Date
July 26–27, 2026
Location
United States
Industry
Water & Wastewater
Access vector
Internet Accessible Device
OT targeting
Direct (sophisticated)
Primary peril
None
Impact duration
Unknown

US water utilities PLC campaign, July 2026

DeNexusIncident analysis
Cover image for the incident analysis: US water utilities PLC campaign, July 2026

The incident path, stage by stage

Each stage of the attack, from intent to financial loss, with this incident’s path highlighted. Solid cells are confirmed, dashed cells are reported by a source but not confirmed, dotted cells are implied by the facts, and Unknown marks what is not publicly known. Click a stage title or a highlighted cell to read that part of the analysis.

Scroll sideways to see every stage.

    IT stagesOT stagesConfirmedPerilReportedImpliedUnknownNot in pathLink not established DeNexus analysis of public sources, as of October 22, 2026
    On this page

      Highlights

        What happened. Over the weekend of July 26 to 27, 2026, attackers reached internet-exposed programmable logic controllers (PLCs) at more than 30 Minnesota community water systems, changing passwords and settings and locking operators out[1][2]. By July 30, the FBI and EPA said water utilities in at least seven states had reported incidents, with effects that included loss of pressure and flooding[3].

        Why it matters. The attackers went straight to field controllers that were reachable from the internet, at many small utilities at once. In the wider PLC activity they have tracked since March 2026, US agencies say critical shutdown and alarm logic was disabled, so that systems could enter unsafe conditions without warning operators[4].

        About this analysis. This analysis covers the July 2026 water wave as one campaign, read against the wider PLC activity US agencies have described since March 2026. It sets out what is known, stage by stage, and reflects the best available information as of October 22, 2026; new information could confirm, change or discredit parts of it.

        Highlights

        • More than 30 Minnesota community water systems were hit on July 26 to 27. In Braham, the well and treatment plant went offline for just under two hours[1][5].
        • The FBI and EPA say utilities in at least seven states reported incidents, with operators losing view, and in some cases function, of connected equipment[3]. ABC News, citing unnamed sources, reported at least 12 states[6].
        • A joint advisory from seven US agencies says that in the wider activity, PLC logic was modified and deleted and shutdown and alarm logic was disabled. It does not say at how many victims, or in which sector[4].
        • No official has attributed the water wave. Security firms and MITRE link it to CyberAv3ngers, a group tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but the US government has not named who was responsible[7][8].

        Attack flow

        • Updated: 2026-10-22
        • Intent: Malicious [confirmed]
        • Threat actors: Nation-State [reported | Iranian-affiliated per CISA; water wave not formally attributed]
        • Access vector: Internet Accessible Device [confirmed | T0883]; Default / Weak Credentials [reported | Minnesota wave, per MITRE]
        • IT impact: Not in path [not in path | No IT network involved]
        • OT targeting: Direct OT Compromise [confirmed]
        • OT sophistication: Sophisticated [confirmed | per CISA AA26-097A]; Crude [confirmed | majority pattern at water utilities]
        • OT impact: Loss / Denial of Control [confirmed | T0813, T0827]; Loss / Denial of View [confirmed | T0815, T0829]; Inhibit Response [confirmed | T0892]; Suppress Alarms [confirmed | T0838]; Loss of Safety [confirmed | T0880]; Manipulate View / Spoof Reporting [confirmed | T0832]; Manipulate Control [inferred | T0831]
        • Perils: Water Damage [reported | flooding, location not stated]
        • Financial losses: Business Interruption [confirmed]; Hardware Bricking [confirmed]; Cyber-Physical Incident Response [implied]; Assets & Equipment [implied]; Data Loss [implied]; Cyber Incident Response [implied]

        What happened

        CISA and six other US agencies first published joint advisory AA26-097A on April 7, 2026. It says that since at least March 2026 they have identified disruptions of internet-exposed PLCs by actors they assess as Iranian-affiliated, in government services and facilities, water and wastewater, and energy. On July 22 it was updated with an “expanded scope of observed targeting”, and it names Rockwell Automation CompactLogix and Micro850, Schneider Electric Modicon M340 and Siemens S7-1200 controllers[4].

        Days later, over the weekend of July 26 to 27, Minnesota IT Services said a coordinated attack had hit more than 30 community water systems, among them Braham, Plymouth, South St. Paul and Maple Plain[1]. Braham said the attack shut down the operating controls for its well and treatment plant; the city posted at 9:34 a.m. on July 27 that the plant was offline, and said it was back online just under two hours later[5]. Residents were asked to minimize water use[9]. Plymouth crews kept operating by manual procedures, South St. Paul put contingency procedures in place, and Maple Plain’s mayor declared a local emergency[1].

        On July 30, the FBI and EPA said water utilities in at least seven states had reported incidents since July 27, and named Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1100 and 1400 PLCs[3]. Michigan’s environment department said nine systems had reported activity consistent with the federal warnings and that “All systems continued to operate safely”[10]. New Jersey’s cybersecurity cell reported two systems, and the Philadelphia Inquirer also listed Wisconsin[11].

        In Georgia, a Clayton County Water Authority pump station failed at about 1 a.m. on July 27, and normal pressure was back by roughly 4 a.m.[12]. The utility issued a precautionary boil-water advisory for parts of north Clayton County and lifted it the next afternoon after testing[13]. Its advisory later spoke of “unauthorized cyber activity that may have caused or contributed to the disruption”, and its spokeswoman said “we can’t confirm that somebody hacked into it”[14][15].

        Intent: malicious

        The activity was deliberate and repeated across many sites. The actors changed controller IP addresses and passwords, and in some cases turned on and set passwords that had not been enabled, which locked operators out[3]. In the wider activity, they extracted PLC project files and modified and deleted control logic[4]. No ransom demand, extortion or claim of responsibility is reported.

        Threat actors: suspected, not formally attributed

        No official has attributed the July water wave. The FBI and EPA name no actor and speak only of “malicious cyber actors”[3]; MITRE’s campaign entry for the Minnesota wave says it is “not formally attributed”[2]; and NPR reported on August 12 that the US government had not officially named who was responsible[8].

        For the wider PLC activity, the agencies behind AA26-097A say they “assess a group of Iranian-affiliated APT actors is conducting this activity”. The advisory names CyberAv3ngers, which it ties to the IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command, only as the actor behind an earlier campaign that began in November 2023[4]. The link from CyberAv3ngers to the 2026 water wave comes from security firms, among them WaterISAC, SafeBreach, Picus Security and Tenable, and from MITRE’s group page, which cites Tenable[7]. The map therefore shows Nation-State as reported, not confirmed.

        Access vector: controllers exposed to the internet

        Exposure is confirmed. The FBI and EPA say the actors acted “After remotely accessing internet-facing devices”[3]. AA26-097A says they reached internet-exposed PLCs with the vendors’ own configuration software (Studio 5000 Logix Designer, EcoStruxure Control Expert and TIA Portal), run from leased, third-party hosted infrastructure, over ports 44818, 2222, 102 and 502[4]. MITRE places the Minnesota PLCs at water towers and sewer lift stations, including cellular-connected sites[2].

        How the logins succeeded is less clear. MITRE says the Minnesota logins used default credentials[2]. The FBI and EPA do not say how, but report that in some cases the actors turned on and set passwords, which means some devices had none[3]. Default credentials are shown as reported. AA26-097A says it “is not highlighting a new vulnerability” and names no CVE[4]; Tenable and Picus Security link the activity to CVE-2021-22681, an authentication bypass in Rockwell Logix controllers disclosed in 2021, a link the advisory itself does not make.

        IT impact: not in this attack’s path

        No source describes a pivot from a corporate IT network. The actors went directly to field controllers, running their configuration software from leased infrastructure rather than from a victim server[4]. No server, workstation or laptop at any affected utility is described as compromised, wiped or rebuilt. In one instance the actors installed Dropbear SSH software on victim modems to gain remote access through port 22[4]; that touched communications equipment at field sites, not the utilities’ IT systems. This stage is marked Not in path.

        OT targeting: a direct compromise

        In every source reviewed, the first systems touched were the PLCs themselves: controllers at water towers, sewer lift stations and, in Braham, a well and treatment plant[2][5]. The attack acted on the equipment that runs the water process, not on IT systems the utilities depend on. That makes this a direct OT compromise.

        The attackers needed no IT network: the controllers themselves were on the internet.

        OT sophistication: crude at most sites, sophisticated in places

        The sources describe two levels of activity. The FBI and EPA describe a comparatively crude pattern at water utilities: IP-address and password changes that caused “a loss of view, and in some cases function”, and prompted a shift to manual operation. They add that at least one organization found modified PLC project files after noticing ladder logic discrepancies across several sites[3].

        AA26-097A describes more. After extracting project files, the FBI and CISA found logic modified and deleted, including Add-On Instructions (reusable logic modules), data manipulated on HMI and SCADA displays, and “critical shutdown and alarm logic” disabled. At one US victim, a malicious project file “retained ladder logic for downstream function” but overrode the instruction sets that kept operations within safe limits[4]. The advisory does not say at how many victims this happened, or that they were water utilities.

        We classify the campaign as sophisticated, because that capability was demonstrated within it, while noting that most water victims on record saw only the crude pattern.

        OT impact: lockouts, lost view and disabled safety logic

        The lockouts are confirmed. Changed passwords and IP addresses cost operators view, and in some cases function, of connected equipment[3]. Plymouth reported communications affected at two water towers[1], and Braham’s plant controls were shut down[5]. On the map that is Loss / Denial of Control and of View, with the credential changes under Inhibit Response. MITRE reads the IP-address changes as Modify Parameter; that mapping is its own[2].

        The deeper effects come from AA26-097A, for victims it does not count or name by sector. The disabled shutdown and alarm logic allowed “systems to enter unsafe conditions without notifying operators”, shown as Suppress Alarms and Loss of Safety. The advisory reports data manipulation on HMI and SCADA displays, without saying the values were falsified[4]. Manipulate Control is inferred from the one victim whose malicious project file overrode its safe-operating instructions.

        Perils: loss of supply, flooding unplaced

        The main consequence was loss of supplied water, not physical damage. Braham’s plant was offline for about two hours, and at Clayton County pressure was lost for about three hours[5][12]. No primary physical peril is shown on the map.

        The FBI and EPA say effects reported to them included flooding, but not where, what flooded or where the water came from, so it is shown as reported water damage and cannot be placed in a chain[3]. They also warn that pressure loss could potentially allow untreated ground water to seep into pipes; the one tested case, Clayton County, came back negative, so contamination is not shown[13]. No confirmed water contamination, injury or death has been reported at any site.

        Financial losses: what it cost

        No utility has disclosed a cost, and no federal source gives a total. AA26-097A says only that “In a few cases, this activity caused operational disruption and financial loss”[4]. The loss is spread across many small public water systems, each absorbing costs too small to disclose. The confirmed items below are operational facts; every amount is missing.

        Loss evidence

        • Confirmed: Lost revenue and productivity (service interruption); Manual operations and workarounds; Third-party physical and societal impact (one boil-water advisory, water-use restrictions); Network device replacement (modems carrying attacker-installed software); Embedded device replacement (PLC logic and settings altered)
        • Implied: Cyber-physical event response; Startup and return-to-service validation; Proprietary data response and recovery (PLC project files); Industry regulation liability; Network event response and recovery; Voluntary improvements; Legally mandated improvements
        • Not supported: Server replacement; Computer and laptop replacement; Bodily injury; Loss of life; Spills cleanup; Environmental regulation liability; Ransom extortion

        The documented public burden is small. One boil-water advisory, of hedged causation, covered three or four communities in north Clayton County for about a day to a day and a half[13][12], and Braham, a town of about 1,700 people, was asked to conserve water while its plant was offline[10][9]. Minnesota IT Services said “There are no requests for residents to change their water drinking habits”[16].

        What this incident shows

        Every federal and independent account agrees on the access point: PLCs from three unrelated manufacturers, at dozens of utilities, reachable from the internet with no perimeter protection[4][3]. AA26-097A’s mitigations lead with taking PLCs off the internet[4], and the FBI and EPA tell operators to replace end-of-life devices[3]. For controllers that cannot be fully patched, reachability is the control that matters.

        The campaign also ran from at least March 2026 to wide public attention in late July before its scale became clear[4]. Where the logic itself was changed, AA26-097A tells operators to compare the running program against known-good logic, which suggests the change was not obvious from normal operation[4]. What limited the harm at the water utilities on record was people: operators who kept systems running by manual procedures[1].

        References

        1. George, Erick. “Cyberattack hits more than 30 Minnesota community water systems.” Valley News Live (KVLY), 28 July 2026. valleynewslive.com/2026/07/28/cyberattack-hits-more-than-30-minnesota-community-water-systems/
        2. MITRE. “2026 U.S. Water Utilities Attacks, Campaign C0066.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20, created 8 Oct. 2026. attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0066/
        3. FBI and EPA. “Public Service Announcement I-073026-PSA.” Internet Crime Complaint Center, 30 July 2026. ic3.gov/PSA/2026/PSA260730.pdf
        4. CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA, DOE, USCYBERCOM-CNMF and Treasury. “Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across U.S. Critical Infrastructure.” Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA26-097A, 7 Apr. 2026, updated 22 July 2026. ic3.gov/CSA/2026/260722.pdf
        5. WCCO / CBS News Minnesota. “‘Coordinated cyberattack’ targeted 30-plus Minnesota water systems.” CBS News, 28 July 2026. cbsnews.com/minnesota/news/cyberattack-malware-braham-water-plant-outage/
        6. ABC News. “At least 12 states face cyberattacks on their water systems, sources say.” Good Morning America, 4 Aug. 2026. goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/12-states-face-cyberattacks-water-systems-sources-135348482
        7. MITRE. “CyberAv3ngers, Group G1027.” MITRE ATT&CK, v20 (accessed 21 Oct. 2026). attack.mitre.org/groups/G1027
        8. McLaughlin, Jenna. “Are hacks of U.S. water facilities a new front in the Iran war?” NPR, 12 Aug. 2026, as carried by Georgia Public Broadcasting. gpb.org/news/2026/08/12/are-hacks-of-us-water-facilities-new-front-in-the-iran-war
        9. “Cyberattack briefly shuts down Braham water plant.” Isanti-Chisago County Star, July 2026. isanti-chisagocountystar.com/news/cyberattack-briefly-shuts-down-braham-water-plant/article_a9192bd1-434c-43e8-a338-fed0d7d225e9.html
        10. Casey, Michael. “Michigan joins Minnesota in reporting cyberattacks on water systems; FBI investigating.” Associated Press, 1 Aug. 2026, as carried by WCAX. wcax.com/2026/08/01/michigan-joins-minnesota-reporting-cyberattacks-water-systems-fbi-investigating/
        11. Savage, Henry, and Robert Moran. “New Jersey water systems cyberattack.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 Aug. 2026. inquirer.com/news/new-jersey/new-jersey-water-systems-cyberattack-nationwide-20260805.html
        12. FOX 5 Atlanta. “Pump station failure leads to boil water advisory in north Clayton.” FOX 5 Atlanta, 27 July 2026. fox5atlanta.com/news/pump-station-failure-leads-boil-water-advisory-north-clayton
        13. Atlanta News First. “Parts of Clayton County under boil water advisory.” Atlanta News First, 27 July 2026, updated 28 July 2026. atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/07/27/parts-clayton-county-under-boil-water-advisory/
        14. Atlanta News First. “Clayton County boil water advisory possibly related to cyberattack.” Atlanta News First, 3 Aug. 2026. atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/08/04/clayton-county-boil-water-advisory-possibly-related-cyberattack/
        15. Tagami, Ty. “Metro Atlanta water authority investigates outage as federal authorities warn of Iran-linked hackers.” Capitol Beat News Service, 4 Aug. 2026. capitol-beat.org/2026/08/metro-atlanta-water-authority-investigates-outage-as-federal-authorities-warn-of-iran-linked-hackers/
        16. ABC News. “Minnesota Water Systems Hit With Cyberattack, State Officials Say.” Republished by Homeland Security Today, July 2026. hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/cybersecurity/minnesota-water-systems-hit-with-cyberattack-state-officials-say/