat-actor profile. icsstrive.com/threat-actor/team-onefist/
- Osorio, Nica. “Team OneFist: New Breed Of Cyber Warriors Pulls Off The ‘Holy Grail Of All Hackers’ In Russia.” International Business Times, 16 Aug. 2022. ibtimes.com/team-onefist-new-breed-cyber-warriors-pulls-off-holy-grail-all-hackers-russia-3602204


