Date
December 29, 2024
Location
Russia + 1 more
Industry
Transportation
Access vector
Not applicable
OT targeting
Indirect: external signal
Primary peril
Collision / Derailment
Impact duration
67 days

Meghna Princess GPS jamming grounding, Baltic, 2024

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: Meghna Princess GPS jamming grounding, Baltic, 2024

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On December 29, 2024, the Bangladeshi bulk carrier Meghna Princess went off course and struck an underwater rock near the Russian port of Ust-Luga, in the Baltic Sea, in what a Bangladeshi officers’ association called GPS jamming[1]. Her hull and propeller were damaged and several tanks flooded, and she stayed on the rocks for about ten weeks[1][2].

        Why it matters. Nothing aboard the ship is reported to have been accessed or compromised. The reported cause is interference with an external satellite signal the ship relies on and cannot authenticate, and the result was physical damage to the vessel[1][3].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. No flag-state, Russian authority or accident-investigation statement on the cause was located, so the account rests on press and union reports, and it reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • The Bangladesh Merchant Marine Officers’ Association (BMMOA) said the ship went off course because of GPS jamming, which The Maritime Executive calls “a common phenomenon in the Baltic”[1].
        • A union newsletter says “incorrect position signals generated by a jamming operation went undetected by the crew”, and a maritime-risk firm read the ship’s AIS track as showing spoofing[3][1].
        • The crew stayed aboard, ran short of food and melted snow for drinking water; salvage help came after pressure from the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)[1].
        • No source attributes the interference to any actor, and no repair, salvage or cargo figure has been disclosed.

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [reported | interference deliberate, vessel not shown targeted]
        • Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | No source names an actor]
        • Access vector: Not applicable [not in path | External GNSS signal, no system accessed]
        • IT impact: Not in path [not in path | No IT system involved]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: External Signal [reported]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No shipboard system compromised]
        • OT impact: Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting [reported | T0832]
        • Perils: Collision / Derailment [primary | grounding]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed]; Products & Materials [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        The Meghna Princess (IMO 9805776) is a Bangladeshi-flagged and crewed bulk carrier operated by Meghna Group, which The Maritime Executive calls Bangladesh’s largest shipowner[4][1]. She had loaded fertilizer at St Petersburg and was due to take on a further 25,000 tonnes at Ust-Luga when, on December 29, 2024, she went off course and struck an underwater rock[1][5].

        The BMMOA, via The Business Standard, said the cause was GPS jamming[1]. The same Maritime Executive article carries an AIS trackline from the maritime-risk firm Pole Star, captioned as showing “clear indications of GPS spoofing, including relocation onto land”[1]. The hull and propeller were damaged and several tanks flooded[1][5].

        The crew appealed to Russian port authorities for an extended period without response. “With pressure from ITF, salvage assistance was finally secured,” and the ship “remained on the rocks for weeks”[1]. Fertilizer Daily says the Baltic branch of the Marine Rescue Service ran the operation with specialty vessels and a diving station, and that about 2,300 tons of fertilizer were unloaded[5]. AIS showed her afloat and moving slowly on March 6, 2025, with a Russian salvage tug nearby[1][2]. The BMMOA president, Capt. Md Anam Chowdhury, said she would be surveyed and taken to dry dock for extensive repairs[5].

        One source disagrees on a basic fact: Fertilizer Daily says the rescue “prevented the ship from grounding”, while The Maritime Executive and Freight News say she remained on the rocks for weeks[5][1][2]. This analysis follows the BMMOA account carried by the latter two. The earliest public report located appeared on March 6, 2025, about ten weeks after the event[1].

        Intent: malicious, but not shown to be aimed at this ship

        Jamming and spoofing are deliberate acts, so the path starts at Malicious. It is shown as reported, because the interference itself is reported by a seafarers’ association and press, not established by an authority[1]. No source says this vessel was the target. Fertilizer Daily says the jammer “inadvertently” threw the ship off course[5], and The Maritime Executive describes GPS jamming as common in the Baltic[1].

        Threat actors: not attributed

        No source attributes this grounding to a named party. GNSS interference across the Baltic is widely associated in open reporting with Russian electronic warfare, but no source here ties the Meghna Princess to it. The grounding happened near a Russian port, with Russian salvage assistance; this analysis notes that context without drawing an inference from it. No threat actor is highlighted on the map.

        Access vector: an external signal, not an intrusion

        There is no access vector in the network-intrusion sense. The reported route is an external satellite navigation signal that reaches every ship in the area without touching any shipboard system[1][3]. No source reports that any system aboard was accessed or compromised. This stage is marked not in path: the attack, if it was one, acted on a shared input the ship consumes, not on the ship.

        IT impact: not in this attack’s path

        No IT system belonging to the ship or its owner is described as affected. No network device, server or workstation was accessed, corrupted or replaced. The equipment aboard kept working; what failed was the integrity of an external input it cannot authenticate. This stage is marked Not in path.

        OT targeting: an external signal

        Nothing belonging to the vessel or its owner was compromised. The reported interference targeted the satellite positioning signal that the ship’s navigation depends on, which makes this an indirect OT impact through an external signal. It is shown as reported, not confirmed, because no authority has stated the cause[1][3].

        The ship’s systems worked as designed on a signal they had no way to check.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        No shipboard system was compromised, so there is no OT technique whose sophistication can be judged. The sources do not even agree on whether the interference was jamming or spoofing: the BMMOA says jamming, while Pole Star’s AIS reading shows the ship relocated onto land, which is a spoofing signature[1]. Jamming denies the signal and spoofing falsifies it. No authority has ruled.

        OT impact: a wrong position on the bridge

        The reported effect is that the bridge was shown a wrong position. MM&P’s Wheelhouse Weekly says “incorrect position signals generated by a jamming operation went undetected by the crew”[3], which describes a wrong position rather than a lost one. In MITRE ATT&CK for ICS terms that is Manipulation of View, shown on the map as reported[6][3]. No source describes what the bridge team saw or did, and no investigation report was located, so whether the crew’s response contributed is not established.

        Perils: grounding

        The primary peril is grounding. The ship struck an underwater rock and stayed on the rocks for weeks, with hull and propeller damage and several flooded tanks[1][5]. MITRE’s Damage to Property technique describes this kind of result[7]. The tank flooding is damage from the strike, not a separate peril. Fertilizer Daily says no oil spill was reported during the rescue[5]; that is a press statement, not an authority’s finding. No fire, sinking, injury or death is reported.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        The physical damage is documented, and none of it is priced. Hull damage, propeller damage, flooded tanks, about 67 days aground, salvage and a disrupted fertilizer cargo are all reported, and no source attaches a figure to any of them[1][5]. After refloating, the ship was to go to dry dock, so the loss of use ran on for an undisclosed time[5]. No source says whether the further 25,000 tonnes were later loaded.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (about 67 days aground, plus dry dock); Cyber-physical event response (salvage by the Marine Rescue Service); Property damage (hull, flooded tanks); Equipment repair and replacement (propeller)
        • Implied: Materials and product loss (fertilizer aboard flooded ship); Startup and return-to-service validation (survey and inspection planned); Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Loss of life; Spills cleanup; Network event response and recovery; Network device replacement; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Embedded device replacement; Industry regulation liability

        Neither Meghna Group nor its insurers have published anything about the cost. No investigation report, detention, penalty or return-to-service approval is recorded in any source.

        What this incident shows

        The Meghna Princess was not hacked. Every system aboard worked as designed; what failed was trust in an external position signal that the ship cannot authenticate[3]. That failure mode, not any particular attacker, is what connects this grounding to the wider problem of GNSS interference.

        The interference was already described as common in the Baltic before this grounding[1], and the incorrect position went undetected by the crew[3]. The fallbacks that would catch it, such as radar and visual position cross-checks and treating satellite positioning as untrusted in the region, are standard recommendations; whether the owner has changed anything is not disclosed.

        References

        1. “Report: GPS Jamming Sent Bangladeshi Bulker Aground in Baltic.” The Maritime Executive, 6 Mar. 2025. maritime-executive.com/article/union-bangladeshi-bulker-grounded-off-ust-luga-and-was-stuck-for-weeks
        2. “Bulker runs aground in Baltic Sea.” Freight News, 7 Mar. 2025. freightnews.co.za/article/bulker-runs-aground-baltic-sea
        3. MM&P. “Wheelhouse Weekly, April 22, 2025.” Bridgedeck, 22 Apr. 2025. bridgedeck.org/wheelhouse-weekly-april-22-2025/
        4. “MEGHNA PRINCESS Bulk Carrier, IMO 9805776.” MarineTraffic. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:5835195/mmsi:405000306/imo:9805776/vessel:MEGHNA_PRINCESS
        5. “Damaged Bangladesh fertilizer carrier rescued by Russian authorities near Ust-Luga port.” Fertilizer Daily, 17 Mar. 2025. fertilizerdaily.com/20250317-damaged-bangladesh-fertilizer-carrier-rescued-by-russian-authorities-near-ust-luga-port
        6. MITRE. “Manipulation of View, Technique T0832 - ICS.” MITRE ATT&CK for ICS (checked 22 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832/
        7. MITRE. “Damage to Property, Technique T0879 - ICS.” MITRE ATT&CK for ICS (checked 22 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879/