- Date
- December 29, 2025
- Location
- Poland
- Industry
- Power Generation
- Access vector
- External Remote Services
- OT targeting
- Direct (crude)
- Primary peril
- Bricking
- Impact duration
- 1 day (destructive phase)
Polish energy sector destructive attack, December 2025

The incident path, stage by stage
Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.
Scroll sideways to see every stage.
On this page
Highlights
What happened. On December 29, 2025, during low temperatures and snowstorms, an attacker disabled remote terminal units (RTUs), protection relays and operator computers at at least 30 Polish wind and solar farms, and tried to wipe computers at a large combined heat and power (CHP) plant[1]. A smaller CHP plant had a short-term outage and a private manufacturer was also hit; CERT Polska, Poland’s national computer emergency response team, reports no interruption of heat supply to consumers[2][1].
Why it matters. An attacker deliberately disabled grid automation devices across dozens of sites in one day. It is also a rare case where a defensive control, endpoint detection at the large CHP plant, is documented as having halted the destructive payload[1].
About this analysis. This analysis sets out what is known, stage by stage. It rests mainly on CERT Polska’s two reports, and no victim has been named. This account reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.
Highlights
- At the farms, the attacker logged into devices with default credentials, uploaded corrupted firmware to RTUs, deleted files on RTUs and relays and ran a wiper on operator computers. The farms lost communication with the distribution system operators, but generation continued[1].
- At the large CHP plant, which supplies heat to nearly half a million customers, endpoint detection and response (EDR) software blocked the wiper after it had started on more than 100 machines[1].
- CERT Polska’s August 2026 supplement disclosed a smaller CHP plant, reached through a misconfigured private mobile network, where a steam turbine and the water treatment system were shut down for a short time[2].
- CERT Polska links the attack infrastructure to the cluster tracked as Static Tundra; ESET attributes the wiper to Sandworm at medium confidence. No government has made an attribution[1][3].
Attack flow
- Updated: 2026-10-22
- Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
- Threat actors: Nation-State [reported | Russian state-linked; sources differ]
- Access vector: External Remote Services [confirmed | T1133, VPN without MFA; private APN]; Credential Theft [confirmed | T1078, valid accounts]; Default / Weak Credentials [confirmed | T1694.001, on OT devices]
- IT impact: Data Sabotage [confirmed | T1485, wipers]; Malware [confirmed | DynoWiper, LazyWiper]; Firmware Manipulation [confirmed | T1693.001]; Credential Manipulation [confirmed | T0892]; Data Exfiltration [confirmed | large CHP plant]
- OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
- OT sophistication: Crude [confirmed | destructive, not deceptive]
- OT impact: Loss / Denial of Control [confirmed | T0827]; Inhibit Response [confirmed | T1693.001, T0892, T0809]; Loss / Denial of View [inferred | T0829]
- Perils: Bricking [primary | permanence not established]
- Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed | short outage]; Assets & Equipment [confirmed]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [implied]; Data Loss [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]
What happened
CERT Polska’s incident report of January 30, 2026 places the destructive phase on December 29, 2025, shortly before New Year’s Eve. At the large CHP plant, attacker activity had been observed several months earlier. At the farms, the attacker held administrative privileges on the FortiGate firewalls that served as VPN concentrators; CERT Polska does not say how or when it got them[1].
At at least 30 wind and solar farms the attacker went device by device. It uploaded corrupted firmware to Hitachi RTU560 units, sending them into a reboot loop; ran a delete-all-files command on Mikronika RTUs, which made them fail; deleted files on Hitachi Relion 650 relays so they could not restart; ran the DynoWiper wiper on Mikronika HMI computers; reset Moxa serial device servers and changed their passwords and addresses; and factory-reset the firewalls. The farms lost communication with the distribution system operators and remote control was prevented. Electricity generation continued[1].
At the large CHP plant the attacker stole sensitive information, gained privileged domain accounts and ran the wiper through a Group Policy Object, and EDR blocked it at run time. CERT Polska says the attacker did not achieve its planned effect of interrupting heat supply. At a private manufacturer, the attacker came in through a Fortinet perimeter device and ran a different, PowerShell-based wiper, LazyWiper; CERT Polska calls that target opportunistic[1]. On August 8, 2026, CERT Polska disclosed a parallel attack on a smaller CHP plant supplying heat to 50,000 residents. A steam turbine and the process-water treatment system were shut down, interrupting cogeneration, and the operators’ prompt response limited it to a short-term outage. Heat supply was not disrupted[2].
Intent: malicious
Destruction was the objective. The attacker corrupted firmware, deleted files and ran wipers, and CERT Polska says its planned effect at the large CHP plant was to interrupt heat supply[1]. No ransom demand appears in CERT Polska’s reports or in ESET’s analysis[1][3]. Sensitive information was stolen at the large CHP plant, but no leak or extortion is documented[1].
Threat actors: Russian state-linked, not formally attributed
Two technical assessments point in different directions. CERT Polska finds that the attack infrastructure overlaps with the cluster publicly tracked as Static Tundra, also known as Berserk Bear, Ghost Blizzard and Dragonfly, and calls this the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to it. Its report names no state or agency[1]. MITRE’s campaign page describes Dragonfly as consistent with an FSB threat activity group[4], and Zaufana Trzecia Strona reports that the US Department of Justice has linked the group to the FSB[5].
ESET attributes DynoWiper to Sandworm, which it notes is commonly attributed to GRU Unit 74455, at medium confidence, and says another group may have run the preparatory stages[3]. CERT Polska says the wiper’s similarity to earlier families is too low to attribute it, and that it cannot conclusively determine whether the actor behind Sandworm took part[1]. MITRE lists both views without choosing[4]. No government has issued an attribution and no indictment exists, so Nation-State is shown as reported.
Access vector: VPNs without multi-factor authentication
CERT Polska describes several entry points. Each farm had a FortiGate acting as VPN concentrator and firewall, its VPN interface exposed to the internet and allowing logins to accounts defined in its configuration without multi-factor authentication. At the large CHP plant, the attacker repeatedly connected to the SSL-VPN portal with multiple statically defined accounts. At the manufacturer, access was through a Fortinet perimeter device that had been vulnerable in the past and whose configuration had been stolen and publicly disclosed[1]. The smaller CHP plant’s OT network was reached through a private APN, a private mobile-network access point, misconfigured to allow connections between any devices in it: to CERT Polska’s knowledge, the first such case observed in a real attack[2].
Once inside, the attacker entered RTUs, relays, HMI computers and serial device servers with default credentials[1]. How it first gained administrator rights on the farm firewalls is not known. CERT Polska could not recover complete logs from any compromised device, and ESET has no visibility into initial access[1][3].
IT impact: stolen credentials and wipers
At the large CHP plant the attacker stole sensitive information, dumped the entire Active Directory database and the memory of the LSASS process, stole FortiGate configuration files, and added a firewall rule allowing any traffic to a chosen device with logging disabled[1]. It then ran DynoWiper through a Group Policy Object; ESET saw its samples run from a shared network directory instead, so the sources differ on that detail[1][3]. ESET describes DynoWiper overwriting files with random data, deleting them and forcing a reboot[3]. LazyWiper ran at the manufacturer[1].
On the farm devices, corrupted firmware disabled the RTU560 units, and changed passwords on the serial device servers impeded recovery[1][6].
OT targeting: a direct compromise
The attacker reached and disabled industrial automation devices themselves: RTUs, protection and control relays, HMI computers and serial device servers at the farms, and the OT network of the smaller CHP plant[1][2]. These were not IT systems that operations happened to depend on. That makes this a direct OT compromise.
OT sophistication: crude
The access campaign was not crude: months of activity at the large CHP plant, and administrator control of the farms’ firewalls[1]. The OT actions were. They were destructive, not deceptive: firmware corrupted, files deleted, devices reset to factory settings and set to unreachable addresses[1]. Nothing suppressed an alarm, falsified a reading or pushed a process toward an unsafe state. Sophistication here is graded by how the OT actions were carried out, not by the capability of the adversary, so this stage is Crude.
OT impact: loss of control, and likely of view
Damage to the RTUs was the direct cause of the farms’ lost communication with the distribution system operators, and it prevented remote control. MITRE classifies the effect as Loss of Control, T0827[1][6]. The firmware uploads, password changes and file deletions on the devices sit under MITRE’s Inhibit Response Function tactic and are confirmed[6].
Loss of view is inferred, not reported: the lost link is the one through which the operator performs remote monitoring and supervisory control[1]. At the smaller CHP plant, a steam turbine and the water treatment system were shut down; no technique is described there[2].
Perils: bricking, of unconfirmed permanence
Bricking is the closest peril, and it is kept as primary: Hitachi RTU560 units stuck in a reboot loop, Mikronika RTUs failed and Hitachi Relion relays could not restart[1]. Its fit is not settled. CERT Polska does not say whether the devices could be restored by reflashing or had to be replaced, and gives no count[1]. The smaller CHP plant’s steam turbine and water treatment system were shut down, not damaged[2], so no other peril is recorded.
Default credentials on field devices turned network access into disabled automation at dozens of sites.
Financial losses: no amount published
No operator has been named and none has published a figure. What is confirmed is physical and operational: RTUs, relays, HMI computers, serial device servers and firewalls disabled at at least 30 farms, and a short-term stop of cogeneration at the smaller CHP plant[1][2]. CERT Polska gives no device count and no duration for the outage. Recovery work, from field attendance to recommissioning devices the attacker controlled, is implied but costed nowhere. Part of the response was borne by a national CERT, whose follow-up investigation lasted more than three months[2].
Loss evidence
- Confirmed: Lost output from a short-term cogeneration outage; Equipment repair and replacement (RTUs and relays); Embedded device replacement; Computer and laptop replacement (HMI computers); Network device replacement (serial device servers, firewalls)
- Implied: Manual operations and workarounds; Cyber-physical event response; Startup and return-to-service validation; Production data integrity; Proprietary data recovery; Server replacement; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements; Legally mandated improvements; Regulatory reporting and cooperation
- Not supported: Ransom or extortion; Third-party physical and societal impact (no customer lost heat)
The near miss is the larger story. The heat customers of both CHP plants, nearly half a million at the large plant and 50,000 residents at the smaller one, were exposed to a destructive attack in winter, and none lost heat[1][2].
What this incident shows
The realized loss was small because defenses worked in two places: EDR halted the wiper at the large CHP plant, and operators at the smaller plant kept the outage short[1][2]. At the farms, no independent layer stood between the attacker and the devices it disabled[1].
The access paths CERT Polska documents are ordinary: internet-exposed VPNs without multi-factor authentication, default credentials on RTUs, relays, HMI computers and serial servers, and a private mobile network configured to allow any-to-any connections[1][2]. CERT Polska says that APN configuration was common in Poland and is widely used in other countries, and it issued recommendations for entities that use private APNs[2].
References
- CERT Polska. “Energy Sector Incident Report -- 29 December 2025.” English PDF edition, CERT Polska / NASK, 30 Jan. 2026. cert.pl/uploads/docs/CERT_Polska_Energy_Sector_Incident_Report_2025.pdf
- CERT Polska. “Follow-Up Report of the December 2025 Energy Sector Incident.” CERT Polska / NASK, 8 Aug. 2026. cert.pl/en/posts/2026/08/incident-follow-up-report-energy-sector-2025/
- ESET Research. “DynoWiper update: Technical analysis and attribution.” WeLiveSecurity (ESET), 30 Jan. 2026. welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/dynowiper-update-technical-analysis-attribution/
- MITRE ATT&CK. “2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, Campaign C0063.” MITRE ATT&CK v20, created 22 Apr. 2026, modified 31 July 2026. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0063/
- “Kto i w jaki sposób zaatakował w grudniu 2025 polską infrastrukturę energetyczną [Who attacked Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025, and how].” Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 30 Jan. 2026. zaufanatrzeciastrona.pl/post/kto-i-w-jaki-sposob-zaatakowal-w-grudniu-2025-polska-infrastrukture-energetyczna/
- MITRE ATT&CK. Technique pages T1694.001, T1693.001, T0809, T0827, T0829, T0892, T1686.002 and T1484.001. MITRE ATT&CK v20. attack.mitre.org/techniques/


