- Date
- September 19, 2025
- Location
- United States + 4 more
- Industry
- Transportation
- Access vector
- Credential Theft
- OT targeting
- Indirect: supply chain
- Primary peril
- None
- Impact duration
- 10 days
Collins Aerospace MUSE ransomware at European airports, 2025

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. From the night of September 19, 2025, ransomware on the systems behind Collins Aerospace’s MUSE passenger processing software stopped automated check-in and bag drop at Heathrow, Brussels and Berlin Brandenburg, with Dublin and Cork also affected[1][2]. Airports checked passengers in by hand, and Brussels canceled flights until September 28[3].
Why it matters. No airport says its own systems were breached. The disruption spread through one shared vendor platform, to several countries at the same moment[4][5].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. Two intrusions are in play, a ransomware attack and a data theft, and the sources do not establish that the same group carried out both. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- RTX, Collins Aerospace’s parent, told the SEC that a “product cybersecurity incident involving ransomware” hit systems that support MUSE and run outside its enterprise network, and that customers shifted to back-up or manual processes[1].
- By September 20, at least 29 departures and arrivals had been canceled across Heathrow, Berlin and Brussels; on September 23, 88% to 94% of flights were delayed at the four main airports[2][6].
- Dublin Airport’s operator says a file of August boarding-pass data was on the compromised server and may have been exposed online. The Everest group claims 1,533,900 passenger records[5][7].
- No one has said how the ransomware got in or who deployed it, and no one has disclosed a loss in money[1][7].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Cyber Criminals [reported | Everest, data theft claim only]
- Access vector: Credential Theft [reported | T1078, data theft only, per Everest]
- IT impact: Malware [confirmed | Ransomware]; Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1486]; System Outage [confirmed | MUSE check-in]; Data Exfiltration [reported | T1657, Everest’s claim]
- OT targeting: Indirect: Supply Chain [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Not applicable [not in path | No OT compromise]
- OT impact: None [not in path | No OT or baggage-handling impact]
- Perils: No Perils [confirmed | No physical event]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | No amount]; Privacy [confirmed | No amount]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Hardware Bricking [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]; Reputation Damage [implied]
What happened
Collins Aerospace, an RTX subsidiary, operates MUSE, a common-use passenger processing platform that lets several airlines share the same check-in desks and boarding gates. RTX dates the earliest event to September 19, 2025[1]. That Friday night, automated check-in and bag drop failed at Heathrow, Brussels Airport and Berlin Brandenburg. Dublin Airport said a “Europe-wide software issue” caused minor impacts at Dublin and Cork, while Frankfurt, Zurich and the Paris airports reported no impact[2].
Airports switched to manual check-in. By Al Jazeera’s report on September 20, at least 29 departures and arrivals had been canceled across Heathrow, Berlin and Brussels, according to Cirium data[2]. Brussels was hit hardest: its spokesperson said 25 departures and 13 arrivals were canceled on September 20, and 45 departures and 30 arrivals on September 21[8]. Brussels later said cancellations ran from September 20 to 28, and that a new check-in and boarding system planned for November 2025 “was fully rolled out in record time”[3]. ENISA, the EU cybersecurity agency, said the disruption was “caused by third-party ransomware incident”[9]. The UK National Crime Agency arrested a man in his forties in West Sussex on September 23, on suspicion of Computer Misuse Act offences, and released him on conditional bail[10].
Data was also taken. Dublin Airport’s operator, daa, said Collins alerted it on September 18, the day before the outage. One file on the compromised server held boarding-pass data for August 1 to 31, and on October 17 daa was told it may have been exposed online by a criminal group[5]. Hudson Rock reports, from the Everest group’s own published chats, that Everest entered through a Collins FTP server on September 10 with old stolen credentials, and treats that as a breach separate from the ransomware[7].
Intent: malicious
RTX and ENISA both describe a ransomware incident, which settles that the attack was deliberate[1][9]. Hudson Rock reports, from chat logs Everest published, that Everest contacted RTX on September 15 and negotiated with an RTX representative from September 17 until talks stalled[7]. That rests on the attackers’ own material. No demand amount and no payment have been disclosed by RTX, Collins or any authority.
Threat actors: not established
No authority has named who deployed the ransomware. The Everest group claims the data theft, but Hudson Rock describes Everest’s intrusion as separate from the ransomware attack that shut the systems down[7]. The UK National Crime Agency’s arrest of a man in West Sussex is the only enforcement step reported, and the agency said its investigation “is in its early stages and remains ongoing”[10]. No charge is reported in the sources. Cyber Criminals is shown as reported, on Everest’s claim to the data theft only, and attribution is classed as suspected.
Access vector: not established for the ransomware
RTX, ENISA and the National Crime Agency have not said how the ransomware got in[1][9][10]. That part of the path is unknown.
For the data theft there is a reported route. Hudson Rock says, from Everest’s own account, that Everest logged in to a Collins FTP server from September 10 to 11, 2025, with credentials captured by infostealer malware on an employee’s computer in 2022[7]. That is shown as Credential Theft, reported, and it applies to the data theft, not to the outage.
IT impact: ransomware on the MUSE systems
RTX confirms ransomware on the systems that support MUSE, and says they operate outside the RTX enterprise network[1]. The map shows Malware, Data Sabotage (MITRE’s data encrypted for impact, the behavior that defines ransomware) and System Outage as confirmed, because ransomware stopped the check-in systems. Neither RTX nor ENISA names the ransomware strain or describes the encryption[1][9]. Waterfall Security Solutions’ 2026 OT Cyber Threat Report says the attack encrypted over 1,000 computers and disrupted some airports for as much as 16 days; no primary source repeats either figure.
Data Exfiltration is shown as reported. daa confirms a file of passenger data on the compromised server, but only that it may have been exposed; the 1,533,900-record count is Everest’s claim[5][7].
OT targeting: through a shared supplier
This is a supply chain case. Heathrow said the system “is not owned or operated by Heathrow”[4], Berlin cited “a systems outage at a service provider”[8], and daa found “no evidence at this time of any direct impact on DAA systems”[5]. No airport says it was attacked. A shared service provider was, and the consequence reached every operator that depended on it, in four countries, at once.
OT sophistication: not applicable
No operational technology was compromised, so there is no OT technique to grade. Passenger processing is an IT service, and the sources describe the ransomware only as affecting the systems behind the MUSE check-in software[1]. The stage is marked not in path.
OT impact: none established
Bag drop stopped, and bag drop sits closer to an airport’s baggage handling system than pure IT does. But no source describes any compromise of baggage-handling control, and the airports say the system that failed was a supplier’s, not theirs[4][5]. No control device or controller is described as corrupted, reflashed or replaced. This analysis does not infer an OT impact, and the stage is marked not in path.
Perils: none
There was no physical event. RTX says the incident affected the systems behind its check-in software and that customers shifted to back-up or manual processes[1]. No source reports damage to aircraft, airport equipment or baggage systems, or any fire, release or injury. The map shows No Perils.
One vendor’s platform was enough to send several national hubs back to pen and paper at the same time.
Financial losses: no figure from anyone
No amount in money has been disclosed by Collins, RTX or any affected airport or airline. RTX says the incident “has not had a material impact and is not reasonably expected to have a material impact,” and names possible remediation costs without an amount[1]. The losses that are documented fall mostly on the airports and airlines, and are counted in flights, not currency.
The workarounds were real. Brussels checked passengers in “with pen and paper, as well as laptops and iPads,” and on September 24 still relied on alternatives to traditional check-in[11][12]. Heathrow apologized to travelers on X[13]. No claim, settlement or litigation against Collins or RTX is disclosed.
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost and delayed flights at the affected airports (borne by airports and airlines); Contingent business interruption at Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin, Dublin and Cork; Manual check-in workarounds; Response to the Dublin passenger data incident; Third-party impact on the traveling public (the same cancellations, not additive)
- Implied: Business interruption liability; Contract and service-level obligations; Startup and return-to-service validation; Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Network event response and recovery; Ransom or extortion; Voluntary improvements; Public relations response; Customer retention
- Not supported: Network device replacement; Embedded device replacement; Information privacy liability; Privacy regulatory action; Industry regulation liability
daa reported the data incident to Ireland’s Data Protection Commission on September 19, 2025[5]. That is a notification, not an action, and no investigation or fine by any data protection authority is reported.
What this incident shows
This is a clear case of concentration risk in a supply chain: one software platform, four countries and about ten days of disruption, with no airport’s own systems breached[1][3]. Common-use passenger processing exists so that desks are not tied to one airline, and that same shared quality is what let the failure spread.
The fallback is what limited the damage. RTX said from the start that the impact could be mitigated with manual check-in, and the airports used it[2][1]. Had there been no manual process to fall back to, the same technical event would have done more harm. For an outage this public, the absence of any disclosed loss in money is itself a notable finding.
References
- RTX Corporation. Form 8-K, Item 8.01 (Other Events). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 24 Sept. 2025. sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/101829/000010182925000036/rtx-20250919.htm
- “Cyberattack Hits Check-in Systems at Some of Europe’s Busiest Airports.” Al Jazeera, 20 Sept. 2025. aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/20/cyberattack-hits-check-in-systems-at-some-of-europes-busiest-airports
- Brussels Airport. “2.3 Million Passengers at Brussels Airport in September, an Increase of 1%.” Brussels Airport Press Room, 9 Oct. 2025. pressroom.brusselsairport.be/en-results-september
- Sharma, Shweta. “European Airports Continue to Crawl After a Cyberattack on Collins’ MUSE Systems.” CSO Online, 22 Sept. 2025. csoonline.com/article/4060804/european-airports-continue-to-crawl-after-a-cyberattack-on-collins-muse-systems.html
- Pepper, Diarmuid. “Dublin Airport Passenger Data Could Be Compromised Following Cyber Breach by Criminal Gang.” TheJournal.ie, 24 Oct. 2025. thejournal.ie/dublin-airprit-daa-collins-aerospace-6855100-Oct2025/
- Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo. “European Airports Still Dealing With Disruptions Days After Ransomware Attack.” TechCrunch, 23 Sept. 2025. techcrunch.com/2025/09/23/european-airports-still-dealing-with-disruptions-days-after-ransomware-attack
- InfoStealers (Hudson Rock). “Collins Aerospace Hit Twice: 2022 Infostealer Infection Enabled a Separate Breach.” InfoStealers, 23 Oct. 2025. infostealers.com/article/collins-aerospace-hit-twice-2022-infostealer-infection-enabled-a-separate-breach/
- “European Airports Slowly Get Back Online After Cyberattack Targeted Check-in Systems.” CBS News (with AP), 21 Sept. 2025. cbsnews.com/news/airport-heathrow-berlin-brussels-cyberattack-check-in-recovery/
- “EU Cyber Agency Confirms Ransomware Attack Causing Airport Disruptions.” TechCrunch, 22 Sept. 2025. techcrunch.com/2025/09/22/eu-cyber-agency-confirms-ransomware-attack-causing-airport-disruptions/
- National Crime Agency. “UK Arrest Following Aerospace Cyber Incident.” National Crime Agency, 24 Sept. 2025. nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/uk-arrest-following-aerospace-cyber-incident
- Chini, Maïthé. “Cyberattack at Brussels Airport: Everything We Know So Far.” The Brussels Times, 22 Sept. 2025. brusselstimes.com/belgium/1758929/cyber-attack-at-brussels-airport-everything-we-know-so-far
- “Ransomware Cyberattack: 6% of Flights Cancelled at Brussels Airport.” VRT NWS, 24 Sept. 2025. vrt.be/vrtnws/en/2025/09/24/ransomware-cyberattack-6-of-flights-cancelled-at-brussels-airp/
- “Hundreds of Flights Delayed at Heathrow and Other Airports After Apparent Cyberattack.” TechCrunch, 21 Sept. 2025. techcrunch.com/2025/09/21/hundreds-of-flights-delayed-at-heathrow-and-other-airports-after-apparent-cyberattack


