- Date
- Jan 22 – 23, 2024
- Location
- Ukraine
- Industry
- Energy
- Access vector
- Exploit Public-facing Application
- OT targeting
- Direct (sophisticated)
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 2 days
FrostyGoop attack on Lviv district heating, 2024

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. From the late evening of January 22, 2024, into January 23, attackers sent Modbus commands to heating controllers at Lvivteploenergo, the district heating utility in Lviv, Ukraine[1][2]. Dragos says the controllers were made to report inaccurate measurements and that the attack caused a two-day loss of heating to customers of a facility that fed over 600 apartment buildings, in sub-zero temperatures[2]. The utility said the same day that a hacker attack had disrupted its heat supply management system[3].
Why it matters. Nothing was broken: the controllers were downgraded and made to report false readings, and equipment that worked as designed produced the wrong physical result[2][4]. Dragos calls FrostyGoop the first ICS-specific malware that uses Modbus TCP communications to cause an impact on OT[2].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Dragos’s brief names neither the city nor the utility; the link comes from press reports of Dragos’s findings and from the utility’s own statement, and the two accounts of scale and duration differ. It reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- Dragos says the attackers possibly got in months earlier through an undetermined flaw in an internet-exposed router; SecurityWeek, reporting Dragos, names a MikroTik router and dates the access to April 2023[2][4].
- The ENCO controllers’ firmware was downgraded to a version that lacks monitoring capabilities, and the controllers were made to report inaccurate measurements[2].
- Lvivteploenergo reported 324 heating points shut down in Sykhiv, a district of about 100,000 people, with 175 back in operation at the time of reporting. Dragos says customers lost heat for two days[3][2].
- No actor has been named. Dragos records connections to Moscow-based IP addresses, and no loss figure of any kind has been published[2].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | Moscow-based IPs observed, no actor named]
- Access vector: Exploit Public-facing Application [reported | T1190, router, per Dragos]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | ReGeorg-like web shell]; Firmware Manipulation [confirmed | T1689, T1693.001]
- OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Sophisticated [confirmed]
- OT impact: Manipulate Control [confirmed | T0836]; Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting [confirmed | inaccurate measurements]; Loss / Denial of View [confirmed | T0829]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Loss of heat, no damage]
- Financial losses: Data Loss [confirmed]; Business Interruption [implied]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]
What happened
Dragos says the adversaries possibly gained access to the victim network months earlier through an undetermined vulnerability in an externally facing router[2]. SecurityWeek, reporting Dragos, says “likely”, names the router as a MikroTik and dates the access to April 2023, with a web shell later that month, user credentials taken from the SAM registry hive in November and a further attempt to obtain credentials in December[4]. BleepingComputer, citing an unnamed investigation, gives April 17, 2023[1]. In January 2024, the adversaries made L2TP connections to Moscow-based IP addresses[2].
Dragos, citing the Cyber Security Situation Center of the Security Service of Ukraine, dates the attack to the late evening of January 22 through January 23[1]. The adversaries sent Modbus commands directly to ENCO controllers, which Dragos says are used for process control in district heating, hot water and ventilation systems. They downgraded the controllers’ firmware to a version that lacks monitoring capabilities, “resulting in the Loss of View”, and caused the controllers to report inaccurate measurements[2]. SecurityWeek describes the controllers reporting that water was hot when in fact it was cold, without attributing that wording to Dragos[4].
The utility’s same-day account, via LB.UA, was narrower and faster: 324 individual heating points shut down in Sykhiv, 175 back in operation at the time of reporting, and restoration expected by 21:00 that day. Lviv City Council called it “a failure in the Lvivteploenergo heating system”[3]. Dragos says the facility fed over 600 apartment buildings, that customers had a two-day loss of heating, and that remediation took almost two days[2]. Whether the utility’s estimate held is not reported. Dragos published its analysis on July 23, 2024, six months later, and named the malware FrostyGoop[5].
Intent: malicious
The intrusion was deliberate and patient. On Dragos’s account as reported by SecurityWeek, the attackers were inside from April 2023 and acted in January 2024[4]. When they did act, they chose what to change on the controllers: they removed the monitoring and falsified the measurements[2].
The attack came in January, in sub-zero temperatures, against the equipment that heats homes[2]. Why the attackers did it, and for whom, is not established.
Threat actors: not attributed
No actor has been named. Dragos tracks the malware, not an actor, and declines attribution. It records L2TP connections to Moscow-based IP addresses[2]; that is an observation, not a conclusion, and it is the only pointer to an origin in the sources.
No government attribution was found in the sources reviewed. The Security Service of Ukraine did not respond to CyberScoop’s requests for comment[5]. No threat actor is highlighted on the map.
Access vector: an internet-exposed router
Dragos’s brief says the adversaries “possibly gained access to the victim network months earlier” through “an undetermined vulnerability in an externally facing router”, without naming the brand[2]. SecurityWeek, reporting Dragos, words it as “likely” and names a MikroTik router[4].
Because Dragos hedges the route, exploitation of a public-facing device is shown as reported, not confirmed. The vulnerability itself has not been identified. The heating controllers were not the entry point; the network edge was.
IT impact: a web shell and stolen credentials
Once inside, the adversaries deployed a web shell with tunnel capabilities similar to ReGeorg and retrieved the contents of the Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive, which yields user credentials[2]. SecurityWeek dates the credential theft to November 2023 and a further attempt to December[4].
Dragos also describes the downgrade of the controllers’ firmware, which MITRE maps as a downgrade attack and a modification of system firmware[2][6]. No source reports that anything detected the intruders in the months between entry and the attack.
OT targeting: a direct compromise
The ENCO controllers were the objective: the adversaries sent Modbus commands directly to them from adversary hosts[2]. Dragos says the systems were not adequately segmented and that hardcoded network routes eased access, so a compromised edge router led to the devices that run district heating, hot water and ventilation[2][1].
That makes this a direct OT compromise. Dragos links the ENCO devices to FrostyGoop with medium confidence[2].
OT sophistication: sophisticated
Nothing here was technically difficult. Modbus has no authentication, so commanding a controller that can be reached needs no exploit.
We grade the attack sophisticated for what the attackers knew. They knew that downgrading the firmware would remove the monitoring that could reveal the manipulation, and that falsifying a measurement would make correctly working plant produce the wrong physical result[2]. That is process knowledge rather than software skill, and it is the harder thing to acquire. Dragos calls FrostyGoop the “first ICS-specific malware that uses Modbus TCP communications” to cause an impact on OT[2].
OT impact: controllers made to report false readings
Three effects are confirmed by Dragos. The adversaries changed controller behavior with Modbus commands; the controllers reported inaccurate measurements; and the firmware downgrade removed monitoring, “resulting in the Loss of View”[2]. MITRE maps the commands to Modify Parameter and the outcome to Loss of View and Loss of Availability[6].
On the map these appear as Manipulate Control, Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting and Loss / Denial of View. The controllers were not damaged, and every change was reversible in software.
Perils: loss of heat, no damage
The consequence was the absence of heat in winter, not damage. Dragos says customers lost heating for two days in sub-zero temperatures[2]. No source reports fire, rupture, release or equipment damage, and none is implied: the controllers were downgraded and lied to, not broken. Loss of heat is not a physical peril on this map, so it shows No Perils.
No source reports injury or death, and no source reports having looked.
Physical consequence did not require physical damage: the controllers kept working, and what they reported was false.
Financial losses: no figure published
No figure exists. Lvivteploenergo is a municipal utility that has published no incident cost, no Ukrainian authority has published one, and Dragos does not price incidents. The largest part of the loss, up to two days without heat in winter for customers in a district of about 100,000 people, fell on residents with no way to invoice it[2][3]. No compensation figure appears in any source.
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Third-party physical and societal impact (loss of heat to customers of a facility feeding over 600 apartment buildings, in sub-zero temperatures); Production data integrity (controllers made to report inaccurate measurements)
- Implied: Lost revenue and productivity; Startup and return-to-service validation; Proprietary data response and recovery (firmware restoration); Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
- Not supported: Embedded device replacement; Cyber-physical event response; Bodily injury (none reported, and no source says it looked)
What this incident shows
The chain is ordinary at almost every step: an internet-exposed router with a flaw, months of quiet access, controllers reachable from the network without adequate segmentation, and Modbus, which lets any host that reaches a controller command it[2][4]. Nothing in the estate treated a firmware downgrade as an event worth stopping.
The one control that acts on the consequence rather than the intrusion is an independent indication of the heat actually delivered, one that does not come from the same controllers. Without it, falsified measurements became two days of cold apartments[2][4].
References
- Gatlan, Sergiu. “FrostyGoop malware attack cut off heat in Ukraine during winter.” BleepingComputer, 23 July 2024. bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/frostygoop-malware-attack-cut-off-heat-in-ukraine-during-winter/
- Dragos, Inc. “FrostyGoop ICS Malware Intel Brief.” Dragos, July 2024. hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Reports/Dragos-FrostyGoop-ICS-Malware-Intel-Brief-0724_.pdf
- “Lviv neighbourhood left without heating, hot water by hacker attack.” LB.UA (English edition), 23 Jan. 2024. en.lb.ua/news/2024/01/23/26110_lviv_neighbourhood_left_without.html
- Kovacs, Eduard. “FrostyGoop ICS Malware Left Ukrainian City’s Residents Without Heating.” SecurityWeek, 23 July 2024. securityweek.com/frostygoop-ics-malware-left-ukrainian-citys-residents-without-heating/
- Vasquez, Christian. “New ICS malware FrostyGoop targeted Ukrainian heating utility.” CyberScoop, 23 July 2024. cyberscoop.com/frostygoop-ics-malware-dragos-ukraine/
- MITRE. “FrostyGoop Incident, Campaign C0041.” MITRE ATT&CK, last modified 31 July 2026. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0041


