Date
May 10, 2025
Location
Saudi Arabia + 1 more
Industry
Transportation
Access vector
External Remote Services
OT targeting
Indirect: external signal
Primary peril
Collision / Derailment
Impact duration
At least 5 days

MSC Antonia grounding and GPS spoofing, Red Sea, 2025

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: MSC Antonia grounding and GPS spoofing, Red Sea, 2025

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. On May 10, 2025, the 304-meter containership MSC Antonia ran aground near Eliza Shoals off Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and was still aground five days later[1][2]. Maritime analytics firms say GPS jamming or spoofing in the Red Sea gave the crew a false position[3][1]. No authority has published a cause.

        Why it matters. Nothing aboard the ship is reported to have been hacked. The attack, as researchers describe it, was on an external signal that the ship’s navigation trusts and cannot authenticate[1].

        About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It rests on trade press and commercial analytics firms; MSC, the Saudi authorities and the Liberian flag state have published no cause, and reporting stops around May 16, 2025. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • The ship ran aground on May 10 and was still aground on May 15, with tugs trying to refloat her. No source gives the refloating date[1][4][2].
        • Windward reported spoofing patterns, and Pole Star Global concluded the ship’s AIS was subject to GPS jamming by fake signals the receiver accepted as genuine. One reported AIS position put the ship about 80 km inland[3][1][5].
        • Several vessels had reported GPS interference in the Red Sea the day before. No source says this ship was singled out, and none names who was behind the interference[1].
        • Pole Star said “every seafarer came through unharmed”. No damage or pollution was confirmed while reporting lasted, and no cost has been disclosed[1][4].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [reported | Deliberate spoofing, per researchers]
        • Threat actors: Not attributed [unknown | No actor named]
        • Access vector: External Remote Services [reported | Spoofed GNSS signals, no intrusion]
        • IT impact: Not in path [not in path | No shipboard system accessed]
        • OT targeting: Indirect: External Signal [reported]
        • OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT system compromised]
        • OT impact: Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting [reported | T0832]
        • Perils: Collision / Derailment [primary | Grounding]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [confirmed]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        MSC Antonia is a Liberian-flagged containership operated by Mediterranean Shipping Company, built in 2009, with a capacity of about 7,000 TEU[3]. W K Webster places the grounding about 20 nautical miles northwest of Jeddah and lists up to 6,969 TEU of cargo aboard[6]. Sources disagree on the voyage. gCaptain says she sailed from Marsa Bashayer, Sudan; Lloyd’s List says she was heading south to Jeddah from Malta on MSC’s West Med to Red Sea service; and the claims firm W.E. Cox says she sailed from Port Said Roads, Egypt[1][7][8].

        The maritime analytics firm Windward reported spoofing patterns that it believed contributed to the grounding[3][9][10]. Lloyd’s List reported that AIS data showed signs of GPS jamming before the grounding[7], and a Lloyd’s List Intelligence casualty report noted large jumps in the AIS position, one placing the ship about 80 km inland near Al Ju’aydah[5]. Pole Star Global then reviewed the data. Its Captain Steve Bomgardner said “we also concluded that the vessel’s AIS was subject to GPS jamming”, and explained: “This happens when a threat actor introduces fake signals which the GPS unit picks up as genuine, therefore giving the vessel’s crew an inaccurate picture of where they are”[1].

        The ship was still aground on May 15, with tugs trying to refloat her, and she appeared to be listing[4][2]. MSC made no public statement on the cause or on damage[4][11]. As of October 2026, no statement from MSC, the Saudi authorities or the Liberian flag registry, and no casualty investigation report, had been found.

        Intent: deliberate interference, as reported

        Spoofing is deliberate: someone has to transmit the fake signals. But that spoofing caused this grounding is the researchers’ reading, not an authority’s, so intent is shown as reported rather than confirmed. No source says this vessel was a chosen target. On May 9, the day before, UK Maritime Trade Operations said it had received “a number of corroborating reports from vessels experiencing GPS interference” in the Red Sea[1]. What the interference was meant to achieve is not known.

        Threat actors: not attributed

        No source names an actor. Pole Star’s Steve Bomgardner refers only to “a threat actor”[1]. Several vessels reported interference in the Red Sea the day before, and no source says this ship was singled out[1]. No authority has attributed the interference, and no threat actor is highlighted on the map.

        Access vector: a radio signal, not an intrusion

        No shipboard system is reported to have been accessed. The route, as researchers describe it, was fake satellite-navigation signals sent from outside the ship and accepted by its GPS receiver as genuine[1][3]. Civil GNSS is unauthenticated by design, so the receiver had no means of telling them apart.

        Spoofing does not fit the usual intrusion vectors. It is shown here as External Remote Services, reported, because it reached the ship’s systems over the air from outside. Sources use “jamming” and “spoofing” loosely; what Bomgardner describes, fake signals accepted as real, is spoofing[1].

        IT impact: not in this attack’s path

        No source reports that any shipboard network, server or workstation was accessed, corrupted or rebuilt. Pole Star reached its view by reviewing tracking data, not by working aboard[1], and Windward’s analysis also came from tracking data[3]. There was no network to investigate, contain or recover. This stage is marked Not in path.

        OT targeting: an attack on an external signal

        Nothing belonging to the ship was compromised. What was attacked, as researchers report it, was a shared external signal that the vessel’s navigation depends on and implicitly trusts, sent through a public medium and reaching every receiver in range[1]. The ship does not own or contract the satellite constellation, cannot authenticate civil GNSS, and was not, on any source, singled out. That makes this an indirect consequence through an external signal. It is shown as reported, because no authority has confirmed the cause.

        OT sophistication: not applicable

        Sophistication is graded only for a direct compromise of OT, and no shipboard system was compromised. For the record, Bomgardner called this interference “unsophisticated” compared with other recent attacks[1]. This stage is marked Not in path.

        OT impact: a false picture of position

        The effect was on what the crew saw. Bomgardner says the fake signals gave the crew “an inaccurate picture of where they are”[1], and Lloyd’s List Intelligence reported AIS position jumps, including one about 80 km inland[5]. MITRE ATT&CK has no technique for spoofing an external satellite signal, so the effect is mapped to the closest match, Manipulation of View, T0832[12], shown as Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting.

        The protection layer that could have caught a false position is the bridge watch, cross-checking GNSS against other means. Whether the bridge team did so is not known; in this case the grounding was not prevented.

        The ship’s systems worked as designed; they were fed a position that was not true.

        Perils: grounding

        The primary peril is grounding, shown on the map as Collision / Derailment. The ship ran aground near Eliza Shoals on May 10, 2025[6][1]. Press reported that she appeared to list afterward[4], but no source reports sinking, capsizing, collision, fire or pollution. Bomgardner said “every seafarer came through unharmed”[1]. A 304-meter vessel run onto a shoal is a scenario with a much worse plausible ending.

        Financial losses: nothing disclosed

        No figure of any kind, for salvage, off-hire, cargo delay, survey or hull repair, has been disclosed by MSC or any other source. Reporting stops around May 16, 2025, before any of it would have been known. The voyage halted for at least five days with up to 6,969 TEU of cargo aboard, and W.E. Cox said cargo deliveries would likely be delayed[6][8]. Tugs were seen trying to refloat the ship[4][11].

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (voyage halted at least five days); Cyber-physical event response (tugs attempting to refloat)
        • Implied: Startup and return-to-service validation (survey before returning to service); Voluntary improvements
        • Not supported: Property damage (none reported, no survey public); Loss of life; Spills and cleanup; Network event response and recovery; Network device replacement; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Embedded device replacement; Regulatory action or liability

        Claims firms said general average or salvage issues may arise, and W.E. Cox said it expected significant cargo loss and damage, but that is a forecast. No source reports a salvage contract or a general average declaration[6][8]. The absence of reported damage is not evidence of no damage.

        What this incident shows

        MSC Antonia is a case where the attacker, as researchers describe it, never touched the victim. The ship’s receiver accepted signals it had no means of authenticating and reported them faithfully[1]. The risk sat in a shared input that the operator consumes but does not own or control.

        That leaves the people on the bridge as the protection layer. Pole Star said the case “highlights the need for good watch keeping” and for awareness of the risks from electronic warfare[1]. Whether this crew cross-checked its position against other means is not known, and no authority has published findings.

        References

        1. Schuler, Mike. “Pole Star Confirms GPS Interference Caused MSC ANTONIA Grounding.” gCaptain, 15 May 2025. gcaptain.com/pole-star-confirms-gps-interference-caused-msc-antonia-grounding/
        2. MI News Network. “Intelligence Firm Confirms GPS Spoofing Responsible For MSC Antonia Grounding.” Marine Insight, 16 May 2025. marineinsight.com/shipping-news/intelligence-firm-confirms-gps-spoofing-responsible-for-msc-antonia-grounding/
        3. “MSC Antonia Runs Aground in Red Sea Amid GPS Spoofing Concerns.” WorldCargo News, 13 May 2025. worldcargonews.com/shipping-logistics/2025/05/msc-antonia-runs-aground-in-red-sea-amid-gps-spoofing-concerns/
        4. MI News Network. “MSC Container Ship Stranded In Red Sea After Suspected GPS Spoofing.” Marine Insight, 14 May 2025. marineinsight.com/?p=1869218
        5. Booth, Liz. “Spoofing Grounding.” Maritime Risk International, June 2025 issue. i-law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?id=448434
        6. W K Webster. “MSC ANTONIA.” Casualty notice, 10 May 2025. wkwebster.com/casualty-details/669/msc-antonia
        7. “MSC-Operated Boxship Runs Aground off Jeddah.” Lloyd’s List, May 2025. lloydslist.com/LL1153446/MSC-operated-boxship-runs-aground-off-Jeddah
        8. W.E. Cox Claims Group. “New Casualty: MSC ANTONIA: Grounding.” Claims notice, May 2025. wecoxclaimsgroup.com/?p=6471
        9. Container News Team. “MSC Antonia Grounding Tied to Escalating GPS Jamming near Jeddah.” Container News, 13 May 2025. container-news.com/msc-antonia-grounding/
        10. Chambers, Sam. “MSC Ship Aground off Jeddah, Likely Victim of GPS Spoofing.” Splash247, 13 May 2025, as reposted by the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. rntfnd.org/2025/05/14/msc-ship-aground-off-jeddah-likely-victim-of-gps-spoofing-splash/
        11. McMillan, Aaron. “MSC Antonia Incident: The Risks From Electronic Warfare.” Supply Chain Digital, 15 May 2025. supplychaindigital.com/supply-chain-risk-management/msc-antonia-risks-electronic-warfare
        12. MITRE. “Manipulation of View, T0832” (detection strategy DET0785). MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, accessed 22 Oct. 2026. attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0785