Date
February 2024
Location
United States
Industry
Manufacturing
Access vector
Supply Chain
OT targeting
Indirect: abundance of caution
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
Several days

International Paper Riegelwood mill cyberattack, 2024

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: International Paper Riegelwood mill cyberattack, 2024

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

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    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. In February 2024, International Paper reported a cyberattack on “operating systems” at its mill in Riegelwood, North Carolina. The company said the attacker “accessed our system through a third-party vendor” and that, “out of an abundance of caution, we coordinated an orderly shutdown of the mill”[1][2]. When it gave its statement, the company was “in the process of starting up the mill”[3].

        Why it matters. The mill stopped because its operator chose to stop it, not because any source shows an attacker acting on the process[1]. The route in was a vendor’s access, a pathway the company itself named[2].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It rests almost entirely on one company statement, reproduced by trade outlets; no copy on International Paper’s own site was located, and no source prints the statement’s date. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • International Paper said the attack came “late last week” and “impacted only a limited set of manufacturing systems at the Riegelwood Mill”; no other mills, locations or systems were affected[3][1].
        • The attacker came in through an unnamed third-party vendor and “did not directly target our company or mill”, according to the company[2][1].
        • The company says everyone at the mill was safe, there were no environmental issues, and it knew of no breach of sensitive, proprietary, personnel or business data[3][1].
        • No source gives the restart date, an attacker, malware or any financial figure[4][5].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | No threat source identified]
        • Access vector: Supply Chain [confirmed | T1199, third-party vendor, per the company]
        • IT impact: Not disclosed [unknown | No technique described]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: Abundance of Caution [confirmed | The company’s own words]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT technique described]
        • OT impact: Not established [unknown | No attacker effect on the process described]
        • Perils: No Perils [confirmed | Orderly shutdown, everyone safe]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        Spokesperson Kimberly Clewis gave International Paper’s statement on a Thursday morning: “Late last week, we experienced a cyberattack event on our operating systems at our mill in Riegelwood, N.C.” The company “quickly initiated our response and containment plans, including notifying appropriate officials”, and coordinated an orderly shutdown of the mill[3]. The attacker “accessed our system through a third-party vendor” and “did not directly target our company or mill”. The event “impacted only a limited set of manufacturing systems at the Riegelwood Mill”, and no other mills, locations or systems were affected[2][1].

        No source prints the date of the statement. ICS-STRIVE gives February 22, 2024, a Thursday, as its incident date[4]; the NR Columbus story carries no printed date, but its web identifier, by our reading, carries a February 22 timestamp[3]; and PITA republished the full statement on March 7, 2024[1]. If the statement was given on February 22, the attack came late in the week of February 12. February 2024 is the best-supported month.

        When it gave the statement, the company was already restarting the mill[3]. No source gives the restart date. ICS-STRIVE lists no threat source and no malware identified[4], and Kaspersky ICS CERT later filed the event as “Denial of IT services, denial of operations | Supply chain/trusted relationship”[6]. International Paper’s first-quarter 2024 earnings release does not mention it[5]. In January 2026, International Paper completed the sale of its Global Cellulose Fibers business to American Industrial Partners[7]; local reporting says that business includes the Riegelwood plant[8].

        Intent: malicious

        The company calls it a “cyberattack event” by an attacker who came in through a vendor[3][2], and no source describes it as an accident or a technical failure, so the path starts at Malicious. What the attacker wanted is not known. The company says International Paper and the mill were not directly targeted[2], no source describes a demand, and no source describes what the attacker did once inside the systems.

        Threat actors: not attributed

        No source names an attacker or attributes the attack to any group. ICS-STRIVE lists “No threat source identified” and “No Malware identified”[4]. The company’s statement says only that the attacker came through a vendor and did not target International Paper directly[2]. No threat actor is highlighted on the map, and no claim of responsibility appears in any source reviewed.

        Access vector: a third-party vendor

        The route is confirmed by the company itself: the attacker “accessed our system through a third-party vendor”[2][1]. Kaspersky ICS CERT files it as supply chain or trusted relationship[6], which MITRE ATT&CK describes as technique T1199, Trusted Relationship[9]. The map shows it as Supply Chain. The vendor is not named, and no source says what kind of access the vendor held or how it was used to reach the mill’s systems.

        IT impact: not disclosed

        No source describes what the attacker did inside International Paper’s systems. No encryption, data theft or malware is reported, and ICS-STRIVE lists no malware identified[4]. The company says it is “not aware of any breach of any sensitive, proprietary, personnel or business data”[1]. What was affected is described only as “operating systems” and “a limited set of manufacturing systems at the Riegelwood Mill”[3][1]. This stage is marked Not disclosed.

        OT targeting: an abundance of caution

        The company’s own words, “out of an abundance of caution, we coordinated an orderly shutdown of the mill”[3], match this category directly. The mill stopped because International Paper stopped it. The reference to manufacturing systems is more specific than a description of corporate IT, but no source says whether process-control systems were reached, as distinct from IT systems that support manufacturing.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No source describes any OT technique or any action on the mill’s process, and the shutdown was the company’s decision[3][4]. With an indirect, precautionary stop and no account of what the attacker did, there is no OT capability to assess, and the stage is marked Not applicable on the map.

        OT impact: not established

        No source describes an attacker effect on the process: the mill stopped because the company shut it down, in good order and as a precaution[3]. The “denial of operations” in Kaspersky’s classification is that shutdown[6]. Whether any control system lost view or control is unknown, because whether the attacker reached process control at all is unknown.

        Perils: no physical event

        The company says “Everyone at the mill is safe and there have been no environmental issues”[3], and no source reports a fire, explosion, equipment failure or release. The stop was orderly, the controlled kind that limits scrapped pulp, and no material loss is reported.

        The mill stopped because its operator chose to stop it, and it stopped in good order.

        Financial losses: no figure disclosed

        International Paper has disclosed no financial figure. Its first-quarter 2024 earnings release does not mention the event; its Global Cellulose Fibers discussion cites lower economic downtime and higher operating costs, with no unplanned outage at Riegelwood[5]. Item 1C of its 10-Ks for fiscal 2024 and 2025, as reproduced by a third party, names no incident[10].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (mill shut for at least several days; no amount disclosed)
        • Implied: Contingent business interruption (vendor-originated); Startup and return-to-service validation; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Materials and product loss; Network device replacement; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Embedded device replacement; Proprietary data response and recovery; Environmental regulation liability; Industry regulation liability

        What this incident shows

        This is one of the most contained events in this library: one site, an orderly stop, no harm reported to people or the environment, and no known data breach, all by the company’s own account[1][3]. Here the operator stopped the mill deliberately and in good order, and was restarting it within days of the attack[3].

        The control lesson is the entry point. The attacker came in through a third-party vendor’s access[2], a pathway the company named but did not describe. For anyone assessing this kind of risk, vendor access into manufacturing systems is the gap this case points to, and no source says how it was closed.

        References

        1. “International Paper Riegelwood Mill Shuts Down after ‘Cyberattack’.” PITA (Paper Industry Technical Association) News Services, 7 Mar. 2024. pita.org.uk/what-we-do/news-services/1358-international-paper-riegelwood-mill-shuts-down-after-cyberattack
        2. “International Paper Riegelwood Mill Shuts Down after ‘Cyberattack’.” Global Paper Money, undated. globalpapermoney.com/international-paper-riegelwood-mill-shuts-down-after-cyberattack-cms-17412
        3. “IP Riegelwood Mill Shuts Down after Cyberattack.” NR Columbus (The News Reporter), undated. nrcolumbus.com/news/business/ip-riegelwood-mill-shuts-down-after-cyberattack/article_df5a0cec-d17e-11ee-9a58-7f96ccce8480.html
        4. “International Paper Takes Mill Operations Offline after Cyberattack.” ICS-STRIVE, incident date 22 Feb. 2024, modified 2 Apr. 2024. icsstrive.com/incident/international-paper-takes-operations-offline-after-cyberattack/
        5. International Paper. “International Paper Reports First-Quarter 2024 Results.” Exhibit 99.1 to Form 8-K, SEC EDGAR, 25 Apr. 2024. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51434/000005143424000029/nextgenip-20240331ex991.htm
        6. Kaspersky ICS CERT. “Q1 2024 -- A Brief Overview of the Main Incidents in Industrial Cybersecurity.” Kaspersky ICS CERT, 3 June 2024. ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/q1-2024-a-brief-overview-of-the-main-incidents-in-industrial-cybersecurity/
        7. International Paper. “International Paper Completes Sale of Global Cellulose Fibers Business to American Industrial Partners (AIP).” PR Newswire, 23 Jan. 2026. prnewswire.com/news-releases/international-paper-completes-sale-of-global-cellulose-fibers-business-to-american-industrial-partners-aip-302669231.html
        8. “Will IP Layoffs in S.C. Affect Riegelwood Plant?” NR Columbus (The News Reporter), 4 Nov. 2024. nrcolumbus.com/news/will-ip-layoffs-in-s-c-affect-riegelwood-plant/article_08aff494-9af1-11ef-9262-bb198e438e07.html
        9. MITRE. “Trusted Relationship, Technique T1199.” MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise, version 2.4, last modified 12 May 2026. attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199/
        10. Board Cybersecurity. Item 1C (Cybersecurity) of International Paper’s 10-Ks for fiscal 2024 and 2025, as reproduced by board-cybersecurity.com, from the filings of 21 Feb. 2025 and 27 Feb. 2026. board-cybersecurity.com/annual-reports/tracker/20250221-international-paper-co-new-cybersecurity-10k