Date
June 2023 – April 2024
Location
Russia
Industry
Water & Wastewater
Access vector
External Remote Services
OT targeting
Direct (crude)
Primary peril
Bricking
Impact duration
Unknown

Moscollector Fuxnet attack on Moscow sensor gateways, 2023–2024

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Moscollector Fuxnet attack on Moscow sensor gateways, 2023–2024

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. In April 2024, the pro-Ukrainian group Blackjack claimed it had damaged or destroyed 87,000 remote sensors and IoT collectors at Moscollector, the Moscow company that monitors the city’s underground water, sewage and communications infrastructure[1]. Claroty Team82 analyzed the malware the group said it used, Fuxnet, and the data it leaked, and concluded that “only a little more than 500 sensor gateways were bricked”[1]. No public statement from Moscollector or any Russian authority has been found.

        Why it matters. Fuxnet is malware built to physically wear out field devices. The case also shows how far an attacker’s claim can run ahead of its own evidence: the attackers’ leaked data supports a count more than two orders of magnitude below their headline[1].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Every count rests on the attackers’ own material as read by Claroty, which says it has “not been able to confirm the attackers’ claims”; no victim account exists. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • In Claroty’s reading of the code, Fuxnet deletes crucial files, shuts down remote-access services, then flips bits across the device’s NAND flash and overwrites its storage to make it unusable[1].
        • Blackjack claimed 87,000 devices and effects on Russia’s 112 emergency number, airports, subways and gas pipelines. Claroty’s reading of the leaked data puts the damage at a little more than 500 sensor gateways, not the sensors behind them[1].
        • Claroty says the malware was likely delivered over SSH or the gateways’ own sensor protocol. The gateways show a default username and password at login, but Claroty does not say the attackers used them[1].
        • The attribution rests on Blackjack’s own claim. A reported affiliation with Ukraine’s security services has not been confirmed by any government or court[2][3].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Hacktivists [reported | Blackjack’s own claim]; Nation-State [reported | Reported link to Ukraine’s services]
        • Access vector: External Remote Services [reported | T0822, SSH or port 4321]; Internet Accessible Device [reported | T0883, per MITRE]
        • IT impact: Malware [reported | Fuxnet]; Firmware Manipulation [reported | T1693.001]; Data Sabotage [reported | T0809]; Denial of Service [reported | T0814]; Inhibit Recovery [reported]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [reported | On the attackers’ data]
        • OT sophistication: Crude [reported]
        • OT impact: Loss / Denial of View [reported | T0829]; Inhibit Response [reported | T0814, T0809]
        • Perils: Bricking [primary]
        • Financial losses: Hardware Bricking [implied]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Data Loss [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        Claroty describes Moscollector as “responsible for the construction and monitoring of underground water and sewage and communications infrastructure” in Moscow. Field sensors measure things such as temperature and gas levels and send their readings over an RS-485/Meter-Bus serial line to MPSB and TMSB sensor gateways made by AO SBK, which pass the data on for central monitoring. Some sites connect through iRZ RL22w 3G routers[1].

        Blackjack says it got in around June 2023; Claroty did not verify that. The group released its claims on April 9, 2024[4]. As Claroty lists them, Blackjack claimed it damaged or destroyed 87,000 remote sensors and IoT collectors, gained access to Russia’s 112 emergency number, bricked sensors and controllers “in critical infrastructure (including airports, subways, gas-pipelines)”, deleted servers, workstations and databases, wiping “30 TB of data” including backups, disabled routers and firewalls, and invalidated the keycards to Moscollector’s office building[1].

        Claroty published its analysis on April 12, 2024, based on the files, screenshots, videos and malware code the attackers shared; it had no access to the victim’s devices. The leaked device list holds 424 MPSB gateways, 93 TMSB gateways and 93 3G routers, plus 11 Windows workstations[1]. By April 15, Blackjack said its leaked files were “only a sample” and claimed 2,659 sensor gateways attacked, about 1,700 of them “reachable and successfully attacked”[1]. No one has checked that figure.

        Intent: malicious

        The malware was written to destroy. In Claroty’s reading of the code, it deletes crucial files and directories, shuts down remote-access services and then wears out the device’s flash memory until the device is unusable[1]. No ransom demand is documented. Blackjack’s own claims describe an operation aimed at Russian infrastructure, with effects on emergency, transport and gas services that Claroty could not confirm[1].

        Threat actors: claimed by a hacktivist group

        The attack is attributed to Blackjack because Blackjack says it did it; no victim or authority has confirmed that. Claroty Team82 and SecurityWeek say the group is “believed to be affiliated with” Ukraine’s intelligence or security services, without saying who believes it[1][2]. The Register, citing the Kyiv Post, says the group is affiliated with Ukraine’s SBU security service[3]. No government statement, indictment or court record confirms any of this. A hacktivist group and a nation-state link are both shown as reported, and the attribution is treated as suspected.

        Access vector: remote services, likely

        How the attackers first got in is not established. Claroty says the malware was “likely” delivered to the gateways over SSH or over the SBK sensor protocol on port 4321, and that the 3G routers were reached over SSH “probably after obtaining the root passwords”[1]. An SSH login to the gateways is greeted with a manufacturer notice that includes a default username and password; Claroty does not say the attackers used it[1].

        Separately, Claroty found about 4,100 iRZ routers exposing services to the internet through Shodan and Censys searches, without saying any belonged to Moscollector[1]. MITRE reads the access as External Remote Services and Internet Accessible Device[5]. Both are shown as reported.

        IT impact: a wiper for field devices

        Claroty’s analysis of the code is the firmest evidence in this case. Fuxnet remounts the filesystem with write access, deletes crucial files and directories, shuts down SSH, HTTP, Telnet and SNMP, and deletes the router’s routing table. It then flips bits across whole sections of the NAND flash chip and overwrites the storage volume with junk data[1]. MITRE maps the destruction to Data Destruction, T0809, and the service shutdown to Denial of Service, T0814[5].

        That the malware ran on Moscollector’s devices rests on the attackers’ data. Claroty also shows a leaked image of a defaced workstation; Blackjack claimed it wiped servers and databases, but the leaked list shows 11 workstations and no servers[1]. All items are shown as reported.

        OT targeting: a direct compromise, on the attackers’ evidence

        On Claroty’s description, the sensor gateways and 3G routers are themselves the boundary devices: reachable over remote-access protocols, and at the same time the serial masters for the field sensors[1]. Attacking them acts on the monitoring network directly, not on IT systems it depends on, which makes this a direct OT compromise. That the attackers reached them rests on their own leaked material and on the malware Claroty analyzed. No victim or authority has confirmed it, so the stage is shown as reported.

        OT sophistication: crude

        Fuxnet is inventive engineering. Wearing out NAND flash takes real understanding of the hardware, and the flooding of the sensors’ serial line shows deliberate exploration of the field protocol[1]. But the dividing line used here is deception against denial. Fuxnet deletes, corrupts and physically wears out devices, with no attempt to fake normal sensor readings or to deceive operators about the state of the infrastructure. That makes it crude in this classification, which measures what an attack does to the process, not how hard the malware was to write.

        OT impact: lost view, and a flooded field bus

        If the gateways were bricked, the sensor data they carried stopped reaching central monitoring. MITRE reads this as Loss of View, T0829, shown as Loss / Denial of View; Claroty did not confirm an actual monitoring outage at Moscollector[5][1]. Shutting down services and destroying storage would also stop remote diagnosis or recovery of a device, shown as Inhibit Response.

        The malware also floods the sensors’ Meter-Bus/RS-485 serial channel, which MITRE maps to Brute Force I/O, T0806[5]. Claroty says this may have been meant to “potentially trigger a bug or vulnerability in the sensors that would damage them”, but concludes that the end sensors were not bricked[1].

        Perils: bricking

        Bricking is the only physical event any source describes. It is primary because it is the direct cause of every loss below, not because it is confirmed. Claroty concludes from the attackers’ leaked data that “only a little more than 500 sensor gateways were bricked by the malware in the attack”, and that “it appears only the sensor gateways were bricked, and not the end-sensors”[1].

        No source reports a fire, explosion or release. The Register reported a sewage eruption in Moscow’s Kommunarka district in October 2024 and named a cyberattack as “the other possibility”, offering no evidence; Moscow police reportedly blamed a planned air release after pressure testing[3]. No source links it to this attack.

        An attacker’s headline count is a claim; its own leaked data can tell a much smaller story.

        Financial losses: nothing disclosed

        No figure has been disclosed, in roubles or any other currency, by Moscollector, by a Russian authority or by any source. Every loss below is implied, because every count comes from the attackers’ leaked data as read by Claroty. If the gateways were bricked, Claroty says they “must be either replaced or their firmware must be individually reflashed”, one by one, across Moscow and its suburbs[1].

        Loss evidence

        • Implied: Network device replacement (about 500 sensor gateways, on Claroty’s reading of the leaked data); Computer and laptop replacement; Startup and return-to-service validation; Production data integrity; Proprietary data response and recovery; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Direct business interruption; Third-party physical and societal impact; Embedded device replacement; Server replacement; Network security liability; Environmental regulation liability; Regulatory action or liability; Bodily injury; Loss of life; Ransom extortion

        What this incident shows

        Moscollector is a case where the malware is better documented than the attack. Claroty’s reading of the code shows a tool built to destroy field devices, and its reading of the leaked data shrinks the attackers’ headline of 87,000 devices to about 500 gateways[1]. Neither number is confirmed by the victim, and keeping the two apart is more useful than repeating the larger one.

        The weaknesses the sources point to are basic. The gateways show a default username and password at login, and Claroty found thousands of routers of the attacked make exposed to the internet[1]. Neither is shown to be the route in, but both are the kind of exposure that keeps field devices within an attacker’s reach.

        References

        1. Claroty Team82. “Unpacking the Blackjack Group’s Fuxnet Malware.” claroty.com, 12 Apr. 2024, updated 15 Apr. 2024. claroty.com/team82/research/unpacking-the-blackjack-groups-fuxnet-malware
        2. “Destructive ICS Malware ‘Fuxnet’ Used by Ukraine Against Russian Infrastructure.” SecurityWeek, 15 Apr. 2024. securityweek.com/destructive-ics-malware-fuxnet-used-by-ukraine-against-russian-infrastructure/
        3. “Skyscraper-high sewage plume erupts in Moscow.” The Register, 28 Oct. 2024. theregister.com/2024/10/28/moscow_sewage_plume/
        4. “Claroty’s Team82 details cyber attack by Blackjack hackers on Moscow’s emergency detection systems.” Industrial Cyber, 15 Apr. 2024. industrialcyber.co/threats-attacks/clarotys-team82-details-cyber-attack-by-blackjack-hackers-on-moscows-emergency-detection-systems/
        5. MITRE ATT&CK. “Fuxnet, Software S1157.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20, checked 21 Oct. 2026. attack.mitre.org/software/S1157/